People v. Santamaria, No. S035076

• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Writing for the Court: ARABIAN; LUCAS; MOSK; KENNARD
• Citation: 8 Cal.4th 903,884 P.2d 81,35 Cal.Rptr.2d 624
• Parties: , 884 P.2d 81 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jose Napoleon SANTAMARIA, Defendant and Respondent.
• Decision Date: 28 November 1994
• Docket Number: No. S035076

Page 624

35 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 8 Cal.4th 903, 884 P.2d 81 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Jose Napoleon SANTAMARIA, Defendant and Respondent. No. S035076. Supreme Court of California,
In Bank. Nov. 28, 1994.

[8 Cal.4th 908] Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald A. Bass, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald E. Niver and Joan Killeen, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and appellant.

John J. Meehan, Dist. Atty., Alameda, William M. Baldwin, Asst. Dist. Atty., and Jeff H. Rubin, Deputy Dist. Atty., as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and appellant.

Lawrence A. Gibbs, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Berkeley, for defendant and respondent.

ARABIAN, Justice.

Do collateral estoppel principles mandate that after a judgment is reversed on appeal, the original jury's finding on a sentence enhancing allegation affects retrial of a murder charge, even though the same jury convicted defendant of that murder? This important question, implicating California's ability to effectively prosecute violent crime, has divided the Courts of Appeal.

Finding this case different from Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, the landmark case engrafting collateral estoppel onto the double jeopardy clause, we conclude that the doctrine does not apply, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which affirmed the dismissal of a murder charge.

Page 625

884 P.2d 82

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 5, 1985, the body of Victor Guadron was discovered in Moss Beach. Evidence indicated the body had been stabbed, run over by a car, and strangled, and that cash and jewelry had been taken from the victim. Defendant was charged with Guadron's murder and robbery (Pen.Code, §§ 187, 211), and with a robbery-murder special circumstance (Pen.Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)). The information also contained a sentence enhancing allegation that defendant personally used a knife in the commission of the crime. (Pen.Code, § 12022, subd. (b).)

The case was tried before a jury. The main prosecution witness was Anthony Nubla, who had pleaded guilty to being an accessory to the murder [8 Cal.4th 909] and agreed to cooperate with the prosecution. Nubla testified that in the morning of September 5, at defendant's request, he gave him and Guadron a ride. After running an errand, they drove to Dolores Park, where Nubla got out to buy marijuana. He heard someone yell "Help," turned around, and saw defendant hugging Guadron's neck and stabbing him.

Nubla returned to the car. Defendant told him to drive toward Pacifica. On the way, defendant took Guadron's jewelry and money. At Moss Beach, they stopped and pulled Guadron out of the car. Defendant then drove the car twice over Guadron's body. The two returned to defendant's house and cleaned the car.

Nubla's testimony and other evidence showed that about a week later Nubla and defendant pawned the stolen jewelry. In May 1987, two conversations between Nubla and defendant were recorded. Defendant did not explicitly admit his involvement in the murder, but did make incriminating statements.

The jury convicted defendant of murder and robbery, and found true the robbery-murder special circumstance, but found not true the allegation that defendant personally used a knife during the commission of the crime. On the first appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, finding that an 11-day continuance during jury deliberations was prejudicial error. (People v. Santamaria (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 269, 280 Cal.Rptr. 43.)

On remand, the People filed a new information identical to the previous one except that it did not include the weapon enhancement allegation. Defendant promptly moved, "based on double jeopardy clause, to prohibit retrial of defendant for use of dangerous weapon, to limit evidence and preclude prosecution's reliance on theory adjudicated in defendant's favor at first trial." The trial court largely granted the motion. It ruled the prosecution could not retry the enhancement allegation (which the new information had not even alleged). In addition, and pertinent here, the court precluded the prosecution "from retrying the defendant on the theory that he personally used the knife during the killing. [p] To this end, the jury is to be instructed at appropriate intervals throughout the case that the defendant did not personally use a knife during the killing of the victim." The defendant's motion regarding the introduction of evidence was "denied without prejudice to objections, particularly, as to relevance during the course of the trial." Among the evidence defendant had sought to exclude was Nubla's testimony that he saw defendant stab the victim.

