People v. Scowley

Decision Date21 October 1933
Docket NumberNo. 21980.,21980.
Citation187 N.E. 415,353 Ill. 330
PartiesPEOPLE v. SCOWLEY.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Error to First Branch, Appellate Court, First District, on Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; James J. Kelly, Judge.

Andrew A. Scowley was convicted of an offense, and he brings error.

Reversed and remanded.

Elwyn E. Long, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago, and J. J. Neiger, of Springfield (Edward E. Wilson and Grenville Beardsley, both of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

FARTHING, Justice.

Plaintiff in error, Andrew A. Scowley, was found guilty under an indictment charging him with the violation of section 253 of chapter 38 (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1929, p. 998), which provides: ‘Whoever, with intent to cheat or defraud another, designedly by color of any false token or writing, or by any false pretense, obtains the signature of any person to any written instrument, or obtains from any person any money, personal property or other valuable thing, shall be fined in any sum not exceeding $2,000, and imprisoned not exceeding one year, and shall be sentenced to restore the property so fraudulently obtained, if it can be restored.’

The grand jury returned the indictment in question on November 20, 1931. It was averred, among other things, that Frankie T. Westbrook and the defendant made a written agreement October 22, 1930, under which she was to convey certain Kansas City, Mo., real estate, and in exchange the defendant was to convey to her real estate in Birmingham, Ala., when he acquired title thereto; further, he was to assign a second mortgage in the sum of $30,000, junior to a first mortgage of $42,500 covering other real estate in the city of Birmingham aforesaid, and certain other real estate in said city and state. One of the terms of the contract was that Mrs. Westbrook was to pay off and have released a second mortgage or deed of trust for $20,000 on the Kansas City property. The indictment further charges: ‘And said Frankie T. Westbrook relying on the promises of said Andrew A. Scowley to carry out said contract, thereafter, on, to-wit, the twenty-third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and thirty, paid off said mortgage of $20,000 and it thereupon became relieved of said last mentioned lien. The grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further present that said Andrew A. Scowley thereafter, on, to-wit, the first day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and thirty, in said county of Cook, in the State of Illinois aforesaid, well knowing the premises and the terms of said agreement, unlawfully, willfully, designedly, fraudulently and falsely did pretend to said Frankie T. Westbrook that he, said Andrew A. Scowley, then and there had ownership and control of said real estate and of said mortgages on real estate situated in said city of Birmingham, and that he, said Andrew A. Scowley, could convey clear title thereto as provided by the terms of said contract as aforesaid, whereas in truth and in fact, as said Andrew A. Scowley then well knew, said mortgage for $30,000 was not then a lien upon said real estate in Alabama, but the total interest of the person that executed said mortgage for $30,000 had been, prior to the execution of said contract,entirely removed and extinguished by certain foreclosure proceedings, and said Andrew A. Scowley did not, either at the time he executed said contract or at the time he made said false pretenses, have any interest in said real estate or in the aforesaid mortgages on said real estate in Alabama, which false pretenses, the same then and there being false pretenses, were then and there made by said Andrew A. Scowley to said Frankie T. Westbrook with the design and for the purpose of then and there inducing said Frankie T. Westbrook to sign and execute a certain written instrument, to-wit, a certain deed of said real estate in Missouri, whereby said Frankie T. Westbrook conveyed to said Andrew A. Scowley said real estate in Missouri, and thereupon to have said Frankie T. Westbrook deliver to said Andrew A. Scowley said deed of said real estate in Missouri after the same had become signed, and to obtain the signature of said Frankie T. Westbrook to said deed and written instrument; and said Frankie T. Westbrook, relying on said false pretenses, believing said false pretenses to be true and being deceived thereby, was then induced by reason thereof, after the making of said false pretenses, to sign and affix the signature of said Frankie T. Westbrook to said written instrument and deed and to then execute and deliver said written instrument and deed, and said Frankie T. Westbrook did then sign and affix the signature of her, said Frankie T. Westbrook, to said deed and written instrument and did then execute and deliver said written instrument and deed, and said Andrew A. Scowley then, in said county of Cook, by means of said false pretenses, knowingly, designedly, willfully, fraudulently and unlawfully obtained the signature of said Frankie T. Westbrook to said written instrument and deed, which false pretenses were then and there made by said Andrew A. Scowley to said Frankie T. Westbrook with the intent to cheat and defraud said Frankie T. Westbrook, and said Andrew A. Scowley so obtained said signature, in the manner aforesaid, with the intent to cheat and defraud said Frankie T. Westbrook, and by means of the false pretenses aforesaid and said obtaining of said signature in the manner aforesaid, said Andrew A. Scowley did then in said county of Cook cheat and defraud said Frankie T. Westbrook,and at the time said Andrew A. Scowley so as aforesaid pretended, he well knew said pretenses to be false.’

A motion to quash was filed and overruled. As set out in the abstract the motion was general, and the action of the trial court in overruling said motion was correct, for the reason that in our opinion the indictment substantially stated an offense under the foregoing section of the Criminal Code.

Defendant entered his plea of not guilty and the trial was had before a jury, which returned a verdict of guilty. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled. The court fixed the punishment at one year in the house of correction and a fine of $2,000. A writ of error was prosecuted from the Appellate Court for the First District and the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. A writ of error was thereupon sued out of this court.

Numerous errors have been assigned by plaintiff in error, the essence of which is that the trial court erred in its rulings on the admission and rejection of evidence; in engaging in the examination of witnesses and their cross-examination, particularly of the plaintiff in error; and that the trial judge displayed a bias during the trial of the case which was manifestly prejudicial to plaintiff in error. It is further urged that the verdict was not supported by the evidence, and that the trial court erred in overruling the motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment.

Frankie T. Westbrook, a woman about seventy-nine years of age, resided in Kansas City, Mo., in 1930, and was interested in various parcels of real estate there and in the state of Alabama. Her daughter, Mrs. Amie H. Priestley, lived in Chillicothe, Ill., and for several years had aided her mother in looking after her real estate as her agent. On January 3, 1930, Mrs. Westbrook appears to have signed a power of attorney to this daughter empowering her to sell, lease, mortgage, and hypothecate all of her real estate wherever situate. The execution of this...

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7 cases
  • Ginesky v. Commissioner, Docket No. 4093-93.
    • United States
    • U.S. Tax Court
    • October 31, 1994
    ...element of the offense of false pretenses in Illinois is that the accused obtain money with the intent to defraud. People v. Scowley, 353 Ill. 330, 187 N.E. 415 (1933). However, the specific intent to defraud need not be proved by direct evidence, but may be proved by facts and circumstance......
  • Skolnik v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue
    • United States
    • U.S. Tax Court
    • March 24, 1971
    ...element of the offense of false pretenses in Illinois is that the accused obtain money with the intent to defraud. People v. Scowley, 353 Ill. 330, 187 N.E. 415 (1933). However, the specific intent to defraud need not be proved by direct evidence, but may be proved by facts and circumstance......
  • American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 21, 1933
  • Martin v. Commissioner, Docket No. 4263-87.
    • United States
    • U.S. Tax Court
    • August 11, 1988
    ... ... Lucas v. People, 75 Ill. App. 662 (1898) ...         In Skolnik v. Commissioner Dec. 30,690, 55 T.C. 1055, 1062 (1971), in similarly considering whether an ... An essential element of the offense of false pretenses in Illinois is that the accused obtain money with the intent to defraud. People v. Scowley, 353 Ill. 330, 187 N.E. 415 (1933). However, the specific intent to defraud need not be proved by direct evidence, but may be proved by facts and ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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