People v. Sanders

• Citation: 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630,73 P.3d 496,31 Cal.4th 318
• Decision Date: 31 July 2003
• Docket Number: No. S094088.,S094088.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arlene Dena SANDERS et al., Defendants and Appellants.

2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630

73 P.3d 496

31 Cal.4th 318

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arlene Dena SANDERS et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. S094088.

Supreme Court of California.

July 31, 2003.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing October 22, 2003.

J. Peter Axelrod, Santa Rosa, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Arlene Dena Sanders.

Elizabeth M. Campbell, Sacramento, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Kenton Michael McDaniel.

Alan L. Schlosser; Kathy Kahn and John T. Phillipsborn, San Francisco, for American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California and California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Law Offices of the Alternate Defender, Jose R. Villarreal, San Jose, Ronald A. Norman and Stephen Elrick for California Public Defenders Association and Alternate Defender Office as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Robert P. Whitlock, Leah Ann Alcazar, John G. McLean and Doris A. Calandra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Steve Cooley, District Attorney (Los Angeles), George M. Palmer, Head Deputy District Attorney, Brentford J. Ferreira and Phyllis C. Asayama, Deputy District Attorneys, for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

MORENO, J.

In In re Martinez (1970) 1 Cal.3d 641, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734 we held that the warrantless search of a residence could not be justified as a parole search if the police did not know of the suspect's parole status when they conducted the search. In In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519 we declined to follow the reasoning of Martinez and instead upheld the warrantless search of the person of a juvenile who was on juvenile probation and subject to a search condition of which the police were unaware at the time of the search. In People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 800, 97 Cal. Rptr.2d 914, 3 P.3d 311, we held that the search of a residence could not be justified by the circumstance that the defendant's brother, who lived in the residence, was on probation and subject to a search condition of which the police were unaware at the time of the search.

In the present case, police searched the residence of two persons, one of whom was on parole and subject to a search condition of which the police were unaware at the time of the search. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that evidence seized during the search must be suppressed as to both defendants.

FACTS

Defendants Arlene Sanders and Kenton McDaniel were charged by information with possession for sale of cocaine base in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5. The information further alleged that McDaniel had suffered a prior conviction of the same offense. Defendants moved to suppress evidence, and a hearing was conducted at which the following evidence was presented.

On April 6, 1999, Bakersfield Police Officers Glen Davis and Scott Thatcher responded to a report of a disturbance at an apartment building. They spoke to the building manager, who indicated that there was a fight going on in defendants' apartment. As they approached the apartment, Officer Davis heard a man and woman inside yelling at each other. Officer Thatcher knocked on the door. The yelling stopped and, a short time later, Sanders peeked out through some blinds. Officer Thatcher knocked again and ordered the occupants to open the door. After a short delay, Sanders opened the door. She had an abrasion on her face, and McDaniel was nearby, standing behind a couch. The officers entered the apartment. They saw McDaniel place something behind a couch cushion. Officer Thatcher caught a glimpse of something metal. Sanders demanded that the officers leave and began "tussling" with Officer Thatcher. McDaniel also demanded that the officers leave and moved toward Officer Thatcher, telling him to leave Sanders alone. The officers handcuffed both defendants.

Officer Davis then conducted a "protective sweep" of the apartment "to make sure there [was] no one else in the residence that could endanger [the officers'] safety." In one of the bedrooms, the closet door was open and Officer Davis saw a pair of work boots. One of the boots "had a bunch of plastic bags stuffed into it and it had little white chunks of cocaine base knotted into the corners." After making this discovery and completing the sweep of the apartment, Officer Davis contacted the police department and learned that McDaniel was on parole and "subject to search terms." Officer Davis requested assistance, including a police dog, and conducted a parole search of the apartment. He seized the baggies he previously had seen in the work boot, as well as other items. Officer Thatcher recovered a pair of scissors from between the couch cushions.

The prosecution introduced into evidence at the suppression motion a one-page document entitled "Notice and Conditions of Parole" that reflected that on May 23, 1998, McDaniel had been released on parole for three years on the condition, among others, that "You and your residence and any property under your control may be searched without a warrant by an agent of the Department of Corrections or any law enforcement officer." ¹

The superior court denied the motion to suppress evidence. Sanders pled guilty to a reduced charge of possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, and was sentenced to a term of 16 months in prison. McDaniel pled guilty as charged to possession of cocaine base, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5. The alleged prior conviction was stricken and McDaniel was sentenced to a term of five years in prison.

Defendants appealed. They did not challenge the validity of the officer's entry into the apartment, but argued it was unlawful for the police to search the apartment after defendants were handcuffed. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, holding that the "protective sweep" of the apartment was unlawful under the rule announced in Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276, and was not justified as a parole search because the officers were unaware at the time of the search that McDaniel was on parole. We granted review to decide whether the search was lawful because McDaniel was on parole, despite the fact that the officers were unaware of McDaniel's parole status when they conducted the search.²

DISCUSSION

Exclusion of "relevant, but unlawfully obtained evidence" is permitted under article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution "only if exclusion is required by the United States Constitution." (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890, 210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744.) "The exclusionary rule was adopted to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of all citizens `to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures....' " (United States v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561.) "[T]he `prime purpose' of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, `is to deter future unlawful police conduct.' [Citations.]" (United States v. Janis (1976) 428 U.S. 433, 446, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046; Stone v. Powell (1976) 428 U.S. 465, 479, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 ["`[T]he exclusion of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement officers.'"].)

"The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim: `[T]he ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late.' [Citation.] Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures: `The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.' [Citations.] In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." (United States v. Calandra, supra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561, fn. omitted; United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677.)

"`[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'" (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 585 [100 S.Ct. 1371, 1379-1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639].) "At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." (Silverman v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734.)

Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709, upheld a warrantless search of the residence of a probationer pursuant to a state regulation permitting any probation officer "to search a probationer's home without a warrant as long as his supervisor approves and as long as there are `reasonable grounds' to believe the presence of contraband—including any item that the probationer cannot possess under the probation conditions." (Id. at pp. 870-871, 107 S.Ct. 3164.) The high court began its analysis by recognizing that "[a] probationer's home, like anyone else's, is protected by the Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches be `reasonable.'" (Id. at p. 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164.) But the usual requirement "that a search be...