People v. Schall, 02SA263.

• Decision Date: 16 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. 02SA263.,02SA263.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mark SCHALL, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

59 P.3d 848

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mark SCHALL, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 02SA263.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

December 16, 2002.

James J. Peters, District Attorney, William Hood III, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Englewood, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Joseph A. Lazzara, Westminster, Colorado, Attorney for Defendant-Appellee.

Justice HOBBS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In this interlocutory appeal, filed pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1 and section 16-12-102(2), 6 C.R.S. (2002), the prosecution appeals the district court's suppression of blood alcohol evidence that the Colorado Highway Patrol obtained from the defendant, Mark Schall. We reverse the district court's suppression order. The district court incorrectly concluded that the police lacked probable cause to arrest Schall for an alcohol-related offense, a precondition to collecting blood from him. The facts supporting probable cause in this case are that an eyewitness observed Schall driving his car into oncoming traffic, the police smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage from his badly wrecked car, and the police saw broken beer bottles inside the car. Because the constitutional prerequisites to collecting a blood sample¹ from a non-consenting suspect are satisfied in this case, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not bar admission of the blood alcohol evidence.

I.

This case involves an automobile accident that occurred in the early morning of April 2, 2001, on Colorado Highway 85 in Douglas County. The facts at the suppression hearing were that Schall's car crossed the centerline of the highway and collided with a semi-truck headed in the opposite direction. A second semi-truck, following behind the first, veered off the road to avoid Schall and the first truck. In the process, the second truck overturned, killing the driver.² Schall was seriously injured. The police did not have an opportunity to interview Schall or conduct a roadside sobriety test before a helicopter evacuated him to a hospital.

The police relied on facts at the scene of the accident to establish probable cause to believe that Schall was driving under the influence of alcohol.³ First, an eyewitness saw Schall driving over the centerline of the highway and striking the semi-truck. The police observed that there were no skid marks, which would have indicated that Schall tried to brake or dodge an animal or other obstacle in the road and lost control of his vehicle before colliding with the semi-truck.

Second, the police smelled a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage from Schall's car. The police saw several broken beer bottles in his car, along with one intact bottle.⁴ Based on the circumstances of the accident and the smell of an alcoholic beverage from Schall's badly wrecked vehicle, the police ordered blood draws while Schall was undergoing treatment for injuries sustained in the accident. Schall did not consent to the collection of these samples.⁵ The samples were obtained within two hours of the accident.

Based in part on test results from Schall's blood draws, the prosecution charged him with vehicular homicide⁶ and driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both.⁷ In a pretrial motion, Schall sought to suppress the results of his blood tests, arguing that the police obtained the evidence without probable cause. After a hearing, the trial court granted Schall's motion. It determined that the information known to the police at the time of the blood draws was not sufficient for probable cause to believe that Schall had committed an alcohol-related driving offense.

II.

We hold that probable cause existed for Schall's blood draws and testing. The facts at the suppression hearing were that Schall caused the accident by driving his car into oncoming traffic, the interior of his badly wrecked car smelled of an alcoholic beverage, and the police observed broken beer bottles in the car. Because the constitutional prerequisites to collecting a blood sample from a non-consenting suspect are satisfied in this case, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not bar admission of the blood alcohol evidence.

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing a suppression appeal, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by the record and review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo. E.g. People v. Hebert, 46 P.3d 473, 480 (Colo. 2002)

.

The taking of blood evidence from one's person is subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. People v. Diaz, 53 P.3d 1171, 1174-75 (Colo.2002). We have enumerated four criteria for evaluating the constitutionality of warrantless, non-consensual blood draws to test for the presence of alcohol: (1) there must be probable cause for the arrest of the defendant on an alcohol-related driving offense; (2) there must be a clear indication that the blood sample will provide evidence of the defendant's level of intoxication; (3) exigent circumstances must exist which make it impractical to obtain a search warrant; and (4) the test must be a reasonable one and must be conducted in a reasonable manner. People v. Sutherland, 683 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Colo.1984).

We determine that the prosecution has met each of these criteria, requiring us to reverse the trial court's order suppressing evidence from Schall's blood draws.

B. Application of the Sutherland Test

The crux of this interlocutory appeal is the first prong of the Sutherland test, whether the police had probable cause to arrest Schall for committing an alcohol-related driving offense. The police have probable cause to arrest when the facts and circumstances known to the police are sufficient to warrant the belief by a reasonable and prudent person that the defendant committed an alcohol-related offense. People v. MacCallum, 925 P.2d 758, 762 (Colo.1996). The probable cause determination rests on all of the facts and circumstances known to the police at the time of the arrest. Id.; People v. Washington, 865 P.2d 145, 147 (Colo.1994). Absolute certainty that the defendant committed the offense is not necessary; rather, probable cause involves that degree of certainty upon which reasonable and prudent people rely in making decisions in everyday life. MacCallum, 925 P.2d at 762; People v. Thompson, 793 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Colo.1990).

In MacCallum, we reviewed circumstances of a head-on automobile wreck from which the defendant driver had been transported to the hospital. The police could not ascertain the smell of an alcoholic beverage at the scene, due to MacCallum's evacuation and the extent of the wreckage. Nevertheless, we determined that the police had probable cause to take a blood draw from MacCallum, based on witness statements that he had been weaving across traffic lanes for a number of miles and drove into an oncoming vehicle. MacCallum, 925 P.2d at 762-63.

In MacCallum, we reviewed and distinguished two cases which held that no probable cause existed for an alcohol-related offense. In People v. Reynolds, 895 P.2d 1059, 1062 (Colo.1995), we held that a driver's one-car accident buttressed by the driver's admission to drinking three beers, six to nine hours before the accident, did not meet the standard of probable cause, in the absence of evidence that the accident occurred as a result of the driver's misconduct or due to the influence of alcohol. In People v. Roybal, 655 P.2d 410, 413 (Colo.1982), we held that the odor of an alcoholic beverage on the defendant was insufficient to support probable cause when there was no evidence that the collision occurred as a result of the defendant's misconduct. On the other hand, in People v. Shepherd, 906 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Colo.1995), we held that probable cause existed based on evidence that the defendant was at fault for a traffic accident resulting in death and serious injury, the presence of empty beer cans near the accident scene, and the odor of an alcoholic beverage on defendant's breath.

Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence contains both guidance and caution. A court must take into account the totality of circumstances known to the police. Facts in combination may support probable cause, whereas facts in isolation may not. See People v. Altman, 960 P.2d 1164, 1171 (Colo. 1998)

; Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(e) at 70 (3d ed.1996). In evaluating probable cause, the police may use their judgment, experience, and training in evaluating the circumstances and assessing the combined importance of the individual facts. Henderson v. People, 879 P.2d 383, 392 (Colo. 1994) ("Due consideration should be given to a law enforcement officer's experience and training in evaluating the significance of the officer's observations relevant to probable cause.")

Probable cause may be based on circumstantial evidence, and the police are entitled to draw appropriate inferences from the circumstantial evidence, even though the evidence might also support other inferences. See People v. Hebert, 46 P.3d 473, 482 (Colo. 2002)

(quoting People v. Hakel, 870 P.2d 1224, 1229 (Colo.1994)).

Here the police had probable cause to believe that Schall caused the accident by driving into oncoming traffic.⁸ They found no skid marks, animal remains, or roadway obstructions that might explain the cause of the accident. They smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from within the open area of the vehicle accessible to the driver. They observed broken and intact beer bottles in the wreckage, but, due to the extent of the vehicle's damage, they could not tell whether one or more of the bottles had been opened prior to the accident or...