People v. Sandifer
| Decision Date | 27 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 1–13–3397.,1–13–3397. |
| Citation | 65 N.E.3d 969,408 Ill.Dec. 493 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Henry SANDIFER, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Amy P. Campanelli, Cook County Public Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Jon Walters, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 A jury convicted defendant, Henry Sandifer, of the murder of the victim, L.M, but acquitted him of the charges of sexual assault of the victim. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to 60 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by (1) interpreting the Illinois rape shield statute to bar testimony regarding the victim's past sexual conduct, (2) admitting the testimony of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) match probabilities, (3) allowing the State to present an argument which inflamed the passions of the jury, (4) allowing evidence which referenced defendant's profile being in the state DNA database, and (5) allowing cumulative errors which denied defendant due process. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 3 Chicago Department of Streets and Sanitation worker Sandra Jones testified that on October 14, 2008, as she unloaded a garbage cart in an alley in the area of 11026 South Normal, she saw a body come out of the garbage cart. The naked body was wrapped in a blanket secured with suspenders around the waist and knees. Darlene Page, the victim's sister, later identified the body at the Cook County Medical Examiner's Office. Page testified that she last saw her sister on the evening of October 10, 2008.
¶ 4 On the evening of October 11, 2008, Maria Cintron, defendant's former girlfriend, was with the victim at the home of Larry Mays at 10813 South Wallace. Cintron and the victim smoked crack cocaine with Larry and his brother, Michael Mays. Cintron testified that the victim ran out of money, wanted more drugs, and begged Larry for more drugs. Cintron had previously told detectives that after Larry gave the victim four or five bags of crack, Larry and the victim went into Larry's mother's bedroom and closed the door. When the victim came out of the bedroom, the victim begged for more crack. Larry and Michael refused to give the victim any more drugs. When the victim began making a scene, Michael punched her in the face. The victim fell to the ground. Michael then picked her up by the neck, dragged her outside and pushed her down the stairs. Cintron helped her up from the ground. The victim stood up and was able to walk. Both Cintron and the victim left, walking in opposite directions.
¶ 5 Five years prior, in 2003, Cintron lived with the defendant at 11036 South Normal, a few doors down from where the streets and sanitation worker found the victim's body. In 2008, she and defendant were still involved in a sexual relationship. The house on Normal where they used to live was vacant and under repair. They would climb in a back window to access the house to sleep and have sex there.
¶ 6 Detective Tim Murphy interviewed Cintron and learned about what transpired on the evening of October 11, 2008. He then interviewed Larry and another frequent guest of Mays, Jeffery Miles. Both gave a DNA sample to Detective Murphy.
¶ 7 Dr. Valerie Arangelovich from the Cook County Medical Examiner's Office performed the autopsy of the victim's body. Dr. Arangelovich believed that the victim had been dead for at least 36 hours at the time the body was found, putting the date of her death on approximately October 12, 2008. The X-rays revealed no fractures. She determined the cause of death to be strangulation, most likely by hand. The toxicology report revealed that the victim had a blood alcohol level of .184, well above the legal limit of .08. Tests showed the presence of cocaine. Dr. Arangelovich estimated that her death occurred 30 to 60 minutes after she ingested the cocaine. She did not see evidence in the body which would indicate chronic cocaine use.
¶ 8 Meredith Misker, a forensic scientist for the Illinois State Police Crime Lab, testified that a male DNA sample was found in the victim's vagina, anus, and under her right hand fingernail clippings. All three of these male DNA evidentiary samples came from the same individual. The Defendant could not be eliminated as the source. Based on her DNA analysis, Misker found that the defendant's DNA was present on the suspenders found with the victim's body. Defendant's DNA profile matched the profile from the victim's vaginal swab. The frequency of a random person matching the profile was 1 in 340 trillion black, 1 in 15 quadrillion white, or 1 in 9.2 quadrillion "Hispanic" unrelated individuals.
¶ 9 On April 22, 2009, Detective Murphy learned from the Illinois State Police that defendant's DNA was in the state's database. He interviewed defendant on July 20, 2009. The jury watched a redacted video of the interview. Defendant denied repeatedly that he knew the victim, and he denied that he had ever met her or that he recognized her photo. He repeatedly denied that he had sex with the victim. He could not explain the presence of his DNA on her body.
¶ 10 Detective Murphy learned during the course of the investigation that defendant lived at 11036 South Normal and that the victim's body was recovered in the alley at 11026 South Normal. The parties stipulated that in October 2008, around the time of the murder, defendant gave a police officer his address as 11036 South Normal.
¶ 11 The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder but acquitted him of criminal sexual assault. This appeal followed.
¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by (1) interpreting the rape shield statute to bar testimony regarding the victim's past sexual conduct, (2) admitting the testimony of DNA match probabilities, (3) allowing the State to present an argument which inflamed the passions of the jury, (4) allowing evidence which referenced defendant's profile being in the state DNA database, and (5) allowing cumulative errors which denied defendant due process. We address defendant's arguments in turn.
¶ 15 In his first claim on appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's rulings with respect to two pieces of evidence relating to the victim's prior sexual activity under the Illinois rape shield statute, section 115–7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115–7 (West 2012) ).
¶ 16 Initially, defendant contends that the rape shield statute is inapplicable here because it does not apply when the victim is deceased. Without citation to any authority, he argues that the statute is ambiguous in that it does not state that it applies equally to both living and deceased victims and should therefore not apply where the victim of a sexual assault has also been murdered. He argues that barring evidence of a deceased victim's sexual conduct is inconsistent with the legislature purpose of the statute, i.e., prevention of harassment and victimization of a rape victim.
¶ 17 However, defendant did not raise this basis for admissibility in the trial court. Accordingly, he has forfeited this argument on appeal. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988) (). Nevertheless, People v. Scott, 401 Ill.App.3d 585, 599, 340 Ill.Dec. 820, 929 N.E.2d 124 (2010). "Furthermore, Supreme Court Rule 615(a), which codifies the plain-error doctrine, provides an exception affording review for those issues otherwise subject to procedural default." Id. As our supreme court explained in People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d 551, 565, 312 Ill.Dec. 338, 870 N.E.2d 403 (2007), plain-error review allows consideration of unpreserved error when (1) a clear, obvious error occurred and the evidence was closely balanced, or (2) regardless of the closeness of the evidence, a clear, obvious error occurred which was so serious that it affected the fairness of the trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. The defendant bears the burden of establishing plain error. Scott, 401 Ill.App.3d at 599–600, 340 Ill.Dec. 820, 929 N.E.2d 124. We must necessarily first determine whether an error occurred, and we "therefore, consider the substance of each claim of error." Id. at 600, 340 Ill.Dec. 820, 929 N.E.2d 124.
¶ 18 Defendant's argument requires us to first address the statutory construction of the rape shield law. We review questions of statutory construction de novo. In re Detention of Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337, ¶ 70, 366 Ill.Dec. 505, 980 N.E.2d 598. "The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature." Id. We construe the statute as a whole and give words their plain and ordinary meaning, and avoid rendering any language meaningless or superfluous. Id. We consider portions of the statute in light of other relevant provisions, and we presume "the legislature did not intend the statute to have absurd, inconvenient, or unjust consequences." Id. We may also consider " the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied and the purpose to be achieved." Id.
¶ 19 The Illinois' rape shield statute provides in pertinent part:
To continue reading
Request your trial