People v. Saunders

Decision Date01 July 1993
Docket NumberNo. S022903,S022903
Citation5 Cal.4th 580,853 P.2d 1093,20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 853 P.2d 1093 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dennis Romero SAUNDERS, Defendant and Appellant.

Fern M. Laethem, State Public Defender, Therene Powell, Deputy State Public Defender, Wilbur F. Littlefield, Public Defender, Los Angeles, Laurence M. Sarnoff and Douglas J. Goldstein, Deputy Public Defenders, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward T. Fogel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Carol Wendelin Pollack, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Susan D. Martynec, John R. Gorey and Pamela C. Hamanaka, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

Michael R. Capizzi, Dist. Atty., Orange, and E. Thomas Dunn, Jr., Deputy Dist. Atty., as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

Gardner & Derham and Cliff Gardner as amici curiae.

GEORGE, Justice.

Numerous California penal statutes allow increased punishment to be imposed upon a defendant if the prosecution alleges and proves that the defendant has suffered one or more prior convictions. In People v. Bracamonte (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 644, 654, 174 Cal.Rptr. 191, the Court of Appeal held that the defendant is entitled to have the determination of the truth of such allegations bifurcated from the jury trial of the currently charged offenses.

In the present case, we consider whether further proceedings to determine the truth of alleged prior convictions are barred if, after such bifurcation has been ordered, the jury returns a verdict of guilty and is discharged, without objection by the defendant, before the truth of the prior conviction allegations has been determined or a jury waiver taken as to those allegations. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that in such circumstances, further proceedings to determine the truth of the prior conviction allegations are not prohibited either by statute or by the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. Accordingly, we disapprove the contrary holdings in People v. Wojahn (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 1024, 198 Cal.Rptr. 277 and its progeny.

FACTS

Defendant Dennis Romero Saunders was charged with attempted murder (Pen.Code, § 664/187, subd. (a)), 1 burglary (§ 459), and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). Further allegations (pursuant to § 667.5, subd. (b)) included: that he had been convicted (in case No. 75-68(R)) of the felony offense of possession of stolen mail and had served a prior prison term for that offense, had been convicted (in case Nos. A-079140 and A-079878) of the felony offenses of rape (two counts), oral copulation (two counts), assault with a deadly weapon, burglary (three counts), and robbery (six counts) and had served a prior prison term for those offenses, and had been convicted (in case No. A-737687) of the felony offense of attempted robbery and had served a prior prison term for that offense.

Defendant pleaded not guilty and denied each allegation. The court docket reflects that, immediately prior to trial, the "[i]ssue of prior convictions [was] bifurcated." A jury trial commenced, but ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the current offenses.

Immediately prior to commencement of the second jury trial, the trial court, on defendant's motion, again bifurcated determination of the truth of the alleged prior convictions from trial of the remaining charges and allegations. The trial court ruled, however, that should defendant testify, his prior convictions relating to credibility could be employed to impeach his testimony.

Defendant did testify, stating he was on parole at the time of the alleged offenses and previously had been convicted of possession of stolen mail, three counts of burglary, six counts of robbery, and one count of attempted robbery.

When the jury returned its verdict on the current offenses, the deputy public defender who represented defendant at trial, Janet Aldapa, was not present, and defendant was represented by Deputy Public Defender Ron Brown. The jury found defendant guilty of burglary, but not guilty of attempted murder or assault with a firearm. The trial court then discharged the jury and continued the case to the following day, when defendant appeared, represented by Ms. Aldapa.

The trial court at that time indicated its understanding, which Ms. Aldapa confirmed, that defendant wished to waive his right to jury trial as to the alleged prior convictions. Defendant then personally waived that right, as did the People. The prosecutor submitted certified records of the prior convictions, which were admitted into evidence without objection; the truth of the allegations was submitted to the court, and proceedings were adjourned to the following court day.

