People v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago

• Decision Date: 23 June 1904
• Citation: 71 N.E. 334,210 Ill. 171
• Parties: PEOPLE v. SANITARY DIST. OF CHICAGO et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

210 Ill. 171

71 N.E. 334

PEOPLE

v.SANITARY DIST. OF CHICAGO et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 23, 1904.

Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; E. F. Dunne, Judge.

Suit by the sanitary district of Chicago to condemn land. From an order dismissing the cross-petition of the Attorney General as intervener on behalf of the people, the Attorney General brings error. Affirmed.

H. J. Hamlin, Atty. Gen., and Martin M. Gridley, for the people.

Arthur B. Wells and John M. Blakeley (Ezra B. McCagg, of counsel), for defendants in error John A. Cook and Louisa Healy.

Wilson, Moore & McIlvaine, David Fales, and Fry & Hyde (N. G. Moore, of counsel), for defendants in error.

The sanitary district of Chicago brought its suit in the circuit court to condemn a strip of land extending from Madison to Randolph streeet along the river bank, which was a part of the original town of Chicago, platted by the canal commissioners in 1836 or thereabouts. The strip in question originally lay within the boundaries of West Water street, as shown upon that plat. The state of Illinois was made a defendant on the allegation by the sanitary district that the state claimed some interest. The state appeared and filed an appearance, but on motion in the lower court the appearance was stricken from the files on the ground that the state could not be made a defendant, in view of the prohibition of the Constitution. At the same time the state intervened by a cross-petition, which is in question here. The property owners moved to strike that cross-petition from the files on the ground that the state was not a proper party to such proceeding, chiefly on the proposition that a cross-petition in the case could only be filed by one who could lawfully be a defendant. The court, however, denied this motion-holding that, as an intervener, the state might come in, though not as a defendant-and required the property owners to answer, which they did, by denying that the state had any title whatever, and claiming that the entire property was of private ownership. On this the court heard the evidence which is now presented to this court, comprising the case of the state of Illinois. At the conclusion of the state's evidence the property owners moved to strike out the evidence on the ground that the state had not made such a case as would require the property owners to make answer, and also moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that no sufficient evidence had been adduced to entitle the state to relief. The court denied the motion to strike out the evidence, but granted the motion to dismiss the petition. To reverse this order, the Attorney General, on behalf of the state, sued out this writ of error.

RICKS, C. J. (after stating the facts).

The question first presented upon this record is as to the right or authority of the state to become a party to this proceeding. By the Constitution (article 4, § 26) it is declared ‘the state of Illinois shall never be made defendant in any court of law or equity.’ In this section of the Constitution the flat of the people, the supreme authority of the state, is so positive and clear that it requires only to be read to produce upon the mind the conviction that the inhibition therein contained is absolute, and must be observed by the courts. People v. Dulaney, 96 Ill. 503;In re City of Mt. Vernon, 147 Ill. 359, 35 N. E. 533,23 L. R. A. 807.

The proceeding is condemnation, to which only there can be the petitioner, who is, properly speaking, the plaintiff, and those interested as owners or otherwise, of the lands sought to be taken or damaged by the petitioner, and who are properly termed by the statute defendant or defendants, according to the number of them. While the statute (chapter 47, § 11, Hurd's Rev. St. 1901), authorizes owners and those interested in the property to be condemned, and who are not made parties to the proceeding, to file a cross-petition, and have their rights considered and determined, it seems clear to us that such cross-petitioner, when such leave is granted and the petition filed, bears only the relation of a defendant to the proceedings. It would seem that in such proceeding only the party seeking the condemnation can be termed the plaintiff, and all other parties to the proceeding, as to such petitioner, bear the relation of defendants. Whenever it becomes necessary to the proper disposition of a cause, courts will look beyond the mere forms of pleading, or the relation or place of the parties to or in the title of the cause, and, from their real interests and the effect the adjudication may have upon their rights, determine their true position in the cause-whether that of plaintiff or defendants. When the cross-petition on the part of the state was filed, if it could be regarded as a party, it was as a defendant. The Attorney General cannot, as we think, waive the state's immunity from being placed in the position of a defendant. Nor can be commit or bind the state by filing a cross-petition, the result of which is to place the state in the attitude of defendant in the proceeding. Ex parte Dunn, 8 S. C. 207; Dabney v. Bank, 3 S. C. 124; Adams v. Bradley, 5 Sawy. 217, Fed. Cas. No. 48; 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 486.

The authorities seem agreed that,...