People v. Sears

Decision Date23 April 1931
Docket NumberNo. 20299.,20299.
Citation344 Ill. 189,176 N.E. 273
PartiesPEOPLE v. SEARS.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Suit by the People against Anna L. Sears. From an adverse decree, defendant appeals.

Reversed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Lake County; Claire C. Edwards, judge.

Cutting, Moore & Sidley, of Chicago (Charles S. Cutting, J. Dwight Dickerson, Edwin C. Austin, Carleton Blunt, and Robert N. Holt, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., John A. Swanson, State's Atty., Hayden N. Bell, Ross C. Hall, Harris F. Williams, Louis H. German, Paul J. Donovan, and Hiram T. Gilbert, all of Chicago, and Montgomery S. Winning, of Springfield, for the People.

PER CURIAM.

Richard W. Sears, a resident of Lake county, Ill., died in September, 1914, leaving a large estate. His personal property was appraised, for the purpose of ascertaining the inheritance tax, at nearly $13,000,000. By his will, which was duly admitted to record, he gave all his property to his widow, Anna L. Sears, and also nominated her as executrix. The subject-matter of the litigation which has resulted in this appeal is a claim of the state for taxes on the personal property of Sears alleged to have been omitted from assessment, in his lifetime, for the years 1907 to 1912, inclusive. The appeal is by Mrs. Sears, individually and as executrix, from a decree of the circuit court of Lake county rendered upon a bill in chancery in the name of the people. By this decree the property received under the will was charged with a lien for the payment of taxes found to be due on Sears' property omitted from assessment during the years stated.

Sears was a resident of the village of Oak Park, in Cook county, on the first day of April in each of the years for which taxes are claimed in this proceeding except 1912. He removed from Oak Park to Lake county in 1912. An assessment of personal property was made against him by the assessor of the town of Oak Park in each of those years, except 1912, upon which taxes were extended, and he paid in his lifetime the taxes so extended. From 1912 until his death he was a resident of Lake county, and this proceeding does not concern any taxes during that time or in that county. The bill was filed originally in the circuit court of Cook county but the venue was changed to Lake county, and Mrs. Sears answered, both individually and as executrix. The appellant resists the collection of the taxes on the ground that at the time Sears died no liability existed for the payment of taxes of any decedent which had been omitted from assessment during his lifetime. If this contention is correct, it will not be necessary for us to consider any of the other points raised.

The liability of the owner of property for the payment of taxes is purely statutory. The law is well settled that the legislative power of a state to provide for the levy and collection of taxes is unlimited, except as restricted by the state and federal Constitutions. Chambers v. People, 113 Ill. 509. The obligation of the citizen to pay taxes is purely a statutory creation, and taxes can be levied, assessed, and collected only in the mode pointed out by express statute. Cooley on Taxation (2d Ed.) p. 15. The Revenue Act of 1872 provided for the assessment of real or personal property which had been omitted in the assessment of any year and the placing of it on the assessment and tax books. The provisions for such assessments are contained in sections 276, 277, and 278 of the Act (Cahill's Rev. St. 1929, c. 120, pars. 291, 292, 293), and are as follows:

§ 276. If any real or personal property shall be omitted in the assessment of any year or number of years, or the tax thereon, for which such property was liable, from any cause has not been paid, or if any such property, by reason of defective description or assessment thereof, shall fail to pay taxes for any year or years, in either case the same, when discovered, shall be listed and assessed by the assessor and placed on the assessment and tax books. The arrearages of tax which might have been assessed, with ten per cent. interest thereon, from the time the same ought to have been paid, shall be charged against such property by the county clerk. It shall be the duty of county clerks to add uncollected personal property tax to the tax of any subsequent year, whenever they may find the person owing such uncollected tax assessed for any subsequent year.

§ 277. If the tax or assessment on property liable to taxation is prevented from being collected for any year or years, by reason of any erroneous proceeding or other cause, the amount of such tax or assessment which such property should have paid may be added to the tax on such property for any subsequent year, in separate columns designating the year or years.

§ 278. No such charge for tax and interest for previous years, as provided for in the preceding section, shall be made against any property prior to the date of ownership of the person owning such property at the time the liability for such omitted tax was first ascertained: Provided, that the owner of property, if known, assessed under this and the preceding section, shall be notified by the assessor or clerk, as the case may require.’

