People v. Sanson

• Decision Date: 24 June 2016
• Citation: 52 Misc.3d 980,2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 26199,33 N.Y.S.3d 883
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Isaac SANSON, Defendant.
• Court: New York Criminal Court

52 Misc.3d 980

33 N.Y.S.3d 883

2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 26199

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff,

v.Isaac SANSON, Defendant.

Criminal Court, City of New York, Queens County.

June 24, 2016.

Seymour James, Esq., The Legal Aid Society, (Lisa Lin of counsel), for the Defendant.

Richard Brown, District Attorney, Queens County, (Joseph Donnelly and Sharon Brodt, of counsel), for the People.

Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, (Nicholas R. Ciappetta of counsel), for the City of New York.

GIA L. MORRIS, J.

In an accusatory instrument filed on March 4, 2015 the defendant, Isaac Sanson, is charged with violating Administrative Code of the City of New York § 19–190 (hereinafter “AC § 19–190”), Right of Way law. The defendant now moves for dismissal of the accusatory instrument filed against him on the grounds that the statute is unconstitutional since it violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the protections afforded under the state constitution, and for other relief.

In determining the instant motion, this Court has considered the defendant's moving papers dated March 29, 2016 and May 24, 2016, the People's responses dated May 3, 2016 and June 20, 2016, the New York City (“NYC”) Office of the Corporation Counsel's (“Corporation Counsel”) opposition papers dated June 7, 2016¹ , an oral argument heard on June 20, 2016 in which attorneys from the Corporation Counsel's office, as well as the parties to the instant action participated, and papers on file with the Court.

The following is the decision and order of the Court.

I. Background

As part of a “Vision Zero” initiative instituted in NYC, several statutes were enacted which intended to impose civil and criminal penalties on motorists in an attempt to eliminate or reduce pedestrian injuries and fatalities (see Introduction to the Mayor's Vision Zero Plan of Action [2014] ). Within this legislative package was Local Law 29 of 2014, which was codified as AC § 19–190, Right of Way, and signed into law on June 23, 2014 (opposition of Corporation Counsel at 2). As relevant to the instant case, the statute reads:

19–190(A) provides, in relevant part, “[A]ny driver of a motor vehicle who fails to yield to a pedestrian or person riding a bicycle when such pedestrian or person has the right of way shall be guilty of a traffic infraction, which shall be punishable by a fine of not more than fifty dollars or imprisonment for not more than fifteen days or both such fine and imprisonment.”

19–190(B) provides, in relevant part, “[A]ny driver of a motor vehicle who violates subdivision (a) of this section and whose motor vehicle causes contact with a pedestrian or person riding a bicycle and thereby causes physical injury, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, which shall be punishable by a fine or not more than two hundred fifty dollars, or imprisonment for not more than thirty days or both such fine and imprisonment;

19–190(c) provides, in relevant part “It shall not be a violation of this section if the failure to yield and/or physical injury was not caused by the driver's failure to exercise due care.”

AC § 19–190.

On March 4, 2015, the defendant, Isaac Sanson was arraigned on a Desk Appearance Ticket, and charged with an unclassified misdemeanor equivalent to a “B” misdemeanor under AC § 19–190. The complaint alleges that on or about December 19, 2014, the defendant violated AC § 19–190, by striking a pedestrian in the crosswalk, thereby causing her to sustain physical injuries² (see Sanson complaint). On March 29, 2016, the defendant moved for dismissal of the accusatory instrument on the grounds that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, improperly shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that his conduct was innocent, and violates the defendant's rights to due process.

On June 20, 2016, this Court heard oral arguments by the parties regarding their position on the Statute's constitutionality. During this oral argument, the People and NYC represented that AC § 19–190 was not intended to be a strict liability statute (see tr. at 3, 11, 16). The NYC attorney further explained that it was the legislature's intent to include as an essential element of the Right of Way law that the injuries were caused by a driver's failure to exercise due care (see tr. at 2–3, 6). During oral argument NYC confirmed that the legislatures intended to define “due care” as one that a reasonably prudent person would use under the same circumstances (see tr. at 7). This is consistent with their definition of “due care” in the federal settlement with the Transport Workers Union, annexed hereto as Appendix A:

6. The phrase “due care” shall have the meaning ascribed to it by case law and common usage. “Due care” connotes a standard of reasonableness under the circumstances. “Due care” is that care which is exercised by reasonably prudent drivers.