When the case resumed, Ms. Aldapa stated that when she had advised defendant to waive his right to jury trial as to the alleged prior convictions, she was unaware the jury had been discharged. In response, the trial court recalled that Ms. Aldapa had stated, in a discussion held off the record during the course of the second jury trial, that her client would waive his right to jury trial as to the alleged prior convictions. Ms. Aldapa admitted having told the court she would advise her client to waive his right to jury trial but claimed that had she known the jury had been discharged after returning its verdict, she would not have so advised her client. The trial court then permitted defendant to withdraw his waiver of his right to jury trial as to the alleged prior convictions.

Following a brief recess, defendant entered a plea of once in jeopardy and moved to dismiss the allegations of prior convictions. The trial court denied the motion. The truth of the alleged prior convictions was tried to a new jury, which found true each of the above mentioned allegations. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for the high term of three years on the burglary charge, plus one year for each of the three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), for a total term of six years.

Defendant appealed, raising the contention, among others, that impanelling a new jury to determine the truth of the prior conviction allegations violated state statutory law and unconstitutionally placed him twice in jeopardy. After the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, we granted defendant's petition for review to determine whether, after discharge of the jury under the circumstances here present, the trial court was barred from conducting further proceedings to determine the truth of the prior conviction allegations.

DISCUSSION
Statutory Provisions

The procedure established by the Legislature for the proof of allegations of prior convictions has not been altered substantially for nearly a century. Section 1025, enacted originally in 1874, 2 provides: "When a defendant who is charged in the accusatory pleading with having suffered a previous conviction pleads either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged against him, he must be asked whether he has suffered such previous conviction.... If he answers that he has not, ... the question whether or not he has suffered such previous conviction must be tried by the jury which tries the issue upon the plea of not guilty.... In case the defendant pleads not guilty, and answers that he has suffered the previous conviction, the charge of the previous conviction must not At the time section 1025 was enacted, a defendant who was alleged to have suffered a prior conviction had two choices: admit the alleged prior conviction, or have the truth of the allegation determined concurrently--during the trial of the current charges--by the jury entrusted with deciding the defendant's guilt or innocence of those charges. On numerous occasions, this procedure was upheld against challenges by defendants. (People v. Owens (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 441, 446-447, 169 Cal.Rptr. 359, and cases cited therein; see also People v. Coleman (1904) 145 Cal. 609, 611-613, 79 P. 283.)

[853 P.2d 1096] be read to the jury, nor alluded to on the trial." 3

The foregoing procedure reflected the state of the law until 1981, when the Court of Appeal in People v. Bracamonte, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d 644, 174 Cal.Rptr. 191, held that a defendant who denies an alleged prior conviction "is entitled to a bifurcated proceeding wherein the jury is not informed of his prior convictions, either through allegations in the charge or by the introduction of evidence, until it has found the defendant guilty." (Id. at p. 654, 174 Cal.Rptr. 191.) 4 The court in Bracamonte observed that a rule requiring a bifurcated trial was not in conflict with section 1025: "While section 1025 does state that 'the question whether or not he has suffered such previous conviction must be tried by the jury which tries the issue upon the plea of not guilty ' (italics added), it does not state nor imply that the jury should try both issues simultaneously." (119 Cal.App.3d at p. 652, 174 Cal.Rptr. 191, italics in original.)

In 1984, the Court of Appeal in People v. Wojahn, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d 1024, 198 Cal.Rptr. 277, addressed what in subsequent years would prove to be a recurring problem. As required by the rule announced in Bracamonte, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d 644, 174 Cal.Rptr. 191, the trial court in Wojahn bifurcated the determination of the truth of the defendant's alleged prior conviction from the trial of the pending charges. But after the jury returned a verdict of guilty, the court discharged the jury without having submitted to the jury the determination of the truth of the alleged prior conviction. Three weeks later, over the defendant's objection, the court instituted a new proceeding to determine the truth of the prior conviction...

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