People v. Scheck

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SHAW
• Citation: People v. Scheck, 356 Ill. 56, 190 N.E. 108 (Ill. 1934)
• Decision Date: 10 April 1934
• Docket Number: No. 22195.,22195.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. SCHECK.

356 Ill. 56

190 N.E. 108

PEOPLE

v.SCHECK.

No. 22195.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 23, 1934.

Rehearing Denied April 10, 1934.

Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Harry B. Miller, Judge.

John Scheck was convicted of murder, and he brings error.

Affirmed.Benjamin C. Bachrach, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago, and J. J. Neiger, of Springfield (Edward E. Wilson, J. Albert Woll, and Henry E. Seyfarth, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

SHAW, Justice.

The plaintiff in error, John Scheck (hereinafter referred to as the defendant), was indicted, tried, and convicted of murder in the criminal court of Cook county, and, upon a verdict of the jury, judgment and sentence of death were pronounced. By leave of court, this writ of error has issued to review that judgment.

On the 24th of July, 1933, there were three indictments pending and undisposed of in the criminal court of Cook county, namely, No. 69193, charging this defendant with robbery while armed, No. 69194, charging him and Carl Grundhoefer with murder, and indictment No. 69391, charging him with robbery while armed. All of said indictments on that date were on the calendar and call of Judge Molthrop. On that call, and for the purpose of having dates set for his trials, the defendant was in the ‘bull pen,’ or prisoner's cage, adjoining Judge Molthrop's courtroom, with several other prisoners, including Grundhoeffer, who was jointly indicted with Scheck in the murder case above mentioned. On the morning in question, Scheck had received a visit from his mother, his sister, and another girl. Before that visit he told Grundhoefer that he expected to have a gun, which proved to be a true prophecy. After answering the call and having his case continued until September, the defendant was returned to the bull pen. When his name was called to be taken from the bull pen to the county jail, he started in the wrong direction and got back of bailiff Kavanaugh, stuck a gun in Kavanaugh's stomach, and said, ‘I've got a gun here; get down on your knees, you son-of-a-bitch.’ Kavanaugh got down on his knees and Scheck then told him to get in the bull pen, and gave him a kick in the ribs. Scheck then started out by way of Judge Molthrop's chambers and courtroom, where a trial was in progress, being preceded by Grundhoefer. At that time John Sevick, a policeman in plain clothes, was on duty in Judge Molthrop's courtroom. Kavanaugh shouted a warning that a man was loose with a gun, and the policeman, Sevick, drew his revolver and attempted to prevent the escape. There was some shooting inside the courtroom and more shooting in the hall, after which Sevick staggered back into the courtroom with a mortal wound in his heart, from which he died within a minute or two. The defendant ran down several flights of stairs to a lower floor in the court building, where he was captured by a policeman on duty in connection with the state's attorney's office. At the time of his capture, he vainly snapped his gun several times at the man who captured him, but it was incapable of further discharge, all of his ammunition having apparently been used up in the encounter with Sevick.

The state proved the facts in the case by sixteen witnesses and three exhibits, which included the gun used by the defendant, the gun used by the policeman, and the bullet which was extracted from the policeman's body. The state also introduced in evidence the three indictments against the defendant hereinabove mentioned, for the purpose of proving the reason why he was present in Judge Molthrop's court, the reason why he might wish to be elsewhere, and in general the motive for his desperate effort to escape. The defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment on the contention that the introduction of these indictments in evidence was error, and also upon a claim of allegedly prejudicial and inflammatory remarks of the assistant state's attorney who tried the case for the people.

