People v. Sandoval
| Decision Date | 17 January 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 68286,68286 |
| Citation | 135 Ill.2d 159,142 Ill.Dec. 135,552 N.E.2d 726 |
| Parties | , 142 Ill.Dec. 135 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Santiago SANDOVAL, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Fred L. Foreman, State's Atty., Waukegan , for people.
Robert P. Will, Jr., of Will & Briscoe, Waukegan, for appellee.
At issue in this case is the admissibility of certain evidence about the sexual history of the complainant under the State's rape shield statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 115-7). Santiago Sandoval, appellee, was found guilty on two counts of criminal sexual assault (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 12-13(a)(1)) and one count of battery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 12-3) and not guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 12-14(a)(2)) and unlawful restraint (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 10-3(a)) following a trial by jury in the Lake County circuit court. On appeal, the convictions were reversed and the cause was remanded for a new trial. (178 Ill.App.3d 669, 127 Ill.Dec. 898, 533 N.E.2d 980.) This court granted the State's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to our Rule 315(a) (107 Ill.2d R. 315(a)). Two questions are presented for review: (1) Is evidence of a victim's sexual relations with men other than defendant strictly precluded under the rape shield statute or may a victim waive the rule of evidence, thus allowing the evidence of prior sexual conduct? (2) Is evidence that a victim has not dated since the alleged attack properly excluded as collateral? For the reasons stated below, we reverse.
The incident which led to the indictment, euphemistically referred to as "date rape," occurred on January 1, 1987. Sandoval had a date on New Year's Eve with his 20-year-old former live-in girlfriend; following a separation begun when the complainant moved out of the apartment she shared with Sandoval, the two had begun seeing one another again and had plans to celebrate the new year together. Although Sandoval's and complainant's accounts of how the evening ended differed substantially, both indicate that repeated acts of anal intercourse followed by oral sex occurred. We will detail the events of the evening only as they are relevant for our analysis.
Sandoval testified that the events of New Year's Eve merely represented the same pattern which had occurred throughout his prior tempestuous relationship with the complainant: a fight was followed by making love. Sandoval further testified that an argument began when, during their evening out, he learned from an acquaintance that the complainant allegedly had an affair with another man during their on-again/off-again separation. Although the evening seemed to be following the same old pattern of fighting followed by sex, he stopped the lovemaking (which he testified had been mutual and consensual to that point) because he could not continue, knowing that complainant had an affair during their separation. He ended the sexual encounter and told complainant to leave his house. Sandoval acknowledged that they had anal sex, a practice which, he testified, the two had engaged in on at least a dozen prior occasions and which was initiated by complainant on this occasion, followed by oral sex, which he also asserts was initiated by his partner. Sandoval argues that the present charges stem from the complainant's anger at being rejected after she had initiated sex between them; indeed, he testified at trial that as complainant left the apartment, she threatened him. Shortly thereafter, the police knocked at his door.
The complainant's testimony depicted a somewhat different conclusion to the evening. Complainant testified that Sandoval had become angry when he learned that she had been out with another man a week earlier. Rather than be left stranded at the bar in Wisconsin where they were when Sandoval learned about the evening out, complainant got into Sandoval's car as he was leaving. Sandoval then drove directly to his apartment. Leaving her coat in the car, the complainant followed Sandoval into the apartment where she attempted to talk with him about their relationship. She testified that he continued to get more upset and angry. She tried to leave, but Sandoval grabbed her arm; he told her, according to her testimony, that he was going to have sex with her one last time. After a physical confrontation in the living room, Sandoval pushed complainant into the bedroom, where he hit her several times on the back of the head, told her he was going to make it hurt, and forced her into repeated acts of anal intercourse followed by oral sex. Complainant testified that she begged Sandoval not to engage in anal sex with her; although she testified that they had had anal sex on two prior occasions, she indicated that she had told Sandoval that she did not enjoy it and that it hurt. Finally, when complainant thought that she could escape without being caught, the complainant ran out of the apartment to an upstairs apartment where the resident allowed her to call the police. When she knocked on the neighbor's door she was wearing only undergarments and a skirt. She left behind her purse, her sweater, and some jewelry.
During the complainant's direct examination at trial, the following exchange occurred between the State's Attorney and the complainant:
"Q. Now, you had had anal sex with him before?
A. Yes.
Q. And on how many occasions had he had anal sex with you?
A. Twice.
Q. And do you recall at whose request that occurred?
A. [Sandoval's].
Q. Had you ever had anal sex in the past?
A. With others?
Q. Yes, with other people.
A. No."
No objection to this testimony was made by the defense counsel.
On cross-examination, the complainant again reiterated that she had not had anal intercourse with others. Defense counsel, in an attempt to impeach the complainant, then asked The State's Attorney objected to the question, basing the objection on the preclusion of such testimony in the provisions of the rape shield statute. Although the trial court initially indicated that the defense could, in its case in chief, bring in testimony to impeach the complainant because the prosecution had "opened the door," the court later reversed that ruling. Having reviewed the rape shield statute, the court found that such testimony was excluded under the provisions of the statute. Out of the hearing of the jury, the court admonished both the defense counsel, for not objecting to the original question posed by the prosecution, and the prosecutor, for asking a question precluded by the statute. The court indicated to counsel, outside the presence of the jury, that the defense could not ignore the strictures of the rape shield statute by failing to object to inadmissible information and then attempt to premise its case on information precluded under the statute. Defense counsel, by offer of proof for the record and out of the hearing of the jury, indicated that a certain male individual would have testified that, when he dated the complainant, they had engaged in anal sex.
Following the court's denial of defense counsel's motion for mistrial and just prior to giving the jury instructions, the court, on defense counsel's motion, instructed the jury to disregard the complainant's testimony that she had not had anal sex with others. Rather than allow further inadmissible testimony to further taint the trial, the court struck the complainant's testimony.
The trial court also rejected defense counsel's attempts to impeach the complainant's testimony, elicited on cross-examination, that the incident with Sandoval had changed her relationship with men and that she had been unable to date since the occurrence. Defense counsel questioned complainant about her presence at a certain bar, just a few days before the trial, with another gentleman. When the complainant denied being on a date, defense counsel indicated to the court that he wished to impeach with a witness who would testify that he saw the complainant, just a few days before the trial, at a local bar "hanging all over a gentleman friend of hers." The trial court refused to admit this evidence.
Sandoval appealed his conviction, arguing that the court's refusal to allow him to challenge the complainant's testimony denied him his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witness against him. The appellate court did not reach the constitutional issue on the impeachment testimony about past sexual experiences, however. Rather, it looked to the language of the statute and concluded that the rape shield statute did not preclude a complainant from testifying about her own past sexual activities, or lack thereof, with third parties. In essence, the appellate court found that the complainant's own waiver of the statute's protection precluded assertion of that protection as a shield against the defendant. As to the complainant's testimony that she had not dated, without citation to authority, the appellate court also reversed. The court reasoned that since the case "came down to an evaluation by the jury of the credibility of complainant and defendant" (178 Ill.App.3d at 677, 127 Ill.Dec. 898, 533 N.E.2d 980), the defendant's impeaching evidence was allowable as "relevant to the believability of [complainant's] accusations against defendant" (178 Ill.App.3d at 678, 127 Ill.Dec. 898, 533 N.E.2d 980).
For the reasons stated below, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.
Prior to enactment of the rape shield statute in 1978 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 115-7), to a...
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