(Stipulated Order of Settlement, Transport Workers Union of Greater New York, et al. v. Bill De Blasio, et al., No. 15cv2225–BMC, at 3 [August 28, 2015] ).

Moreover, during oral arguments, the People admitted the statute intended to criminalize ordinary negligence:

MS. BRODT: Again, your Honor, I am not disagreeing that it's ordinary negligence. I'm not saying that the definition isn't one of ordinary negligence. I am agreeing with the Court, that the core constitutional question is whether that can be grounds for criminal liability and we are arguing that the core of the argument, that the legislature is free to use strict liability, it could also use ordinary negligence as the grounds for what is a minimal criminal liability, equivalent to a B misdemeanor, and that's the issue. (tr. at 14)(emphasis supplied).

Accordingly, all the parties to this action agree that the statute was intended to apply a civil tort negligence standard in lieu of a culpable mens rea normally required in criminal cases under the state and federal constitution, and codified in PL § 15.05.

II. AC § 19–190 is Unconstitutional

In the instant action, the defendant argues that AC § 19–190, Right of Way, is unconstitutional because it lacks the culpable mens rea required pursuant to PL § 15.05 and is violative of his rights to due process under the state and federal constitutions. While facial constitutional challenges are strongly disfavored, the instant case involves a unique question of law, to wit, whether the civil tort liability standard of negligence may be applied instead of a culpable mens rea set forth in PL § 15.05. In as much as the determination of whether the statute is constitutional would apply to all defendants, a facial constitutional challenge is the only appropriate standard of review in this case (see e.g. People v. Nivar, 30 Misc.3d 952, 915 N.Y.S.2d 801 [Crim.Ct., BX County 2011]

(applying facial constitutional challenge since the statute on its face infringes on a defendant's constitutional rights); People v. Aboaf, 187 Misc.2d 173, 185, 721 N.Y.S.2d 725 [Crim.Ct., N.Y. County 2001] (conducting a facial constitutional challenge and not an as-applied constitutional standard appropriate since statute on its face infringed on First Amendment rights)).

It is well-settled law that legislative enactments carry a strong presumption of constitutionality (People v. Stuart, 100 N.Y.2d 412, 422, 765 N.Y.S.2d 1, 797 N.E.2d 28 [2003]

; People v. Scott, 26 N.Y.2d 286, 291, 309 N.Y.S.2d 919, 258 N.E.2d 206 [1970] ) Thus, a party seeking to find a statute unconstitutional bears a heavy burden and “must demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt', that the statute suffers from wholesale constitutional impairment' ” (People v. Davis, 13 N.Y.3d 17, 23, 884 N.Y.S.2d 665, 912 N.E.2d 1044 [2009], quoting Matter of

Moran Towing Corp. v. Urbach, 99 N.Y.2d 443, 448, 757 N.Y.S.2d 513, 787 N.E.2d 624 [2003] ). While this burden is high, facial constitutional challenges are permissible “in the presence of a constitutionally-protected right” (Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 744 [2d Cir.2010]

[discussing City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 [1999] ).

Here, the defendant has met this high burden of proof. AC § 19–190, Right of Way law, is unconstitutional on its face since it improperly utilizes a civil tort negligence standard in a criminal case in lieu of a culpable mens rea. Therefore, it cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny under both the state and federal constitutions. While this appears to be a case of first impression³ , the United States Supreme Court's decision in Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 192 L.Ed.2d 1 [2015]

, is instructive on this point. In Elonis, the Supreme Court reversed a defendant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) on the grounds that the jury was improperly charged utilizing a civil tort liability negligence standard instead of a standard that utilized a culpable mens rea. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court expressly held:

Elonis's conviction, however, was premised solely on his posts would be understood by a reasonable person. Such a “reasonable person” standard is a familiar feature of civil liability in tort law, but is inconsistent with “the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing. ” Staples [v. United States ], 511 U.S. [600], at 606–607, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed. 608

[ (1994) ] (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281, 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943) ; emphasis added). Having a liability turn on whether a “reasonable person” regards the communication as a threat—regardless of what the defendant thinks—“reduces culpability on the all-important element of the crime to negligence,” Jeffries [v. United States ], 692 F.3d [473] at 484 [ (6th Cir.2012) ]. (Sutton, J., dubitante ), and we “have long been reluctant to infer that a negligence standard was intended in criminal statutes, ” Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 45 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) (c...