People v. Sandoval

Decision Date01 April 2008
Docket NumberNo. 2-06-1053.,No. 2-06-0996.,2-06-0996.,2-06-1053.
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jose J. SANDOVAL, Defendant-Appellee. The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jose J. Sandoval, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Joseph E. Birkett, Du Page County State's Attorney, Lisa Anne Hoffman, Assistant State's Attorney, Wheaton, Lawrence M. Bauer, Deputy Director, Gregory L. Slovacek, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, for the People.

David Badillo, Katz Law Office, Ltd., Chicago, for Jose J. Sandoval.

Justice GILLERAN JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the court:

The State appeals orders in which all of the charges pending in two cases against the defendant, Jose J. Sandoval, were dismissed for the failure to bring him to trial within 160 days under the speedy trial statute, section 103-5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2004)). Sandoval filed a single speedy trial demand, identifying the charges to which the demand was meant to apply as "Du Page DUI," but not providing the docket numbers of the cases involving those charges. We determine that Sandoval's speedy trial demand was sufficient under section 3-8-10 of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS 5/3-8-10 (West 2004)) to invoke his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. However, it was effective only as to the charges named in his demand, namely, the DUI charges. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the other charges against him.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 14, 2003, in case No. 03-DT-2937, in Du Page County, Sandoval was charged by separate citations with (1) driving under the influence (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2002)); (2) improper lane usage (625 ILCS 5/11-709 (West 2002)); (3) driving while his license was revoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303 (West 2002)); and (4) DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2002)). Sandoval posted bond and was to appear in court on July 11, 2003. He failed to appear, and bench warrants were issued for his arrest.

On December 27, 2004, in case No. 04-CF-3607, also in Du Page County, Sandoval was charged by complaint with (1) aggravated DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(A) (West 2004)); (2) obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a) (West 2004)) (3) improper lane usage (625 ILCS 5/11-709 (West 2004)); (4) failure to signal (625 ILCS 5/11-804 (West 2004)); and (5) driving while his license was revoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2004)). The first two counts arose on March 25, 2004, while the remaining counts arose on December 16, 2004. On February 3, 2005, he was indicted on the charge of obstructing justice and on two counts of Class 4 felony DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (c-1)(1) (West 2004)). The separate indictments superseded counts I and II of the complaint.

In December 2004, Sandoval was incarcerated in a Department of Corrections (Department) facility on other charges. On October 3, 2005, he mailed copies of a pro se speedy trial demand to the State's Attorney in Du Page County and to the Du Page County clerk, using a form provided by the Department. The form, which was titled "Demand for Speedy Trial and/or Quash Warrant," invoked both section 103-5(b) of the speedy trial statute (725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2004)) and section 3-8-10 of the Code. It included spaces in which the defendant was to supply certain information, including the charges pending against the defendant. At the bottom, the form demanded trial within 160 days "on the above stated charges."

In the demand, Sandoval wrote that he was presently incarcerated and serving a 2½-year sentence for a June 15, 2005, conviction of DUI. On the line for listing the charges pending against him, he wrote "Du Page DUI." Sandoval did not provide case numbers for the charges he identified. The demand form contained in the record has "04CF3607" written on the top corner, in different handwriting. Sandoval alleges that it was added by the Du Page County clerk after that office received the demand. The State does not dispute that contention. There is no evidence that the copy mailed to the State had the number written on it.

On August 9, 2006, counsel appeared for Sandoval in case No. 04-CF-3607 and moved to dismiss the charges because Sandoval was not brought to trial within the time required by the speedy trial statute. The State admitted that it likely received the mailed speedy trial demand, but it argued that the lack of case numbers on the demand prevented the State from knowing which cases the demand pertained to. The State submitted documents showing that multiple cases were returned on a record search for "Jose Sandoval" and that a search for "Jose J. Sandoval" produced cases beyond the two at issue in this appeal. The State further argued that Sandoval violated a local court rule requiring that case numbers be included in speedy trial demands.

