People v. Scott

• Decision Date: 10 June 2021
• Docket Number: NO. 4-19-0538,4-19-0538
• Citation: 2021 IL App (4th) 190538 -U
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JULIUS O. SCOTT, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2021 IL App (4th) 190538-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JULIUS O. SCOTT, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-19-0538

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

June 10, 2021

NOTICE

This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from Circuit Court of McLean County

No. 18CF692

Honorable Scott D. Drazewski, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Cavanagh and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) the trial court did not err in excluding defense witness testimony and (2) the prosecutor did not improperly bolster the victim's credibility during trial.

¶ 2 Following a May 2019 trial, a jury found defendant, Julius O. Scott, guilty of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(d) (West 2016)). The jury acquitted defendant on two counts of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20 (a)(1) (West 2016)). In July 2019, the trial court sentenced defendant to four years' imprisonment on both counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, to be served concurrently.

¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing he was denied a fair trial where (1) the trial court excluded critical testimony from a defense witness that corroborated his defense that he reasonably believed the alleged victim was 17 years old at the time they had intercourse and (2) the prosecutor improperly bolstered the credibility of the alleged victim by (a) personally vouching for the alleged victim's testimony during closing arguments, (b) arguing the alleged victim made prior consistent statements based on evidence outside of the record, and (c) using voir dire to predispose the jurors into accepting the alleged victim's testimony. We affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On July 18, 2018, the State charged defendant with (1) criminal sexual assault (the penis of defendant and the vagina of the victim) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20 (a)(1) (West 2016)) (count I), (2) criminal sexual assault (the mouth of defendant and the vagina of the victim) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20 (a)(1) (West 2016)) (count II), and (3) criminal sexual assault while being in a position of trust (the penis of defendant and the vagina of the victim) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20 (a)(4) (West 2016)) (count III), and (4) criminal sexual assault while being in a position of trust (the mouth of defendant and the vagina of the victim) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20 (a)(4) (West 2016)) (count IV), (5) aggravated criminal sexual abuse where the victim was at least 13 years old but under 17 years old and defendant was at least five years older than the victim (the penis of defendant and the vagina of the victim) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60 (d) (West 2016)) (count V), and (6) aggravated criminal sexual abuse where the victim was at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age and defendant was at least five years older than the victim (the mouth of defendant and the vagina of the victim) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60 (d) (West 2016)) (count VI). The charges stemmed from a November 2017 incident between the victim, D.H., who was 16 years old and defendant, who was 22 years old, where defendant inserted his penis into D.H.'s vagina and performed oral sex on D.H.

¶ 6 A. Pretrial Motions

¶ 7 On March 29, 2019, defendant provided discovery pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 413 (eff. July 1, 1982), alleging, in relevant part, he might call "Kendell [sic] Martin"as a witness at trial. During an April 5, 2019, pretrial hearing, defense counsel requested a continuance, stating,

"About two weeks ago my client gave me the name of someone who had information as to the victim in this case. It's a—it's a—a couple of the charges are charged as unable to consent based on the victim being under the age of 17 years of age. Obviously, there is a defense that if the defendant was under a reasonable belief that the victim was over 17 on his part, this witness, Kendall Martin, has information pertaining to that.

I, after getting a [tele]phone number for Mr. Martin, had an investigator attempt to contact him. She did make contact over [the] [tele]phone. He did not meet with her as she had requested. She has since in the last week been trying to get him served with an actual subpoena for next week and talk to him further but has been unable to do that."

The trial court granted defendant a continuance. On April 25, 2019, Kendall Martin was personally served a witness subpoena.

¶ 8 On May 3, 2019, defendant provided discovery pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 413 (eff. July 1, 1982), alleging he "intends to assert the defense that he reasonably believed the alleged victim to be 17 years of age of [sic] over, defendant may call any of the persons listed in the State's Discovery Compliance as a witness." On May 6, 2019, defendant provided additional discovery pursuant to Rule 413, alleging he intended to assert the defense of consent as to counts I and II.

