People v. Scott

• Decision Date: 28 January 1885
• Citation: 56 Mich. 154,22 N.W. 274
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. SCOTT.

22 N.W. 274

56 Mich. 154

PEOPLE v. SCOTT.

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 28, 1885

Error to the recorder's court of Detroit.

Atty Gen. Moses Taggart, for the People.

Edward S. Grece, for respondent.

COOLEY C.J.

The respondent was convicted in the recorder's court of Detroit of a felony. After conviction he made a motion for a new trial, based upon the affidavits that one of the jurors by whom he was convicted was born in Canada, and had never been naturalized. There was no showing that the knowledge had come to the respondent subsequent to the impaneling of the jury, and no reason was given for not taking the objection to the juror by way of challenge before he was sworn. The recorder assumed the truth of the fact stated in the affidavits, but held that it constituted no ground for a new trial, and proceeded to sentence. The respondent took exception to the ruling on the motion, and now brings the case here by writ of error. The respondent relies upon the statute which requires jurors to have the qualifications of electors, (How.St. � 7555,) and upon the case of Hill v People, 16 Mich. 351, which was recognized as authority in Johr v. People, 26 Mich. 430, and Bronson v People, 32 Mich. 34. But a very cursory examination of the statute shows that respondent fails to establish the fact that the juror did not have the qualifications of an elector. Error will not be presumed; it must be affirmatively made out; and there are in this state many electors of foreign birth who have never been naturalized. If the intention to become a citizen is declared in due form of law, and the other conditions of age, residence within the state and voting precinct for the proper length of time, are found to exist, the constitution (article 7, � 1) confers the right of suffrage; and this juror, for anything shown in the case, may be a lawful elector.

It will also appear, in reference to the case of Hill v. People, that this case differs from that in the fact that in that case the disqualifying circumstances did not come to the knowledge of the accused until after the jury had been impaneled, when it was too late to take the objection by challenge. The fact was shown on the motion for a new trial but nothing of the kind appears here. It is quite consistent with all the facts now shown that the respondent knew of the disqualification when the jury was called, and purposely reserved the objection until after he had taken the chances of an acquittal by the jury and found the result unfavorable. It is said, however, on the part...