People v. Savage

• Decision Date: 30 September 2020
• Docket Number: No. 1-17-3135,1-17-3135
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jakeen SAVAGE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2020 IL App (1st) 173135

178 N.E.3d 221

448 Ill.Dec. 897

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Jakeen SAVAGE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-17-3135

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FOURTH DIVISION.

Opinion filed September 30, 2020

James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Richard Connor Morley, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Matthew Connors, and Tyler J. Cox, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant Jakeen Savage appeals from the first-stage dismissal of his pro se petition for postconviction relief.

¶ 2 After a bench trial, defendant, age 22, was convicted of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder and sentenced to a total of 85 years with the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC).

¶ 3 Defendant's pro se petition claims that his 85-year sentence violates the provision of the Illinois Constitution requiring penalties to have the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11 ("All penalties shall be determined * * * with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship."). Defendant alleges that the sentencing court failed to consider his drug addiction, particularly in conjunction with his young age.

¶ 4 For the following reasons we reverse and remand for second-stage proceedings.

¶ 5 BACKGROUND

¶ 6 I. Pro Se Petition

¶ 7 On September 15, 2017, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his 85-year sentence violated the provision of the Illinois Constitution requiring "penalties" to have "the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. Defendant alleged that he had been a drug addict since he was nine years old and "under the sway of adult gangbangers." At the time of the offense, he was "22 yrs. old with a mind soaked in drugs since childhood." Defendant alleges that his long-term addiction and his young age left him "more susceptible to peer pressure" and "more volatile in emotionally charged settings." Defendant claims that he could not have made these arguments prior to the decisions in People v. House , 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, 436 Ill.Dec. 355, 142 N.E.3d 756, appeal allowed , No. 125124, 435 Ill.Dec. 673, 140 N.E.3d 231 (Ill. Jan. 29, 2020), and People v. Harris , 2018 IL 121932, 427 Ill.Dec. 833, 120 N.E.3d 900. Defendant argues that his sentence does not take into account whether he could be restored to useful citizenship, thereby violating the constitution as applied to him.

¶ 8 In his supporting affidavit, defendant avers that, in the instant offenses, he was "attempt[ing] to rob a drug house and got into a position of having to kill someone or be killed." Defendant avers that, at the time of the offense, he was "abusing drugs on a daily basis."

¶ 9 Defendant further avers that he has since "conquered [his] drug habit," that he has been tested many times in prison for drugs, and that, although drugs were readily available in prison in the past, he did not once test positive for them.

¶ 10 II. Order Appealed From

¶ 11 The order entered by the trial court on October 27, 2017, dismissing defendant's petition, contains no description of either the evidence at trial or the sentencing hearing. Concerning the trial, the order states simply: "Petitioner's convictions stem from events occurring on August 12, 1992, when petitioner murdered Brian Keyes and attempted to murder Leon ‘Tony’ Reed. After a bench trial, he was found guilty. Petitioner appealed[.]"

¶ 12 The trial court dismissed defendant's claim under both the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause on the ground that defendant was over 18 years old and "directly responsible for the murder." The four-page order makes no mention of defendant's drug addiction.

¶ 13 III. The Trial

¶ 14 No issues are raised on this appeal concerning the evidence at trial or defendant's conviction of the underlying charges. Thus, we provide a summary of the facts below.

¶ 15 The State's evidence established that defendant shot two men, killing one, during a bungled attempt to rob the victims of drugs. During the evening of August 12, 1992, a group of people were sitting around a table and playing cards. The card-playing group included Brian Keyes, the murder victim; Leon Reed, the attempted murder victim; Sandra Hampton; and Lynn Cooper, who was also Keyes's mother and Reed's aunt. The table was located in the front room of an apartment shared by Reed and Ronald Allen, and where Keyes sometimes resided. Hampton lived in the apartment next door. Reed, Allen, Hampton, and Cooper all testified at trial.

¶ 16 At 9 p.m., Allen exited the apartment and entered the hallway of the apartment building where he encountered defendant and another man. The second man held Allen in the hallway, while defendant entered the apartment. Before the apartment door closed, Allen observed defendant pull a silver revolver out of the back of his pants, by his waist.