The statute thus provided for the assessment of omitted property. During Sears' lifetime none of the omitted property was assessed, therefore no liability existed against Sears in his lifetime for any omitted taxes. He had paid all the taxes assessed against him. None of the property involved in this suit which he owned at the time of his death had ever been assessed. Section 276 provided for the assessment of omitted property when discovered, and required the county clerk to add uncollected personal property taxes to the taxes of any subsequent year whenever he should find the person owing such uncollected tax assessed for any subsequent year. Its provisions clearly apply only to the omitted property of a living person, as it would obviously be impossible for the county clerk to find and tax a person who was dead. Section 277 makes no reference to an omitted tax but refers merely to uncollected taxes. This court, in People v. National Box Co., 248 Ill. 141, 93 N. E. 778, 779, held that section 277 ‘deals only with a tax which had been already levied, and had not, for some reason, been collected.’ This section, therefore, has no bearing upon the question of omitted taxes, and would only have applied if Sears had failed to pay taxes levied against him, which is not true in this case. Section 278 provides that ‘no such charge for tax and interest * * * shall be made against any property prior to the date of ownership of the person owning such property at the time the liability for such omitted tax was first ascertained.’ etc.

The liability for such omitted tax was not ascertained during the lifetime of Sears, who died in September, 1914. The assessments for omitted taxes are for the years 1907 to 1912, both inclusive. The petition for assessment of omitted personal property of decedent was not presented to the board of review of Cook county until September, 1915, and the assessments now in question were not made by the board until September, 1916. At the death of Sears, in 1914, there was a change of ownership. His will gave all his property to his widow at the instant of his death, subject only to the payment of his debts. There was no tax debt at that time, because during his lifetime there had been no assessment for omitted taxes. After his death and the change of ownership to his widow, any charge against the property for taxes and interest for previous years was expressly prohibited by section 278. If there is any doubt whether the sections in question authorized a charge for taxes against the legatee on account of property omitted from assessment by a deceased owner and devised by him, the language of the statute cannot be extended beyond its clear import to make the property subject to the taxation. Such statutes imposing a tax, in case of doubt, are construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the citizen. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Board of Review, 264 Ill. 11, 105 N. E. 704;People v. Barrett, 309 Ill. 53, 139 N. E. 903. There could be no valid subsequent assessment, for the reason that the statute expressly prohibited an assessment after a change of ownership. While the executrix held the legal title, the sole beneficial ownership was in the legatee or heir. If Sears had transferred all of his money and personal property to another in his lifetime, there would have been a change of ownership, which under the express terms of section 278, would have prevented any charge against the property for taxes or interest of previous years. He did make a transfer by his will, which had the same effect at the moment of his death as a transfer by a grant and delivery of possession would have had in his lifetime. The fact that the new owner of his property was his widow made her position no different from that of a stranger, as no exceptions are made in section 278 to its general prohibition against the assessment of omitted property after a change of ownership.

Even if the language of section 276 were construed to authorize an assessment of omitted taxes of a decedent, the provisions of section 278 would nullify the authorization. The language used in section 278 compels the conclusion that it refers to section 276. Section 278 provides, ‘No such charge for tax and interest * * * as provided in the preceding section.’ The only previous reference to ‘interest,’ or the duty of the clerk to ‘charge’ it against property, is in section 276. Section 278 also refers to the ‘person owning such property at the time the liability for such omitted tax was first ascertained.’ The use of the phrase ‘such omitted tax’ shows that section 278 referred to and euqlified section 276, as that section deals with omitted taxes while section 277 does...

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21 cases
  • People ex rel. Eitel v. Lindheimer
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 7 juni 1939
    ...a statutory creation, and taxes can be levied, assessed and collected only in the method pointed out by express statute. People v. Sears, 344 Ill. 189, 176 N.E. 273. Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed., p. 15. So, also, any right to a refund or a credit of taxes is purely of statutory origin, and in......
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    ...not competent even for the Legislature to give such operation to an act where it will affect existing vested rights. People v. Sears, 344 Ill. 189, 176 N.E. 273, 277 (1931) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1497, 1......
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    • 4 september 1956
    ...a statutory creation, and taxes can be levied, assessed and collected only in the method pointed out by express statute. People v. Sears, 344 Ill. 189, 176 N.E. 273; Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed., p. 15. So, also, any right to a refund or a credit of taxes is purely of statutory origin, and in......
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    • 4 april 1933
    ...ownership at the death of Mr. Tuttle and the appointment of plaintiff by the probate court, as executor of his will. In People v. Sears, 344 Ill. 189, 176 N. E. 273, 274, a question similar to that involved was before the court. The statute of Illinois provided for the reassessment of omitt......
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