People v. Schulz

• Decision Date: 20 July 2021
• Docket Number: F080978
• Citation: 66 Cal.App.5th 887,281 Cal.Rptr.3d 469
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Stephen Ray SCHULZ, Defendant and Appellant.

66 Cal.App.5th 887

281 Cal.Rptr.3d 469

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Stephen Ray SCHULZ, Defendant and Appellant.

F080978

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Filed July 20, 2021

Certified for Partial Publication.^*

Christopher Love, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Catherine Tennant Nieto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

MEEHAN, J.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Stephen Ray Schulz raises two issues on appeal. He claims the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to reduce his felony convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol to misdemeanors pursuant to Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b).¹ He also claims, via supplemental briefing, that pursuant to the Estrada² presumption, he is entitled to relief under Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 1950 or Assem. Bill No. 1950), which amended section 1203.1, subdivision (a), to limit probation for felony offenses to no more than two years, subject to certain exceptions. (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2.) The People contend that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion to reduce his felony convictions to misdemeanors, and although they do not dispute defendant's assertion that he is otherwise eligible for a probationary term that does not exceed two years under section 1203.1, subdivision (a), as amended, they contend that probation is not punishment and, therefore, the amendment does not apply retroactively to this case under Estrada.

After briefing was complete, we ordered the parties to file supplemental letter briefs pursuant to Government Code section 68081, addressing whether, assuming Assembly Bill No. 1950 applies retroactively, defendant's convictions for violation of Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivisions (a) and (b), qualify for a reduction in the probationary period under section 1203.1, subdivision (a), given that subdivision (m) of section 1203.1, which was added by Assembly Bill No. 1950, excludes "an offense that includes specific probation lengths within its provisions." (See Veh. Code, § 23600, subd. (b)(1) ["If any person is convicted of a violation of Section 23152 or 23153 and is granted probation, the terms and conditions of probation shall include ... [¶] ... a period of probation not less than three nor more than five years ...."].)

Defendant concedes that "in felony cases, Vehicle Code section 23600, subdivision (b) mandates a period of probation of ‘not less than three’ years." However, he claims that the exclusion under section 1203.1, subdivision (m)(1), applies only to those offenses that are both a violent felony under section 667.5, subdivision (c), and include a "specific probation length[ ] within its provisions." ( § 1203.1, subd. (m)(1).) The People disagree with defendant's interpretation of the statute and contend that because his convictions for violating Vehicle Code section 23153 subject him to a specific statutory probation period under Vehicle Code section 23600, he is excluded by section 1203.1, subdivision (m)(1), from eligibility for the two-year maximum probationary period under subdivision (a).

We reject defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to reduce his felony convictions to misdemeanors. We also reject his claim that he is entitled to a reduction in his probationary period.

As discussed below, we agree with defendant that under Estrada , Assembly Bill No. 1950 applies retroactively to cases not yet final on review, but we reject his interpretation of section 1203.1, subdivision (m)(1), and conclude that his convictions for violating Vehicle Code section 23153 preclude him from relief under subdivision (a) of section 1203.1. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY^**

DISCUSSION

I. Denial of Motion to Reduce Felony Convictions to Misdemeanors^***

II. Assembly Bill No. 1950

A. Background

As amended by Assembly Bill No. 1950, subdivision (a) of section 1203.1 provides, "The court, or judge thereof, in the order granting probation, may suspend the imposing or the execution of the sentence and may direct that the suspension may continue for a period of time not exceeding two years , and upon those terms and conditions as it shall determine. The court, or judge thereof, in the order granting probation and as a condition thereof, may imprison the defendant in a county jail for a period not exceeding the maximum time fixed by law in the case...." (Italics added.) However, Assembly Bill No. 1950 also added subdivision (m) to section 1203.1, which provides:

"The two-year probation limit in subdivision (a) shall not apply to:

"(1) An offense listed in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 and an offense that includes specific probation lengths within its provisions. For these offenses, the court, or judge thereof, in the order granting probation, may suspend the imposing or the execution of the sentence and may direct that the suspension may continue for a period of time not exceeding the maximum possible term of the sentence and under conditions as it shall determine. All other provisions of subdivision (a) shall apply.

