People v. Santiago
| Decision Date | 31 December 1975 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Carlos SANTIAGO, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Norma Jean DRUMMOND, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Luis JIMENESS, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Samuel Boxer, White Plains, for Santiago.
Carl A. Vergari, Dist. Atty., White Plains (B. Anthony Morosco, White Plains, of counsel), for the People.
John F. Middlemiss, Jr., Riverhead (Anna M. Perry, Northport and Leon J. Kesner, Bay Shore, of counsel), for Norma Jean Drummond.
Henry F. O'Brien, Dist. Atty., Riverhead (Ronald E. Lipetz, Riverhead, of counsel), for the People.
Eugene Gold, Dist. Atty., Brooklyn (Laurie Stein Hershey and Robert Dublirer, Brooklyn, of counsel), for the People. William E. Hellerstein and William J. Gallagher, New York City (Steven Lloyd Barrett, New York City, of counsel), for Luis Jimeness.
Before RABIN, Acting P.J., and HOPKINS, LATHAM, CHRIST and BRENNAN, JJ.
We treat these three appeals together because the sole issue in each is whether CPL 720.10 (subd. 2) is unconstitutional. The challenged statute provides that a person between the ages of 16 and 19 is eligible for youthful offender treatment 'unless he (a) is indicted for a class A felony, or (b) has previously been convicted of a felony' (CPL 720.10, subd. 2). We hold that the statute is constitutional.
As the factual pattern in each appeal differs, we state the circumstances in each separately.
The defendant Santiago
Santiago was indicted in January or Erbruary, 1974 for the crimes of criminal sale of a controlled substance (cocaine) in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) in the third degree, criminal sale of a controlled substance (marijuana) in the fifth degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) in the sixth degree; in addition, in March, 1974 he was indicted for the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) in the sixth degree.
During his trial Santiago pleaded guilty to the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree in satisfaction of all counts of both indictments. At that time Santiago was advised of the consequences of his plea and that the mandatory minimum sentence was one year to life. A month later, and before sentencing, his counsel moved to vacate the conviction and to substitute a youthful offender adjudication on the ground that the statute forbidding the application of youthful offender treatment to persons indicted for class A felonies was unconstitutional. 1 In reply the prosecution claimed, among other things, that Santiago could not challenge the statute since he had entered a plea of guilty. The motion was denied and Santiago received a sentence of one year to life.
On this appeal Santiago contends that the statute is unconstitution and that he must be resentenced as a youthful offender.
Drummond was indicted for the crime of murder. She pleaded guilty to the crime of manslaughter in the first degree (a class B felony). No application was made by her that she be afforded youthful offender treatment. She received an indeterminate term of imprisonment with a maximum term of 12 years. On appeal she contends, Inter alia, that the statute is unconstitutional.
Jimeness was indicted for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree. After a jury trial he was convicted of the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.
At sentencing his counsel requested that Jimeness be granted youthful offender treatment. That application was opposed by the prosecution, but the trial court granted the relief. Jimeness was then sentenced to five years' probation on condition that he undergo inpatient treatment at the Drug Abuse Control Commission for a period not in excess of one year. The People appeal, claiming that the sentence imposed was illegal as the relevant statutes require imprisonment (Penal Law, §§ 60.05, subd. 1, 70.00).
The predecessor to CPL article 720 (Code Crim.Pro., tit. VII--B, §§ 913--e--913--r) was enacted in 1944 (L.1944, ch. 632). Section 913--e read substantially as CPL 720.10 (subd. 2) now reads. 2 Under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a four-step process was established to determine whether a youth should be granted youthful offender treatment: (a) the grand jury or the District Attorney recommended, or the court, on its own motion, determined, that an investigation of the youth be made; (b) the court approved the recommendati and directed the investigation to be made (upon consent of the defendant); (c) the investigation was made; and (d) the court, on the return of the results of the investigation, either granted or denied youthful offender treatment (see Denzer, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 11A, CPL art. 720, pp. 314--315). If the court granted youthful offender treatment, the indictment was sealed and replaced by a youthful offender information; a private trial was then held on the information; an adjudication of guilt did not operate as a criminal conviction (Code Crim.Pro., § 913--n).
