People v. Schott
| Decision Date | 31 October 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 70861,70861 |
| Citation | 145 Ill.2d 188,582 N.E.2d 690,164 Ill.Dec. 127 |
| Parties | , 164 Ill.Dec. 127 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Arthur J. SCHOTT, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Cecil A. Partee and Jack O'Malley, State's Atty., Chicago (Terence Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, Asst. State's Atty., Margaret M. Regan, Sp. Asst. State's Atty., of counsel), Chicago, for the People.
Julius Lucius Echeles and Frederick F. Cohn, Chicago, for appellee.
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Arthur J. Schott, stepfather of the complainant herein, was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 11-4.1(b)(1)(A)), sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment and fined $6,750. Defendant appealed and by a written Rule 23 order, the appellate court reversed his conviction, finding the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (200 Ill.App.3d 1109 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).) This court allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 315).
The sole issue presented for review is whether a victim's testimony must satisfy the sex-offense standard of review, that such testimony be either clear and convincing or substantially corroborated, to sustain a sex-offense conviction where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal.
At trial, the first witness called by the State was Yvonne Jones, complainant's former second-grade teacher, who testified as follows: around the end of May 1985, a teacher's aid delivered a note to her that had been taken from the complainant; drawn on the note was a picture of an erect penis and the words--"Do you want to f*** "; she confronted complainant about the note but complainant denied that she had written it; a few minutes later, complainant admitted that she drew the picture and wrote the note; and approximately one week later, complainant told her that she felt as though she was pregnant and that the defendant had put his penis into her "private parts."
After complainant was adjudged competent to testify, the State elicited the following testimony from her: she stated that her date of birth was April 9, 1977; the defendant sexually molested her one evening around her birthday in a basement apartment located at 2638 W. Evergreen; she resided in this apartment with her mother, two brothers and the defendant; on the evening in question, the defendant woke her up so that she could use the bathroom because she had "wet" the bed; she went to the bathroom, removed her clothes and stepped into the tub; defendant then told her to turn off the water and he then put his finger into her vagina; approximately one week later, she was left alone with the defendant in the living room of the basement apartment; defendant told her to take off her clothes, lay on a bed and bend her knees; after doing so, defendant put his penis halfway into her vagina and she screamed; after she screamed defendant stopped and told her to get dressed; and towards the end of the school year, she told her second-grade teacher that she was abused by the defendant.
Defense counsel then subjected complainant to an exhaustive cross-examination. As a result, many inconsistencies were presented, including the location of where the offense had occurred: complainant stated that the two instances of sexual abuse that she had testified to on direct examination occurred at 2638 W. Evergreen; yet, her prior testimony from a juvenile court proceeding was introduced where she stated that the only thing defendant did to her at 2638 W. Evergreen was that he kissed her and grabbed her "private" and that "all of the other stuff happened at 2629." (The record shows that the defendant owned two apartment buildings, one at 2629 W. Evergreen and the other at 2638 W. Evergreen.) Her juvenile court testimony as to the location of the alleged offense was as follows:
"
After her juvenile court testimony was introduced, the trial judge proceeded to ask the complainant the following questions:
"THE COURT: * * * The apartment at 2629, was it a basement apartment?
A. Well, there was a basement downstairs. That was ours, and we lived on the top, the first floor.
THE COURT: And 2638 was a basement apartment?
A. Yes.
THE COURT: So, 2629, you lived on the first floor?
A. Yes.
THE COURT: At 2629, where was the television?
A. In the front of the house.
THE COURT: On the first floor?
A. Yes.
THE COURT: At 2638, where was the television?
A. The front of the house.
Complainant's answers to the judge's questions in the preceding passage tended to show that she confused the address of the building in which she was abused, 2638, with the address of another building that the defendant owned, 2629.
During the cross-examination, she was also contradicted as to the time of year that the alleged offense occurred. She said that there were no leaves flying around at the time the defendant put his penis into her vagina. Yet, her prior juvenile court testimony was introduced and in that proceeding she testified as follows:
"Q. And how many times did that happen to you?
A. Once.
Q. And what was the address?
A. 2629.
Q. Do you know when that was?
A. During the spring and fall.
Q. When?
A. The fall, in the fall.
Q. How do you know it was in the fall?
A. Because all kinds of leaves were flying around.
Q. Pardon?
A. Leaves were flying around."
Defense counsel's cross-examination established that complainant had previously lied to a judge when she told him that her uncle Mark put his penis inside of her. She explained that she made the story up about her uncle "[b]ecause [she] was angry[ ]" and "because my uncle had gave [sic] me some money, and he took it away from me." Complainant also gave the following testimony on cross-examination:
"Q. Did you ever lie at Larkin [Children's Home] or any place else just to see what people would do?