The trial court found that the local court rule requiring the inclusion of case numbers placed a burden on the defendant beyond those contained in the speedy trial statute and section 3-8-10 of the Code. The court further found that the State had actual notice of the demand and that the interests of justice required recognition of the demand. The court reasoned that a defendant might not have the information needed to include case numbers and that the State's Attorney could easily search for pending cases. The court then stated: "If such a search reveals more than one pending case, the defendant should be immediately writted in to determine whether he is demanding trial on those cases and if he is, which case the State elects to proceed on." Determining that the speedy trial term had run, the trial court dismissed the charges. On September 15, 2006, the court denied the State's motion to reconsider.

On September 29, 2006, a hearing was held on a similar motion to dismiss the charges in case No. 03-DT-2937, the other case pending against Sandoval. The trial court did not make findings about actual notice, but it determined that Sandoval's demand for speedy trial was sufficient as to that case as well and dismissed the charges. The State separately appealed in both cases, and we consolidated the appeals for disposition.

II. ANALYSIS

The State contends that Sandoval did not properly demand a speedy trial and that it lacked actual notice of the charges that Sandoval intended to be covered by the demand. It also argues that Sandoval failed to comply with a local court rule requiring that speedy trial demands under section 103-5(b) contain the case numbers of the charges subject to the demand. Sandoval argues that his demand complied with section 3-8-10 and that the State easily could have determined the specific cases subject to the demand. He also argues that the local court rule places an impermissible additional burden on defendants.

A. Compliance with Section 3-8-10

Section 103-5(b) of the speedy trial statute provides that "[e]very person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the defendant." 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2004). Although the parties discuss only section 103-5(b), section 3-8-10 of the Code applies to defendants committed to a Department facility who have charges pending in any county. People v. Staten, 159 Ill.2d 419, 423, 203 Ill.Dec. 230, 639 N.E.2d 550 (1994). That section invokes section 103-5(b) but provides further specific requirements for the speedy trial demand. In particular, section 3-8-10 provides:

"[The person demanding speedy trial] shall include in the demand under subsection (b), a statement of the place of present commitment, the term, and length of the remaining term, the charges pending against him or her to be tried and the county of the charges, and the demand shall be addressed to the state's attorney of the county where he or she is charged with a copy to the clerk of that court and a copy to the chief administrative officer of the Department of Corrections institution or facility to which he or she is committed." 730 ILCS 5/3-8-10 (West 2004).

An Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Court rule requires that a demand for speedy trial under section 103-5(b) shall be in writing, with a proper caption and case number, and signed and dated by the defendant or the defendant's attorney. The rule provides that the requirements are mandatory and that "a demand for trial that does not comply * * * shall not be recognized unless the Court finds that the State had actual notice of defendant's trial demand and that the interests of justice require recognition of [it]." 18th Jud. Cir. Ct. R. 30.06(b) (eff. July 15, 2003).

It is undisputed that Sandoval's pro se demand for speedy trial complied with the letter of section 3-8-10: it included the place and term of Sandoval's imprisonment and a description of the charges pending against him, and it was properly served on the required persons or offices. However, the State argues that the words "Du Page DUI," standing alone, were insufficient to constitute the statutorily required "statement of * * * the charges pending against" Sandoval, because they were not accompanied by case numbers.

"The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Federal and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 8)." Staten, 159 Ill.2d at 426, 203 Ill.Dec. 230, 639 N.E.2d 550. In addition, criminal defendants in Illinois have a statutory right to a speedy trial. 725 ILCS 5/103-5 et seq. (West 2004). The speedy trial statute enforces the constitutional right to a speedy trial and thus its protections are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant. People v. Buford, 374 Ill.App.3d 369, 372, 312 Ill.Dec. 551, 870 N.E.2d 995 (2007). "[T]he statutory right to a speedy trial is not the precise equivalent of the constitutional right." Sta...

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