People v. Sargent

• Decision Date: 21 June 1912
• Citation: 254 Ill. 514,98 N.E. 959
• Parties: PEOPLE v. SARGENT.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

254 Ill. 514

98 N.E. 959

PEOPLE

v.SARGENT.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 21, 1912.

Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; Sheridan E. Fry, Judge.

R. Earl Sargent was convicted of driving an automobile, for hire, without a chauffeur's license, and he brings error. Affirmed.Daniel L. Cruice, A. S. Langille, and O. J. C. Wray, for plaintiff in error.

W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen., John E. W. Wayman, State's Atty., and Fred H. Hand (Zach Hofheimer, of counsel), for the People.

VICKERS, J.

Plaintiff in error was convicted, in the municipal court of Chicago, for driving his automobile, for hire, without a chauffeur's license, in violation of section 13 of the Motor Vehicle Act of 1911. Said section provides for an examination by the Secretary of State, or by examiners appointed by him, of every person who applies for a license to operate a motor vehicle for hire, and for the issuing of a license to such person, if found qualified, upon payment of a fee of $5, and prohibits any person from operating or driving a motor vehicle, as a chauffeur, upon the public highways of this state, after the 1st of January, 1912, unless such person has complied in all respects with the requirements of this section. Section 18 of said act imposes a penalty of $25 for willful violation of section 13. The plaintiff in error, when arrested, was operating his automobile,for hire, without having complied with section 13 in regard to procuring a license. It is admitted that he violated the statute; and the only defense interposed is that said amended Motor Vehicle Act of 1911 is unconstitutional.

[1] The principal objection urged against the validity of the act of 1911 is that it includes more than one subject, and that the subject of said act is not embraced within the title, as is required by section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution, which provides that ‘no act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title.’ An act under this provision of the Constitution may be void, (1) either because it embraces more than one subject, or (2) because the subject is not embraced within the title. The title of the act is as follows: ‘An act defining motor vehicles and providing for the registration of the same and of motor bicycles, and uniform rules regulating the use and speed thereof; prohibiting the use of motor vehicles without the consent of the owner and the offer or acceptance of any bonus or discount or other consideration for the purchase of supplies or parts for any such motor vehicle or for work or repairs done thereon by others, and defining chauffeurs and providing for the examination and licensing thereof, and to repeal certain acts therein named.’ The act contains 21 sections, and, when read together, it will be seen that it was intended to be a general revision of the law in relation to the subject of owning and operating motor vehicles, and was designed to supersede all previous legislation on that subject and all city ordinances relating to the speed of automobiles and other horseless vehicles.

In discussing the Motor Vehicle Law of 1907, this court, in Ayres v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 237, on page 245, 87 N. E. 1073, on page 1075, said: ‘It is a fact within the common knowledge of most persons that automobiles, other than those used in particular localities for hire, are extensively used in this state in making tours of considerable distance, in the course of which many cities, villages, and towns would be visited. The Legislature has, by the Motor Vehicle Act, taken the subject of the regulation of the speed and operation of automobiles out of the hands of local authorities and passed the Motor Vehicle Law as a general, uniform regulation, applicable alike to all municipalities of the state. The effect of this law manifestly is to abrogate all municipal ordinances, designed to regulate the use of motor vehicles, passed prior to the time such law went into force, and to deprive such municipalities of the power to pass such regulating ordinances in the future. The necessity for such uniform law was a matter for legislative determination, with which the courts have nothing to do. Clearly the purpose of the Legislature was to pass a new and complete law, designed to take the place of all municipal ordinances or rules regulating the equipment and operation of motor vehicles.’

A careful reading of the act of 1911 will show that the legislative intent is the same as expressed above in respect to the act of 1907. The manifest purpose of the Legislature was to bring the whole subject of regulating the use of motor vehicles under the control of the state.

[2][3] As we understand the argument of plaintiff in error, his contention seems to be that both the act and the title include a plurality of subjects, and for that reason the whole act is void. The word ‘subject,’ as used in the Constitution, signifies the matter or thing forming the groundwork. It may contain many parts which grow out of it and are germane to it, and which, if traced back, will lead the mind to it as the generic head. Any matter or thing which may reasonably be said to be subservient to the general subject or purpose will be germane, and may be properly included in the law. O'Leary v. Cook County, 28 Ill. 534. The Constitution of 1848 provided that ‘no private or local law shall embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title.’ Article 3, § 23. The Legislature passed an act entitled ‘An...