The court stated its belief that there were "several alternate instrumentalities of death." The district attorney replied, "The cause of death in this case [8 Cal.4th 910] was a knife wound. It was not manual strangulation." Defense counsel added, "My belief is that Dr. Benson testified that the cause of death was a stab wound to the hepatic artery complicated by the other factors...."

When the prosecution later stated that it was unable to proceed in light of the ruling, the court dismissed the case pursuant to Penal Code section 1385. The People appealed. (Pen.Code, § 1238, subd. (a)(8).) ¹ The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that "the negative enhancement finding precludes

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[884 P.2d 83] the People from retrying defendant on the theory he personally killed the victim with a knife."

We granted the Attorney General's petition for review.

II. DISCUSSION

The parties agree that the jury's "not true" finding on the knife-use enhancement allegation precludes retrial of that allegation. (People v. Superior Court (Marks) (1991) 1 Cal.4th 56, 78, fn. 22, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 389, 820 P.2d 613; see also People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 593, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093.) Defendant additionally argues that the finding limits the retrial of the murder charge of which the same jury had found him guilty. He claims that at retrial, the prosecution had to prove some basis for liability, such as that defendant aided and abetted the actual perpetrator, that did not involve personal knife use, and that the trial court correctly stated an intent to instruct the jury that he did not use the knife. When the prosecution admitted an inability to prove defendant guilty on a different basis than before, he argues, the charges were properly dismissed.

A. Background

The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...." (See also Cal. Const., art. I, § 15 ["Persons may not twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense...."]; People v. Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 593, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093.)

"It has long been settled ... that the Double Jeopardy Clause's general prohibition against successive prosecutions does not prevent the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of [8 Cal.4th 911] some error in the proceedings leading to conviction." (Lockhart v. Nelson (1988) 488 U.S. 33, 38, 109 S.Ct. 285, 289, 102 L.Ed.2d 265; see also United States v. Ball (1896) 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300; cf. Burks v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 [recognizing an exception when the sole ground for the reversal is insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict].) "[T]o require a criminal defendant to stand trial again after he has successfully invoked a statutory right of appeal to upset his first conviction is not an act of governmental oppression of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect." (United States v. Scott (1978) 437 U.S. 82, 91, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2194, 57 L.Ed.2d 65.)

It is equally settled that an inherently inconsistent verdict is allowed to stand; if an acquittal of one count is factually irreconcilable with a conviction on another, or if a not true finding of an enhancement allegation is inconsistent with a conviction of the substantive offense, effect is given to both. (United States v. Powell (1984) 469 U.S. 57, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461; People v. Pahl (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1651, 1656-1657, 277 Cal.Rptr. 656; see Pen.Code, § 954 ["An acquittal of one or more counts shall not be deemed an acquittal of any other count."]; see also People v. Nunez (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 214, 225-228, 228 Cal.Rptr. 64 [applying the rule to an enhancement finding].) When a jury renders inconsistent verdicts, "it is unclear whose ox has been gored." (United States v. Powell, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 65, 105 S.Ct. at p. 477.) The jury may have been convinced of guilt but arrived at an inconsistent acquittal or not true finding "through mistake, compromise, or lenity...." (Ibid.) Because the defendant is given the benefit of the acquittal, "it is neither irrational nor illogical to require her to accept the burden of conviction on the counts on which the jury convicted." (Id. at p. 69, 105 S.Ct. at p. 479.)

Thus, as a general matter, double jeopardy principles would not preclude defendant's retrial on the murder charge despite the earlier reversal, and the murder conviction would be allowed to stand even if inconsistent with the not true finding on the use enhancement.

Defendant does not quarrel with these principles but, relying on the doctrine of

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[884 P.2d 84] collateral estoppel, ² he argues that the knife-use finding precludes retrial of the murder charge on the theory that he used a knife. For [8 Cal.4th 912] support, he cites Pettaway v. Plummer (9th Cir.1991) 943 F.2d 1041 and People v. White (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 822, 231 Cal.Rptr. 569, which agreed with this contention under substantially similar facts. He contends that a contrary...