People v. Saterfield

• Decision Date: 12 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 1–13–2355.,1–13–2355.
• Citation: 34 N.E.3d 1174
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Lloyd SATERFIELD, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

34 N.E.3d 1174

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Lloyd SATERFIELD, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–13–2355.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division.

June 12, 2015.

Abishi C. Cunningham, Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Barbara McClure, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Brian K. Hodes, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant Lloyd Saterfield appeals from the circuit court's dismissal of his pro se petition for postjudgment relief filed pursuant to section 2–1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2–1401 (West 2012) ). On appeal, defendant contends, relying on People v. Laugharn, 233 Ill.2d 318, 330 Ill.Dec. 780, 909 N.E.2d 802 (2009), that the court's sua sponte dismissal of the petition was premature because the court entered it before the 30–day period for the State to respond had expired. We affirm.

¶ 2 In July 2001, defendant entered into negotiated pleas of guilty to home invasion and felony murder predicated on home invasion. At the plea hearing, the prosecutor offered the following factual basis for defendant's plea.

¶ 3 The prosecutor stated that the evidence would show that on August 25, 1999, defendant and his codefendants discussed a plan to murder Niquita Johnson, who was 33 years old at that time. The original plan was to use a firearm, but they were unable to obtain one. They planned to enter Johnson's bedroom while she was asleep with knives and a garden shovel. Defendant was the first one to enter the bedroom where Johnson was asleep on the bed with her 11–month–old baby. He began to stab her “about the head and neck with the garden shovel.” One of the codefendants removed the baby from the bed. Two codefendants also began stabbing Johnson. Defendant then carried Johnson from the bed to the front room of the apartment. When he heard her breathing, he stabbed her two more times with the garden shovel. Defendant and his codefendants cleaned the apartment and defendant changed his clothes. They carried Johnson's body outside, put it in the trunk of her car, and pushed the car down the street, and then defendant lit the car on fire.

¶ 4 When defendant was arrested, he gave a videotaped confession outlining the planned murder of Johnson. The medical examiner would testify that he found over 30 stab wounds on Johnson's body, primarily to her neck, shoulders, and chest. The trial court found the factual basis sufficient to support the charges, accepted defendant's plea of guilty, and entered a finding of guilty. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 60 years for felony murder and 30 years for home invasion. Defendant then filed several unsuccessful collateral attacks upon his convictions. See, e.g., People v. Saterfield, No. 1–08–3096, 401 Ill.App.3d 1143, 371 Ill.Dec. 289, 989 N.E.2d 1217 (2010) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 ).

¶ 5 On March 18, 2013, defendant's pro se section 2–1401 petition was stamped “received,” by the clerk's office, criminal division. The petition sought injunctive relief for a “void sentence” alleging that the truth-in-sentencing legislation was unconstitutional and that the calculation of his “credit” under this legislation violated his constitutional rights. The same petition was also stamped “filed” on April 8, 2013, by the clerk's office, criminal division, 26th and California. On April 15, 2013, at a proceeding in the criminal division, the petition was on the court's call and an assistant State's Attorney (ASA) asked the court for time to look at the petition, specifically to April 26th, and report back to the court.

¶ 6 On April 26, 2013, the circuit court¹ concluded that defendant's petition was frivolous and patently without merit and sua sponte dismissed the petition. The court found:

“[Defendant] was convicted of murder and is alleging that the Truth and Sentencing Statute is unconstitutional. The grounds that [defendant's] petition are frivolous and patently without merit. Numerous cases have held that the Truth and Sentencing is constitutional.”

¶ 7 The transcript of April 26, 2013, indicates that the same ASA was present and that an assistant public defender appeared on behalf of defendant. Neither attorney spoke on the record.

¶ 8 On May 28, 2013, defendant filed a petition for rehearing and argued the merits of his petition and that the circuit court had prematurely dismissed his petition, citing People v. Laugharn, 233 Ill.2d 318, 330 Ill.Dec. 780, 909 N.E.2d 802 (2009). On June 4, 2013, the circuit court denied defendant's pro se petition for rehearing.

¶ 9 Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that People v. Laugharn, 233 Ill.2d 318, 330 Ill.Dec. 780, 909 N.E.2d 802 (2009), prohibits the sua sponte dismissal of a section 2–1401 petition before the expiration of the 30–day period in which the State has time to answer. Defendant argues that because the instant petition was filed on April 8, 2013, and dismissed on April 26, 2013, the cause must be remanded to the circuit court. Defendant did not file a reply brief and made no substantive arguments regarding his section 2–1401 petition in his opening brief.

