People v. Savvides

• Decision Date: 11 July 1956
• Citation: People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885, 136 N.E.2d 853 (N.Y. 1956)
• Parties: , 136 N.E.2d 853 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Savva SAVVIDES, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 885

154 N.Y.S.2d 885

1 N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v.Savva SAVVIDES, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 11, 1956.

Peter L. F. Sabbatino and Edward J. Fontana, New York City, for appellant.

Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty., New York City(Sidney M. Fruhling and Charles W. Manning, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

FULD, Judge.

Convicted of the crime of feloniously possessing a narcotic drug with intent to sell, Penal Law,Consol.Laws, c. 40, § 1751, defendant seeks a reversal on the ground that the principal witness against him testified falsely, to the knowledge of the prosecutor who stood by in silence.

The relevant facts are briefly stated.Arthur Mantzinos, apprehended while picking up a quantity of marijuana from a locker in a New York City bus terminal, implicated defendant, Savva Savvides, as the one from whom he had obtained the narcotic drug.When Mantzinos pleaded guilty to the first count of the indictment, felonious possession with intent to sell, which carried with it a mandatory minimum sentence, the assistant district attorney advised the court that the plea was taken with the 'understanding' that, upon Mantzinos' 'continued, truthful co-operation,' the district attorney would 'permit' him to withdraw it and plead guilty to a lesser crime, one carrying no mandatory minimum.

Upon Savvides' trial, before a different judge, the People introduced a confession ascribed to him, which he repudiated, as well as incriminating testimony by Mantzinos, which he denied.The court and jury, however, were never informed of Mantzinos' understanding with the district attorney, the consideration promised for his continued co-operation.Indeed, though questioned at some length on the subject, the witness actually denied that he expected 'any consideration' in return for his testimony.The assistant district attorney, the same one who had been in charge of the case against Mantzinos, remained silent.

Some days after the jury found Savvides guilty, the agreement with Mantzinos was carried out.The court, assured by the district attorney that Mantzinos' co-operation was 'the ultimate factor' in obtaining that conviction, suspended execution of the one to two year sentence of imprisonment which it had imposed, after allowing him to withdraw his original plea and plead guilty to an attempt.

On the day set for his sentence, defendant, having learned about the undertaking, moved to set aside the verdict that had been returned against him.Following the court's denial of that motion and some time after he had been sentenced, he applied for an order in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis, and that too was denied.On appeal to the Appellate Division, both the judgment and the order were affirmed.

The conviction cannot stand.The administration of justice must not only be above reproach, it must also be beyond the suspicion of reproach.The prosecutor should have corrected the trial testimony given by Mantzinos and the impression it created.He should have, by immediate statement of his own or by further appropriate examination of Mantzinos, forthrightly exposed the lie, so that the court and jury would have known that the witness had reason to expect lenient treatment for 'continued * * * co-operation'.His failure to do so constitutes 'error so fundamental, so substantial,' that a verdict of guilty will not be permitted to stand.People v. Creasy, 236 N.Y. 205, 221, 140 N.E. 563, 569.

It is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness' credibility rather than directly upon defendant's guilt.A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and, if it is in any way relevant to the case, the district attorney has the responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth.Nor does it avail respondent to contend that defendant's guilt was clearly established or that disclosure would not have changed the verdict.The argument overlooks the...