"(2) A felony conviction for paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of Section 487, Section 503, and Section 532a, if the total value of the property taken exceeds $25,000. For these offenses, the court, or judge thereof, in the order granting probation, may suspend the imposing or the execution of the sentence and may direct that the suspension may continue for a period of time not exceeding three years, and upon those terms and conditions as it shall determine. All other provisions of subdivision (a) shall apply." (Assem. Bill No. 1950, Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2, pp. 4–5, italics added.)

Assembly Bill No. 1950 also amended section 1203a to provide that probation in misdemeanor cases may not exceed a period of one year ( § 1203a, subd. (a) ), except for "any offense that includes specific probation lengths within its provisions" (id. , subd. (b)). (Assem. Bill No. 1950, ch. 328, § 1, p. 1.)

The parties disagree on the following two issues: one, whether Assembly Bill No. 1950 applies retroactively to cases not yet final on appeal under the Estrada presumption and, two, whether, by virtue of the specific probationary period set forth in Vehicle Code section 23600, subdivision (b)(1) and the limitation in section 1203.1, subdivision (m)(1), defendant is excluded from relief under section 1203.1, subdivision (a). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude Assembly Bill No. 1950 applies retroactively, but defendant is not eligible for relief because his convictions fall within the exception set forth in subdivision (m)(1).

B. Legal Principles

"We review de novo questions of statutory construction. [Citation.] In doing so, ‘ "our fundamental task is ‘to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ " ’ [Citation.] We begin with the text, ‘giv[ing] the words their usual and ordinary meaning [citation], while construing them in light of the statute as a whole and the statute's purpose [citation].’ [Citation.] ‘If no ambiguity appears in the statutory language, we presume that the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute controls.’ " ( People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1123, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 458, 354 P.3d 268.) " ‘Only when the statute's language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, may the court turn to extrinsic aids to assist in interpretation.’ " ( In re C.H. (2011) 53 Cal.4th 94, 100, 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 573, 264 P.3d 357 ( C.H. ).)

"Generally, statutes are presumed to apply only prospectively." ( People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 627, 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 292, 466 P.3d 844 ( Frahs ), citing People v. Superior Court (Lara ) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 307, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22 ( Lara ); § 3.) "However, this presumption is a canon of statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional mandate. [Citation.] Accordingly, ‘the Legislature can ordinarily enact laws that apply retroactively, either explicitly or by implication.’ [Citation.] Courts look to the Legislature's intent in order to determine if a law is meant to apply retroactively." ( Frahs, supra , at p. 627, 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 292, 466 P.3d 844, citing Lara, supra , at p. 307, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22.)

Pursuant to the California Supreme Court's decision in Estrada , "[n]ewly enacted legislation lessening criminal punishment or reducing criminal liability presumptively applies to all cases not yet final on appeal at the time of the legislation's effective date. (See Estrada, supra , 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744–745 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948].) This presumption ‘rests on an inference that, in the absence of contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not.’ " ( People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 852, 272 Cal.Rptr.3d 814, 477 P.3d 539 ( Gentile ); accord, Frahs, supra , 9 Cal.5th at p. 624, 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 292, 466 P.3d 844 ; People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 44–45, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 459 P.3d 25 ; Lara, supra , 4 Cal.5th at p. 307, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22.)

C. Analysis

1. Estrada Presumption Applies

As an initial matter, the People maintain that Assembly Bill No. 1950 is not retroactive because the Estrada presumption applies to punishment and probation is not punishment. This position has been uniformly rejected by courts considering the matter. ( People v. Lord (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 241, 245, 278 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 ) ( Lord ); People v. Stewart (2021) 62...