People v. Schneider

• Citation: 362 Ill. 478,200 N.E. 321
• Decision Date: 19 February 1936
• Docket Number: No. 23381.,23381.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. SCHNEIDER.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

362 Ill. 478

200 N.E. 321

PEOPLE

v.SCHNEIDER.

No. 23381.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 19, 1936.

Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Grover C. Niemeyer, Judge.

Ernest Schneider was convicted of manslaughter, and he brings error.

Reversed and remanded.

WILSON, J., dissenting.

Grenville Beardsley, Thomas J. Johnson, Sr., and Thomas J. Johnson, Jr., all of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago, and A. B. Dennis, of Danville (Edward E. Wilson, Richard H. Devine, John T. Gallagher, and Morris G. Meyers, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

SHAW, Justice.

The defendant, Ernest Schneider, was found guilty of manslaughter in the criminal court of Cook county and seeks a review of that conviction by this writ of error.

He was tried and convicted once before on the same indictment; that judgment being reversed and the cause remanded by this court in People v. Schneider, 360 Ill. 43, 195 N.E. 430.

In our former opinion, we fully set forth the facts shown by the record of the first trial, and it is unnecessary to again repeat them here. On this trial some witnesses were either absent or not called and other and additional witnesses testified, but the evidence and the issues remained substantially the same. As in the former trial, the principalissues of fact contested were as to whether or not another car immediately preceded that driven by the defendant so as to cut off his view of the street and prevent him from having a reasonable opportunityto avoid the collision, whether or not he was driving at an excessive rate of speed, and, most important of all, whether or not he was intoxicated at the time of the accident. On the former trial, three witnesses testified that another car was preceding that driven by the defendant, whereas on this trial seven other witnesses testified to the same fact, and also testified that the people's witness Delacker did not stand in the middle of the street waiving to the defendant to stop. As on the prior trial, there was a sharp and irreconcilable conflict in the evidence as to whether or not defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident; several police officers and others testifying that he was under the influence of liquor, and a large number of others, including a doctor and trained nurse, testifying that he was not intoxicated. For obvious reasons we will refrain from discussing the testimony in detail, or expressing any opinion as to its weight or conclusiveness. The defendant strongly urges that it fails to show him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and preponderates in his favor, whereas the people attack the credibility of defendant's witnesses and with equal vigor assert the contrary. It is enough for us to say that the record is of such a character as to make it imperative that a trial be had free from prejudicial error; that the jury be protected from outside improper influence; that it be fully and fairly instructed; and that the prosecutor avoid appeals to passion and prejudice.

At the beginning of the trial, the attorney for the defendant requested that the jury be kept together during the trial and as a reason therefor suggested to the court that the case was certain to attract newspaper publicity of a character unfavorable to the defendant; that the case had been tried before and it was reasonable to suppose that the newspapers would carry articles in connection with it, and also pointed out to the presiding judge that he had no control over the papers; that ‘there undoubtedly would be a blast in the papers' about the case which would prejudice the rights of the defendant. The state's attorney objected to keeping the jury together, saying, ‘I think the real reason why you are making this motion is this, the Supreme Court said this is a close case and if you get the jury locked up you have a decided advantage over the State.’ The court overruled the defense motion to keep the jury together and permitted them to separate and have access to newspapers throughout the trial, which lasted several days. The day after the trial started, a Chicago paper published an article which was admittedly read by some members of the jury, and which stated not only the facts as to the case being retried, but contained the following paragraph: ‘A week ago Schneider drove his car against a parked automobile in front of the Hudson avenue police station. He was arraigned in traffic court for driving while intoxicated and the case was continued.’ Defendant moved to withdraw a juror and declare a mistrial, which motion was denied. This ruling of the court is assigned as error.

Other errors complained of concern the refusal of instructions, examination of witnesses, and the arguments for the people. The court refused to give an instruction defining intoxication, refused to give an instruction as to proximate cause, and refused to give an instruction that there was no legal duty resting upon a witness to an accident to give his name and address to the police or state's attorney; the latter instruction being requested because of the trial court permitting the prosecutor to question witnesses at length as to whether or not they had given their names to the police or the state's attorney, and, if not, why not.

Although it is apparent that the defendant was prejudiced by allowing the jury to separate, it is urged by the people that this was a matter entirely within the discretionof the trial court. It is intimated, although not actually claimed, that this is a discretion not subject to our review. Four cases are relied upon, namely, Sutton v. People, 145 Ill. 279, 34 N.E. 420, 421;People v. Stowers, 254 Ill. 588, 98 N.E. 986, 988;People v. Foster, 288 Ill. 371, 123 N.E. 534; and People v. Robinson, 299 Ill. 617, 132 N.E. 803.

In Sutton v. People, supra, which appears to be the earliest case in this state on the subject, it affirmatively appears that the request to keep the jury together was made privately of the court after the trial had started, and that the court informed the defendants that, unless some reason for such an order was shown, it would not be made. The defendant declined to make any such showing, and the jury was permitted to separate. This action of the court was held not to be erroneous. It was said, ‘Cases, both criminal and civil, may arise in which it will be proper to keep the jury away from the public while the trial is in progress, but they are the exception, and may be safely left to the discretion of the judge trying the case.’

In People v. Stowers, supra, the opinion states that it was not shown that the accused made any objection to the separation nor that any prejudice resulted by allowing the separation. We said, ‘The court may exercise its discretion in allowing the jury to separate during the progress of a trial in a criminal case less than capital, unless some sufficient cause is shown why they should be kept together, upon properly instructing them concerning their duties.’ In People v. Foster, supra, no question was raised as to permitting the jury to separate until after verdict, and in People v. Robinson, supra, the opinion states that no cause was shown why the jury should be kept together and holds that it was not error to allow them to separate. It is thus apparent that none of the cases relied upon by the people is broad enough to sustain the ruling of the court in the case before us, and, so far as we are able to find, this is the first case in...