A. Not just to see what people would do, I lie a lot, yes.
Q. You lie a lot?
A. Yes."
Complainant also stated that she previously accused two boys, Brian and Antoine, of sexually abusing her. Moreover, she testified that her uncle Mark's friend, Steve, put his finger into her vagina when her mother left the defendant and she moved in with other relatives.
The cross-examination further disclosed that complainant was a sexually aberrant child. When she first moved in with her mother, she made her younger brother "suck on [her] private." She stated that she learned this sexual act "from a couple kids" in Arlington Heights (complainant lived in Arlington Heights with her grandmother before moving in with her mother, her two brothers and defendant). She also said, "the thing that I had my brother do on the toilet was called a cherry lick." However, her testimony was inconsistent with her prior juvenile court testimony where she had stated that she made up the story of "[w]hat William did to me on the toilet." Moreover, she denied on cross-examination that she had her brother, William, put his "private part" in her or another girl. This statement was also inconsistent with her prior juvenile court testimony where she had stated that "I had him put his private in the little girl, and then he put it in me." Complainant testified that, while living in Arlington Heights, she would take her clothes off in private and then show her "private parts" to other people.
Her juvenile court testimony, introduced during cross-examination, revealed that complainant observed her uncle engage in sexual activity. However, she answered "no" when asked by defense counsel whether she ever saw her uncle Mark and aunt Eva engage in sex. This statement was inconsistent with complainant's juvenile court testimony where she testified as follows:
"Q. Did you see Eva and Mark, what did you see Eva and Mark do?
A. He put his private inside of her.
Q. You saw him do that?
A. (Nodding in the affirmative)
Q. How many times did you see that?
A. Once."
Complainant was also contradicted during cross-examination about the number of times she was molested by the defendant. She denied ever telling anyone that the defendant had molested her everyday or almost everyday. However, she had given the following testimony in juvenile court:
"Q. Now, these incidentss [sic ] when [the defendant] would molest you, did you ever tell anybody that these happened on almost every day?
A. That is [sic ] was happening every day?
Q. Yes, almost every day.
A. Did I tell anybody?
Q. Yes.
A. My teacher and my mom, and my best friend. See, before I told my teacher, I talked to my friend about it, and she said it would be best--."
Doctor Sharon Ahart, a pediatrician, gave the following testimony: she physically examined the complainant on December 17, 1985; her physical examination revealed that there was redness on the inside of both of the large lips to the vaginal region and only a partial hymen was present; and based on her physical exam, the history taken from the child and evaluations received from a child psychologist and child development specialist, she diagnosed complainant's condition as child sexual abuse. However, on cross-examination, the doctor could not "say for sure that [the vaginal redness] would be definitely part of the child sexual abuse"; she also stated that the complainant exhibited "psychotic features due to past traumatization"; and she believed that some of the history that she had taken from the complainant was that the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Bahe
... ... Anderson, 47 M.J. 576, 578 (Navy-Marine Corps App.1997); Oliver v. United States, 711 A.2d 70, 71-72 (D.C.App.1998); People v. Eppens, 948 P.2d 20, 25 (Colo.App.1997) (rev'd for improper credibility evidence); State v. Childers, 1996 WL 729877 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. 1996) ... Chamberlain, 137 N.H. 414, 628 A.2d 704, 705 (N.H.1993); State v. Smith, 508 N.W.2d 101, 103-105 (Iowa App.1993); People v. Schott, 145 Ill.2d 188, 164 Ill.Dec. 127, 582 N.E.2d 690, 699 (Ill.1991) ... Although the majority of sexual abuse convictions are in ... ...
-
People v. Bailey
... ... We therefore reject Coyne's argument. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support Coyne's conviction. See People v. Schott (1991), 145 Ill.2d 188, 203, 164 Ill.Dec. 127, 582 N.E.2d 690; People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 48-49, 131 Ill.Dec. 86, 538 N.E.2d 461 ... III. CONCLUSION ... For the foregoing reasons, we uphold the constitutionality of the stalking and aggravated stalking statutes and ... ...
-
People v. Liner
... ... We note, however, that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of home invasion and armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Schott, 145 Ill.2d 188, 203, 164 Ill.Dec. 127, 582 N.E.2d 690 (1991) ... Even if a defendant denies his guilt and the defense witnesses corroborate his alibi, his alibi defense does not, in and of itself, create a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Wade, 51 Ill.App.3d at 726, 9 Ill.Dec. 271, ... ...
- People v. Parker