The record must be considered in the light of the manner in which the case was tried. Although no defense was made on behalf of the defendant, and although at the close of the trial, after the state had made its opening argument to the jury, the attorney for the defendant quite freely stated and admitted that the defendant was guilty of murder, yet the fact remains that the case was before the court on a plea of not guilty, making it incumbent upon the state to prove every element of the crime of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant did not see fit to enter a plea of guilty, and then introduce before a judge whatever evidence he might have in mitigation of his offense, but chose rather to take a chance that a jury might give him something less than the death penalty, thereby placing the state's attorney in such a position that it was not only proper but necessary for him to introduce all of the evidence which might tend to prove the guilt of the defendant and the degree of his culpability. It is apparent from the entire argument of the attorney for the defendant, which appears fully in the record, that the jury was selected and its personnel chosen with the single idea of trying to get something less than the death sentence, and that a jury to his satisfaction was obtained without using all of his peremptory challenges.

When the indictments in question were first offered in evidence, the attorney for the defendant offered to stipulate that the defendant was in custody by virtue of ‘an indictment’ but refused to stipulate any further. This offer was refused by the state's attorney and the court permitted him to introduce the records themselves. It was contended by the plaintiff in error that the real purpose of the state's attorney was to create prejudice against the defendant, and that, inasmuch as the crime was fully proved, it was unnecessary for the state to prove a motive. On this point this court has held quite to the contrary. We find the following language in the case of People v. Munday, 293 Ill. 191, 127 N. E. 364, 371: ‘At the beginning of the trial it was admitted by the defendant that on June 11, 1914, the bank was insolvent and the defendant knew it, and objections were made to the state introducing any evidence to show the insolvency of the bank and the knowledge of the defendant. His plea was not guilty, and he could not prevent the introduction of competent evidence to prove every element of the crime charged by admitting a part of them. The people were entitled to present to the jury all the facts, in order that they might have proper weight in determining criminal intention and what the verdict ought to be, as well as to decide whether the punishment should be by a fine only, or by fine and imprisonment. [Citing cases.] It is said that the only effect of the evidence was to create prejudice against the defendant, and it is undeniable that proof of criminal acts tends to create a feeling of prejudice against the guilty person; but that results in every criminal prosecution and furnishes no good ground for excluding evidence of such acts.’

In People v. Watkins, 309 Ill. 318, 141 N. E. 204, 206, the plaintiff in error had been convicted of the murder of a police officer, which occurred during an attempt to arrest the defendant and others. On the trial of the case the state was permitted to prove that ten days before the murder the Tri-City State Bank at Madison, Ill., had been robbed of some $13,000, and witnesses were permitted to testify on the murder trial that one of the men who were being arrested at the time of the murder was one of the men who had robbed the bank, and that the defendant was the driver of the automobile and waited in front of the bank until the robbers came cut. In that case it was held, at it had previously been held in the case of People v. Spaulding, 309 Ill. 292, 141 N. E. 196, that the fact that evidence offered proved, or tended to prove, an offense other than the one with which the defendant was charged, constituted no objection to its admissibility, and that when such evidence is offered, the same considerations with respect to admissibility arise as upon the offer of any other evidence. The only question in such a case is whether or not the evidence is relevant and whether or not it tends to prove any fact material to the issue involved. People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 96 N. E. 1077,43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1206;Farris v. People, 129 Ill. 521, 21 N. E. 821,4 L. R. A. 582, 16 Am. St. Rep. 283. In the course of the opinion in the Watkins Case the court said: ‘When a suspected person attempts to escape or evade a threatened prosecution, it may be argued that he does so from a consciousness of guilt, and so it is admissible for the prosecution to show that the prisoner killed an officer in attempting to escape. People v. Johnson [286 Ill. 108, 121 N. E. 246], supra; 2 Wharton on Crim. Evidence (10th Ed.) 1495. Where a deliberate criminal act is established by the evidence, the people are not required to prove a motive for the act (People v. Corder, 306 Ill. 264, 137 N. E. 845), but the presence of a motive which would lead the accused to commit the act charged is important in the consideration of the question of whether he committed it, and it is always proper for the people to prove motive when it can be done. People v. Zammuto, 280 Ill. 225, 117 N. E. 454.’

The...