People v. SanFord

• Decision Date: 22 December 1925
• Docket Number: No. 138.,138.
• Citation: 233 Mich. 112,206 N.W. 370
• Parties: PEOPLE v. SANFORD.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

233 Mich. 112

206 N.W. 370

PEOPLE

v.SANFORD.

No. 138.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 22, 1925.

Error to Circuit Court, Jackson County; Benjamin Williams, Judge.

Clinton Sanford was convicted of assault with intent to rob, being armed with a dangerous weapon, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before McDONALD, C. J., and CLARK, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, STEERE, FELLOWS, and WIEST, JJ.Joseph L. Hooper and Howard W. Cavanagh, both of Battle Creek, for appellant.

John Simpson, Pros. Atty., and Harry E. Barnard, Asst. Pros. Atty., both of Jackson, for the People.

MOORE, J.

The trial judge stated the issue involved in this case so clearly that we quote from his opinion as follows:

‘This is a motion that the plea of guilty heretofore made by the respondent in the above-entitled cause, and the judgment and sentence of the court on said plea of guilty, may be set aside and a new trial granted.

‘On February 9, 1925, respondent was arraigned in the circuit court for said county under an information filed by the prosecuting attorney, which charged respondent and two others impleaded with him with assault with intent to rob, being armed with a dangerous weapon, under the provisions of C. L. 1915, § 15207. All three respondents pleaded guilty thereto, and the court, after the private interview required by law with each of said respondents, accepted their pleas and imposed sentence.

‘As a matter of fact, no preliminary examination had been had by those respondents or either of them, which fact, however, was not known to the court until the present motion for a new trial was brought on for hearing.

‘After the plea of guilty by the respondents, the court had the private interview required by law with each of them, going into the whole details of the transaction at considerable length. The first phase of the matter inquired into was whether or not the particular respondent, who was at the time being interviewed, fully understood the nature of the charge made against him, whether he was pleading guilty thereto freely, understandingly, and without any promises having been made to him by the officers or any one else, and whether he was in any way influenced by any possible threats or fear. To all of these inquiries, all of the respondents, including Sanford, unequivocally stated that they understood what they were doing, and had in no way been influenced in making their pleas.

* * *

‘Without going into detail, the court's interview with respondent Ashley disclosed that he understood they were coming to Jackson.

* * *

‘It also appeared that these same three respondents had held up a drug store recently in Muskegon under very similar circumstances, obtaining some $33 thereby. It also appeared that the arrest of the respondents Sanford and Ashley was brought about through the stealing by all three respondents of an automobile in Grand Rapids, Mich.; that at that time Callaghan escaped, coming to Jackson, where he was apprehended, confessed, implicated Sanford and Ashley, and informed the officers that Sanford and Ashley were under arrest in Grand Rapids, from which place they were returned to Jackson for trial on the instant case.

‘The sole question raised upon the present motion is whether the sentence of respondent Sanford was valid; it being conceded that there was no preliminary proceeding by complaint and warrant first had before a magistrate.

‘No claim is made in the motion, the supporting affidavit, or in the argument on the hearing of the motion that respondent misunderstood the proceedings or has any meritorious defense.

‘Section 15767, C. L. 1915 reads: ‘No information shall be filed against any person for any offense, until such person shall have had a preliminary examination therefor, as provided by law, before a justice of the peace, or other examining magistrate or officer, unless such person shall waive his right to such examination.’

‘The court is clearly of the opinion that the respondent Sanford did waive his right to such preliminary examination within the express provision of the statute quoted, by pleading guilty to the information. This proposition is believed to be settled beyond any dispute by a...