People v. Schrantz, Docket No. 13177

• Decision Date: 31 October 1973
• Docket Number: No. 1,Docket No. 13177,1
• Citation: 50 Mich.App. 227,213 N.W.2d 257
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donne Michael SCHRANTZ, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 257

213 N.W.2d 257

50 Mich.App. 227

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donne Michael SCHRANTZ, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 13177.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 1.

Oct. 31, 1973.

Released for Publication Dec. 27, 1973.

James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Div., Patricia J. Boyle, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before BRONSON, P.J., and V. J. BRENNAN and WALSH,* JJ.

V. J. BRENNAN, Judge.

Defendant, Michael Schrantz, appeals as of right from his conviction by a jury in the Wayne County Circuit Court of murder in the first degree (M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548). Defendant argues that several alleged errors require reversal of his conviction.

I.

At the time of the alleged offense, defendant and his wife were in the process of obtaining a divorce. In an agreement with his wife, defendant surrendered his right to possession of a house they jointly owned. On August 28, 1970, defendant was observed driving past the house and that night was observed standing by some bushes at the side of the house. Fifteen minutes later a scream was heard coming from the house by two neighbors and the police were summoned. Upon their arrival, the police observed a screen off the front window of the home and a Mercury automobile parked in the driveway. They knocked on the front door but initially received no response. After repeated knocking, a female voice responded that her daughter was sick and that there was nothing the police could do. The officers stated that the woman sounded as if she was crying and that she seemed upset. Believing that something was amiss, the police kept the house under surveillance. At 6:00 a.m., while driving past the house, the police noticed a white Cougar parked in the driveway. A license check was made on the car which revealed that it was owned by the defendant. On the afternoon of August 29, 1970, neighbors again called the police and asked them to see if everything was all right at the Schrantz home. At this time one lady told the police that she was certain that Mrs. Schrantz was home but that she repeatedly failed to answer her telephone. A further license check of both cars revealed that about a month earlier defendant had filed a missing report on his wife which indicated the existence of marital discord between them and contained the statement that the wife had left, taking the Mercury car and several guns with her.

By this time several police officers recalled that the defendant, about five years earlier, had driven his wife out of their home with a gun. The police also recalled that defendant was taken into custody under a 48-hour commitment order (M.C.L.A. § 330.19; M.S.A. § 14.809) only after the use of tear gas had become necessary.

Police officers were again dispatched to the home but no one responded to repeated knockings on the door. The police left and returned about an hour and a half later and proceeded to knock on all the windows and doors of the house. At this time, they observed general disarray in the kitchen and surgical tape, rope, and a long handgun case inside the Cougar. The police chief was informed of these developments and a police officer was then sent to obtain a search warrant. The judge before whom the officer appeared 'disqualified' himself from considering the matter because he was involved in the Schrantz's divorce action. He referred the policeman to the prosecutor's office. The police officer contacted an assistant prosecutor who authorized a forty-eight-hour commitment order under M.C.L.A. § 330.19; M.S.A. § 14.809.

During the time the police officer was attempting to procure a search warrant, other officers were still attempting to obtain some reply from within the house. Repeated knocking finally elicited a response from a male who adamantly refused to open the door stating that he was in insulin shock and that his wife and daughter were asleep. When the police officer arrived with the commitment order and after admittance was again refused, they broke into the house. Defendant was subdued in the living room as he attempted to draw a gun from his pocket. Police officers then went through the house and found both the wife and daughter dead of gunshot wounds.

At the trial defendant sought to have all evidence obtained as a result of the entry into the house suppressed on the basis that it was procured in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial judge denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence holding that defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because the officers had probable cause to believe that a crime had been or was being committed in the house at the time and because exigent circumstances justified their actions.

Defendant appeals, contending that the evidence should have been suppressed for two reasons: (1) the police did not comply with the statutory requirements of the forty-eight-hour commitment order and take him to a medical facility but rather used the commitment order as if it was a search warrant; and, (2) the evidence was procured by a search of the whole house without a warrant or consent.

Defendant's contention that the warrantless search of the house violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment is without merit. Although a search warrant is preferred, its absence does not per se make the search unreasonable. The legality of a search conducted without a warrant depends upon the law's appraisal of its reasonableness. People v. Eddington, 387 Mich. 551, 198 N.W.2d 297 (1972); People v. Cook, 24 Mich.App. 401, 180 N.W.2d 354 (1970); People v. McDonald, 13 Mich.App. 226, 163 N.W.2d 796 (1968).

In the case at bar the police knew that screams had been heard from the house, that the neighbors had not seen or heard from Mrs. Schrantz all day, that the defendant, who was having domestic difficulty with his wife, was in the house, that the kitchen was in disarray, that defendant had a past history of violent action, and that in defendant's car were rope, surgical tape, and a handgun case. The knowledge of these facts on the part of the officers gave them probable cause to believe that a crime had been or was being committed in the house. Their entry into the house under these circumstances, coupled with the fact that a commitment order had been authorized, was lawful and justified. Similarly, knowledge of the above facts, plus the fact that defendant was subdued as he was attempting to draw a gun from his pocket, gave the officers the right, if not the duty, to assure themselves that there were no injured persons on the premises. United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (CA 2, 1964). It was in performance of this task that the officers discovered the evidence complained of on this appeal. The evidence was not obtained through a full-blown search. Indeed, the investigation made here was not even an attempt to procure evidence but rather to ascertain whether any person on the premises was in need of aid. Under these circumstances we hold there was no violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and that error was not committed by the trial judge's refusal to suppress the evidence so obtained. The evidence was in plain view of the officers who had a legal right to be where they were. People v. Bennett, 46 Mich.App. 598, 208 N.W.2d 624 (1973); People v. Gray, 37 Mich.App. 189, 194 N.W.2d 545 (1971). We attach no significance to the fact that the officers did not take defendant to a medical facility after they had arrested him.

II.

The defendant, after raising the defense of insanity, was ordered to submit to a psychiatric examination to be administered by Dr. Bruce Danto, a psychiatrist for the prosecution. The defendant sought to have his counsel present during the examination but his motion in this regard was denied. Exclusion of others is common practice for many reasons, one being it is difficult for a psychiatrist to effectively exhaust the complete area of inquiry of mental state and receive the probably guarded...