People v. Schultz—knighten
| Decision Date | 21 February 1917 |
| Docket Number | No. 10907.,10907. |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. SCHULTZ—KNIGHTEN. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; David M. Brothers, Judge.
Anna B. Schultz-Knighten was convicted of murder, and brings error. Reversed and remanded.
Day & Guenther and Comerford & Cohen, all of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
P. J. Lucey, Atty. Gen., Maclay Hoyne, State's Atty., and Everett Jennings, both of Chicago, and George P. Ramsey, of Springfield (Edward E. Wilson and Dwight McKay, both of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Dr. Anna B. Schultz-Knighten was convicted in the criminal court of Cook county of the murder of Flossie Emerson by performing an abortion on her and has sued out a writ of error to reverse the judgment. She is a colored woman. Flossie Emerson was a colored woman about 23 years old and a prostitute. Most of the witnesses who testified directly to facts implicating the plaintiff in error were colored prostitutes or their associates, some of whom had served one term or more in the penitentiary. The prosecution rests largely on the testimony of one such witness, Minnie Shouse, which is contradicted in detail by the plaintiff in error, with slight corroboration of either. No comment will be made on the testimony further than to say that it was so contradictory and uncertain that it cannot be fairly said that the jury could not reasonably have rendered any other verdict than that which was rendered, and that therefore error occurring on the trial did not affect the result and was not prejudicial.
The prosecution introduced evidence for the purpose of showing that in 1909 the plaintiff in error committed an abortion on Mrs. Charles Ruppert which resulted in her death. The evidence was competent for the purpose of showing the knowledge of the plaintiff in error and her guilty intent. People v. Hagenow, 236 Ill. 514, 86 N. E. 370. Though a single abortion may have been committed for a sufficient reason and with no criminal intention, repeated acts of that character may create a reasonable presumption that they were not done to preserve life or ignorantly, but with criminal intent and knowledge, and the more numerous the acts the stronger, ordinarily, will be the presumption.
Charles Ruppert made and signed a written but unsworn statement in regard to the abortion charged to have been committed upon his wife, and this statement was read to the jury at the coroner's inquest in regard to the cause of her death. By agreement of counsel the coroner's record of that inquest was read in evidence, including this statement and the verdict, which found that the abortion was not induced but was spontaneous. The plaintiff in error now contends that the admission of this statement, even by agreement, was erroneous because it violated her constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face and to cross-examine them. Objections to evidence may be waived even though based on this constitutional ground, for the defendant may by a plea of guilty or a confession waive the production of all evidence of his guilt. The statute provides for the reading of an affidavit which has been admitted by the defendant to avoid a continuance, and it has been held that this statute does not deny to the accused the right to meet the witnesses testifying against him face to face. Hoyt v. People, 140 Ill. 588, 30 N. E. 315,16 L. R. A. 239;Keating v. People, 160 Ill. 480, 43 N. E. 724.
Dr. Charles A. Simmons, who had been called to see Mrs. Ruppert before her death, was called by the plaintiff in error as a witness. In the course of his examination an objection was made, and in the course of argument the court said: To which counsel for the plaintiff in error replied, ‘We don't know anything about it,’ and the court then said: ‘But the evidence on that fact, whether there was or not, is not introduced for the purpose of proving or disproving an abortion; it is only for the purpose of proving a knowledge of a former act or intent.’ Afterward the court instructed the jury that:
‘The purpose of allowing the testimony in regard to the Ruppert Case was for the purpose of showing the knowledge and intent of the defendant, only, and for no other purpose whatever.’
The jury were therefore given to understand that the evidence in regard to the Ruppert Case was not for the purpose of proving that the plaintiff in error had committed an abortion in that case, but only to show her guilty knowledge or intent. How the jury could infer guilty knowledge or intent on the part of the plaintiff in error from the evidence in the Ruppert Case unless she was guilty in that case is incomprehensible; but this is, in...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Cragun
... ... S. 1933, 103-2-1, supra, and that she could not be ... prosecuted therefor either as principal or as an accomplice ... Says the court in People v. Vedder, 98 N.Y ... "We ... regard the proposition as too well settled by authority, and ... too salutary in practice to be now ... ...
-
State v. Steadman
... ... her identity she used the assumed name of 'Mary ... Smith.' She was told by the accused that sometimes people ... talked, and if she signed that piece of paper, it would keep ... the accused out of trouble ... It is argued by ... counsel ... ...
- People v. Williams
-
Smith v. State
... ... issue, as part of the state's case in chief. State v ... McCurtain, 52 Utah 63, 172 P. 481, 482; Clark v ... People, 224 Ill. 554, 79 N.E. 941; People v ... Hagenow, 236 Ill. 514, 86 N.E. 370; People v ... Schultz-Knighten, [277] Ill. 238, 115 N.E. 140; ... ...
-
The Use of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence to Prove Knowledge
...knew the semi-automatic rifle was indeed a rifle. If not, admission was arguably improper. 105. See, e.g., People v. Schultz-Knighten, 115 N.E. 140, 141 (Ill. 1917) (holding in prosecution for murder by committing illegal abortion, trial court erred in admitting evidence that the defendant ......