¶ 17 After defendant entered the apartment, defendant pointed the gun toward the ceiling, fired a shot, and announced that this was a robbery. Defendant pointed the gun at Keyes's head. Reed looked at Keyes, who was Reed's cousin, and Keyes looked back at Reed. Reed said "three" and lifted the table up, which he intended as a diversionary tactic and which he intended Keyes to join. Cooper fell backward in her chair, and Hampton headed for the floor. Reed, Cooper, and Hampton then heard one shot fired. Reed stood up, and defendant asked him, "Tony, where's the dope." "Tony" was Reed's nickname. Defendant then shot Reed twice in the stomach.

¶ 18 The parties stipulated that, if called to testify, the medical examiner would testify that Keyes died from a single gunshot wound to the head.

¶ 19 After listening to the parties' closing arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty of the first degree murder of Keyes and the attempted first degree murder of Reed.

¶ 20 IV. Evidence at Sentencing Hearing

¶ 21 Defendant's sentencing hearing was held on January 26, 1995. After finding that defendant was eligible for the death penalty, the trial court considered factors in aggravation and in mitigation.

¶ 22 The parties stipulated (1) that defendant pled guilty to criminal trespass to a vehicle on May 21, 1991, and received four months of court supervision, and (2) that, in May 1992, defendant was arrested for possession of cocaine, to which he pled guilty on August 7, 1992, and was sentenced to one year of probation by Justice Bertina Lampkin,¹ when she presided in criminal court. The parties further stipulated that he was on this probation when he was arrested for the instant offense.

¶ 23 As its first witness in aggravation, the State called Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) Michael Rogers. Rogers identified a 14-page statement by defendant that had been recorded by a court stenographer on August 14, 1992, and that Rogers, defendant, and a detective had signed. The statement was recorded two days after the offense in question and described the offense. After the statement was admitted in evidence, the ASA read it into the record and thereby published it to the trial court.

¶ 24 In the statement, defendant said that on August 12, 1992, he formulated a plan "[t]o stick up the dope dealers," who were located in the apartment that was the scene of the offense. When he entered the hallway of the apartment building, he observed two women exiting the apartment who had just purchased drugs. Then a man exited the apartment, and defendant reached for his gun, but it was stuck in his back left pocket. As defendant was trying to reach for his gun, the man stepped back, away from the apartment, and the apartment door was open. Defendant pulled his gun out with his left hand and entered the apartment. Inside the apartment, defendant observed two men and two women playing cards. Defendant pointed his gun at the man who was sitting closest to defendant, with his back toward defendant, and defendant demanded money. This man jumped up and grabbed defendant's left wrist. The two men tussled, and the gun went off. When the gun went off, the gun was in defendant's left hand and the gun fired at the man's head. The other man "was already by" defendant, and defendant shot him too and fled. Defendant gained nothing from this intended robbery.

¶ 25 On August 15, 1992, defendant provided a second statement that was also recorded by a court stenographer and signed by defendant, the ASA, and a detective. This second statement concerned a robbery that defendant committed earlier, on May 27, 1992. After being admitted into evidence, this statement was also read into the record and thereby published to the trial court. Defendant stated that he went with a "bee-bee gun," to the same apartment building involved in the instant offense, with the intent of "[s]ticking up some dope peddlers." Defendant observed three men about to enter the apartment building, and he robbed them of a black jacket and $890, which he used shortly thereafter to purchase cocaine. After the purchase, he was arrested for a drug offense.

¶ 26 The State next called Detective Dennis Walsh, who testified that he searched the apartment shortly after the shooting in the instant offense and that he did not observe drugs or drug paraphernalia.

¶ 27 In mitigation, the defense called James Edwards, who was the superintendent of Division 1 of the Cook County Department of Corrections. Since defendant's arrival at Division 1 in August 1992, Edwards has received no disciplinary reports concerning defendant.

¶ 28 Defendant's mother, Mae Davis, testified that she and defendant's father were not living together when defendant was born and that the relationship ended when defendant was five years old. Davis lived with her mother until defendant...