The original version of the CPL (L.1970, ch. 996) did not change the basic structure of title VII--B. However, because that structure was considered 'extremely cumbersome', the present article 720 was substituted (Denzer, Practice Commentaries, Supra, p. 315). The most prominent alteration was that the process of investigation and determination of youthful offender treatment was transferred from a point before the adjudication of guilt to a point after that adjudication (L.1971, ch. 981; Denzer, Practice Commentaries, Supra, p. 316). 'The new scheme', states Professor (now Judge) Denzer, 'possesses practically all the virtue of the former ones while concomitantly shedding their burdensome, wasteful investigation requirements and other destructively cumbersome features' (Denzer, Practice Commentaries, Supra, p. 317). In both schemes, however, the eligibility standard remained the same and the purpose underlying both procedures was identical--to avoid the stigma attaching to a conviction for youths treated as youthful offenders (see People v. Shannon, 1 A.D.2d 226, 231, 149 N.Y.S.2d 550, 555, affd. 2 N.Y.2d 792, 158 N.Y.S.2d 334, 139 N.E.2d 430).
The issue of the constitutionality of the Youthful Offender Procedure (CPL article 720) has been raised previously in several cases, but without uniform conclusions. In People v. Brian R., 78 Misc.2d 616, 356 N.Y.S.2d 1006, Judge Polsky found CPL 720.10 (subd. 2) unconstitutional because it violated both due process and equal protection of the laws. Thus, he said (p. 619, 356 N.Y.S.2d p. 1010) that the statute deprived youths of due process 'because it gives conclusive weight to the untested allegations of the indictment', and of equal protection 'since it irrationally discriminates against those youths who had been charged with Class A felonies but who would be ultimately convicted of lesser felonies.' The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed without opinion (People v. Brian R., 47 A.D.2d 599, 365 N.Y.S.2d 998). No appeal from that decision has been perfected by the People. In the First Department, therefore, the state of the law is that the statute is unconstitutional.
In People v. Goodwin, 49 A.D.2d 53, 378 N.Y.S.2d 82, the Appellate Division, Third Department, by a split decision, held the statute constitutional. The majority (per Main, J.) found no denial of due process or equal protection; Mr. Justice Greenblott, dissenting, was of the view that the statute offended equal protection for the reason stated by Judge Polsky. Apparently, no appeal is pending from that decision. 3 In the Third Department, therefore, the state of the law is that the statute is constitutional.
Other reported decisions reaching varying results as to the constitutionality of the statute have not been considered by the appellate courts. 4 Unquestionably, the effect of the stringent narcotics laws has induced the assault upon the constitutionality of the statute (see People v. McNair, 46 A.D.2d 476, 479, 363 N.Y.S.2d 151, 155). It is, after all, the classification of crimes by the Legislature which is the operative factor in the determination of eligibility, and the enactment of legislation denominating certain violations of the narcotics laws as class A--I, A--II and A--III felonies (L.1973, chs. 276--278) prevents youths charged with these crimes from being treated as youthful offenders. The statute has since been amended to remove the prohibition of eligibility to youths indicted for Class A--III felonies, thus avoiding the wholesale denial of consideration for youthful offender treatment to youths indicted for crimes arising out of violations of the narcotics laws (CPL 720.10, subd. 2, as amd. by L.1975, ch. 832, eff. Aug. 9, 1975).
Nevertheless, the issue remains open for the present defendants and those similarly situated, as well as for youths who may be indicted in the future for class A--I or class A--II felonies. Moreover, in view of the conflict which exists in the decisions, it is highly important that an authoritative ruling be made on the issue. We invite, therefore, an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals from the determinations reached here so that such a ruling can be made.
As we see it, the constitutionality of the statute has several aspects: (1) whether, as the defendants contend, it breaches due process; (2) whether, as the defendants contend, it breaches the equal protection of the laws; and (3) whether, as the People...
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