People v. Schrag

• Decision Date: 08 June 1990
• Citation: 558 N.Y.S.2d 451,147 Misc.2d 517
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Ralph SCHRAG, Defendant.
• Court: New York County Court

Page 451

558 N.Y.S.2d 451

147 Misc.2d 517

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Ralph SCHRAG, Defendant.

Rockland County Court.

June 8, 1990.

Kenneth Gribetz, Dist. Atty., for Rockland County, for the people.

Hollis Griffin, Fury & Kennedy, Pearl River, for defendant.

WILLIAM A. KELLY, Judge.

The defendant has moved for an order dismissing Count 1 of the indictment on the grounds that the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was not legally sufficient to establish that the defendant had the intent to defraud anyone and that the report at issue was not made pursuant to defendant's duties as a police officer. The People have opposed the defendant's motion.

In support of his arguments that no intent to defraud was proved before the Grand Jury, the defendant cites People v. Saporita, 132 A.D.2d 713, 518 N.Y.S.2d 625 (2nd Dept., 1987); app. dismissed 70 N.Y.2d 937, 524 N.Y.S.2d 689, 519 N.E.2d 635. The trial court in Saporita had used the New York Criminal Jury Instructions (CJI) definition of defraud as follows: "The term defraud means to cheat or deprive another person of property or a thing of value or a right." The Appellate Division, Second Department, stated that the People had not objected to this definition and they had become bound by it. Defendant Saporita was a police officer who was alleged to have falsified police records with the intent to cover up an automobile accident and to shield himself from disciplinary action. The Court found that conduct to be insufficient to establish an "intent to defraud" as charged since there was no evidence that "another person" was deprived of any property or right as a result of the defendant's actions. A review of the Article 175 crimes illustrates that the use of the term "intent to defraud" is not qualified by any language which limits their applicability to property or pecuniary loss.

When the Legislature intended to limit the scope of a fraud statute it has done so (i.e., Penal Law Sections 195.20 and

190.60.). While several Penal Law fraud statutes are directed specifically to preventing property or pecuniary loss, the fraud crimes in Article 175 of the Penal Law are not so delimited and therefore the "intent to defraud" terminology must be interpreted so as to effectuate their object, spirit and intent. A Court must interpret a statute in light of the purpose underlying its enactment.

Both the People and the defendant have discussed People v. Coe, 131 Misc.2d 807, 501 N.Y.S.2d 997 (N.Y.Cty., 1986); aff'd. 126 A.D.2d 436, 510 N.Y.S.2d 470; aff'd. 71 N.Y.2d 852, 527 N.Y.S.2d 741, 522 N.E.2d 1039, which involved a nurse who omitted from her nursing notes any facts relating to her search of a patient. The trial Court found that the intent to defraud required by Penal Law § 175.10 "is the intent to defraud anyone." The trial court stated the target of the intent to defraud could have been the facility, the patient's relatives, the defendant's supervisors, or others. Similarly in this case it may be that the target of the intent to defraud could have been the defendant's supervisors, the defendant's employer, or the victim of the assault himself. The Court of Appeals found the defendant's challenge to her conviction for a lesser included charge, with the same element of intent to defraud, to be without merit.

Although CJI refers to the object of the intent to defraud as being "another person," there seems to be no basis in law to require the defrauded entity to be a person. In fact, because the crime involves the false entry or omission of information from business records, the defrauded party is most likely to be a business entity rather than a person. See Penal Law § 175.00(1). The decision in People...