¶ 9 B. Defendant's Jury Trial

¶ 10 Below, we summarize the relevant testimony elicited during defendant's May 2019 jury trial. Before the case proceeded to voir dire, the State moved to dismiss counts III and IV because "upon further investigation it appears that the defendant did not hold a position of trust or authority or supervision over [the] victim." The case proceeded to trial on counts I, II, V, and VI. The trial court admonished defendant on the charges against him. As to counts V and VI, the court stated, "consent is not a defense. However, an affirmative defense of that you had a reasonable belief that the alleged victim was over 17 is available as a defense."

¶ 11 1. Voir Dire

¶ 12 During voir dire, the prosecutor asked potential jurors about their possible responses to a mass shooting. The prosecutor stated,

"All right, folks, this next question, I'm definitely not trying [to] bring up anything that makes anybody uncomfortable, but could you raise your hands—the folks sitting up here in this jury box, could you raise your hand if you remember the 2012 mass shooting that took place in Aurora, Colorado, inside of a movie theater, if you remember that incident happening in the United States of America. ***.

***

*** So it looks like everybody raised their hand related to that question. So, ladies and gentlemen, obviously unfortunately in society today mass shootings are a fairly frequent occurrence. And the reason I bring that up is my next question is could you raiseyour hand if you've thought about what you would do personally if you were in a mass shooting situation? Could you raise your hand if you ever thought about what you would do in a mass shooting situation?"

The prosecutor then informed jurors that there were three possible victim reactions to a mass shooting: (1) confront the mass shooter, (2) flee from the mass shooter, and (3) uncertain how one would react to a mass shooter. For each possible response, the prosecutor had the jurors raise their hands to indicate how they would react to a mass shooter. The prosecutor asked the same set of questions to a second group of prospective jurors. Both parties selected prospective jurors from the two groups to serve on the jury.

¶ 13 2. Opening Statements

¶ 14 During opening statements, the prosecutor reminded the jurors of their different responses to the mass shooting question during voir dire and asked them to remember their responses when observing D.H. testify. Specifically, the prosecutor stated,

"I want you to keep that in mind that [D.H.] at the time this happened was just sixteen years old. She may not act the way that you expect a typical sexual assault survivor to act. Going back to the Colorado shooting example when you guys were all selected through the jury selection process, each one of you had a different reaction to how exactly you would react in that situation. I want you to keep that in mind when [D.H.] is testifying in front of you. Because she was a child when this happened, she may react a little bit differently by laughing nervously. She has a tendency to smileat awkward times. She understands the gravity of what happened to her, even though she was young at the time that it happened and she's embarrassed to talk about it. I'm confident you'll find her account of what happened to be authentic and the details to be compelling."

¶ 15 3. The State's Evidence

¶ 16 a. D.H.

¶ 17 D.H., the victim, testified that in the fall of 2017 she was 16 years old and lived in Bloomington, Illinois, with her grandmother. D.H. lived down the street from the Boys and Girls Club (Club) and Sunnyside Park. D.H. testified that in November 2017 she was not a member of the Club but she attended teen nights at the Club on Tuesdays and Thursdays. D.H.'s sister worked at the Club, and D.H. frequented the Club.

¶ 18 D.H. first met defendant in the summer of 2017, when she went to Sunnyside Park after seeing a group from the Club and defendant, who she guessed "was a volunteer" with the Club, playing in the park. D.H. identified defendant in court as the person she met at Sunnyside Park. D.H. testified she saw defendant at the Club frequently but she did not interact with him. D.H. spoke with defendant one time while she played with the younger kids in the gymnasium. D.H. did not recall a staff member at the Club ever speaking to her about defendant.

¶ 19 D.H. testified that in the fall of 2017 she obtained defendant's Snapchat information from her cousin. D.H. and defendant began to communicate back and forth on Snapchat. D.H. described her and defendant's communications as "Sometimes it was just hey, how you doing. But then it got to the point where he kept texting me and asking me, you know,begging me to try to be with him." D.H. explained she took "be with him" to mean date him. D.H. told defendant she was not interested in dating him. D.H. testified she told defendant she was 16 years old and never told defendant she was 17 years old or older. Defendant told D.H. h...