¶ 10 The State responds first by arguing that the petitioner has “waived” any issues regarding the merits of the petition because of his failure to present any argument on the issues in his brief on appeal. It further contends that the circuit court's dismissal of the petition was not premature because more than 30 days had passed by the time the court denied defendant's motion to reconsider. The State further argues that the petition was properly dismissed when an ASA was present in court and did not object to the dismissal. The State finally argues that remand is unnecessary because the instant petition is meritless and a remand would be a waste of judicial resources in light of this fact.

¶ 11 As to the State's first argument that the merits of the petition have been forfeited, we agree. Petitioner has made no argument regarding the merits of his petition on appeal and has therefore forfeited these issues on appeal. See Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) (“Points not argued are waived and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing”). However, were we to address the merits of defendant's petition, the result would not change.

¶ 12 With regard to defendant's challenge to the truth-in-sentencing legislation, the statute was found to be unconstitutional as enacted because the legislature violated the single-subject clause of the Illinois Constitution in enacting the law. People v. Reedy, 186 Ill.2d 1, 12, 237 Ill.Dec. 74, 708 N.E.2d 1114 (1999). Reedy, however, acknowledged that the constitutional infirmity was corrected when the legislature passed curative legislation, Public Act 90–592 (eff. June 19, 1998), and therefore, the act was no longer unconstitutional as applied to offenses committed after June 19, 1998. Reedy, 186 Ill.2d at 17–18, 237 Ill.Dec. 74, 708 N.E.2d 1114.

¶ 13 Here, the record indicates that defendant entered a plea of guilty in 2001, and he does not, nor can he, claim that the offenses at issue were committed prior to June 19, 1998, because the offense were committed on August 25, 1999. Therefore, his claim that the truth-in-sentencing law is unconstitutional must fail. Similarly his claim that the calculation of his good-time credit pursuant to the truth-in-sentencing law deprives him of his constitutional rights must fail, when defendant fails to explain how the application of a constitutional statute caused him a constitutional deprivation.

¶ 14 Next, we address petitioner's argument that the trial court's dismissal of section 2–1401 petition was premature. Section 2–1401 of the Code establishes a comprehensive procedure for allowing the vacatur of final judgments more than 30 days after their entry. See People v. Vincent, 226 Ill.2d 1, 7, 312 Ill.Dec. 617, 871 N.E.2d 17 (2007). We review the dismissal of a section 2–1401 petition de novo. People v. Laugharn, 233 Ill.2d 318, 322, 330 Ill.Dec. 780, 909 N.E.2d 802 (2009).

¶ 15 All parties to a section 2–1401 petition must be notified as provided by rule. 735 ILCS 5/2–1401(b) (West 2012). Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 105 (eff. Jan. 1, 1989), notice of the petition shall be directed to the party against whom relief is sought and must be served either by summons, by prepaid certified or registered mail, or by publication. See also Ill. S.Ct. R. 106 (eff. Aug. 1, 1985) (notice of the filing of petition under section 2–1401 shall be given by the methods provided in Rule 105 ). The purpose of these rules is to notify a party of pending litigation in order to secure his presence. People v. Ocon, 2014 IL App (1st) 120912, ¶ 23, 379 Ill.Dec. 616, 7 N.E.3d 42. In construing the sufficiency of the notice, our focus is not on whether the notice is formally and technically correct but, rather, on whether the object and intent of the law were substantially attained. Id.

¶ 16 Our supreme court laid out the procedure for the dismissal of a section 2–1401 petition in People v. Laugharn, 233 Ill.2d 318, 330 Ill.Dec. 780, 909 N.E.2d 802 (2009). In that case, the defendant was found guilty of first degree murder in 1996 and filed a pro se section 2–1401 petition in 2004, alleging that evidence that had a bearing on her case had been withheld from her. Id. at 320–21, 330 Ill.Dec. 780, 909 N.E.2d 802. Seven court days later, the circuit court sua sponte dismissed the petition as untimely because it was filed more than two years after the judgment. Id. at 321, 330 Ill.Dec. 780, 909 N.E.2d 802.

¶ 17 On appeal, our supreme court first addressed the State's argument that the defendant forfeited the question of timeliness because she did not raise the issue in ...