People v. Seaton

• Decision Date: 20 April 1967
• Citation: 227 N.E.2d 294,19 N.Y.2d 404,280 N.Y.S.2d 370
• Parties: , 227 N.E.2d 294 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Marie SEATON, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 370

280 N.Y.S.2d 370

19 N.Y.2d 404, 227 N.E.2d 294

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Marie SEATON, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 20, 1967.

Margrethe R. Powers, Albany, for appellant.

M. Andrew Dwyer, Jr., Dist. Atty. (William J. Doyle, Jr., and Edward O. Spain, Troy, of counsel), for respondent.

FULD, Chief Judge.

The defendant herein was convicted, on her plea of guilty, of the crime of 'wilfully' causing or permitting her children to be 'placed in such a situation * * * that * * * life or limb (was) endangered,' and 'health (was) likely to be impaired' (Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, § 483, subd. 2), and sentenced to prison. According to the information, the defendant's children, both infants, were found, inadequately clothed on a street in Troy at 6:30 in the morning during a rainstorm. It is the defendant's claim--as set forth in her affidavit on appeal--that she had left her children at the home of a friend to be taken care of while she looked for a place to live and that, upon leaving for work the following morning, the friend placed the children on the street to play.

The defendant, adequately informed of her rights, elected to waive her right to counsel and pleaded guilty. Such action on her part imposed a heavy responsibility upon the trial judge. Before accepting the waiver and the guilty plea, he should have questioned her and satisfied himself, first, that she understood the consequences of her waiver (see, e.g., Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309), and, second, that she committed an act which constituted a crime and would furnish basis for the plea. (See People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 308, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386, 388, 206 N.E.2d 330, 331; see, also, American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, Tent. Draft (Feb., 1967), pp. 30--34.) Concerning the waiver, the Supreme Court wrote in the Von Moltke case (332 U.S., at p. 724, 68 S.Ct., at p. 323), 'To be valid (it) must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges * * * *. A judge can make certain that an accused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered.' And, particularly in a case where the plea is given without the benefit of counsel--unless the circumstances are such as those which existed in People v. Griffin, 7 N.Y.2d 511, 515--516, 199 N.Y.S.2d 674, 677, 166 N.E.2d 684, 686--the trial judge should inquire of the defendant 'as to the * * * details of the crime to which he is admitting his guilt' and not rely upon his 'mere mouthing of the word 'guilty ". (People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 308, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386, 388, 206 N.E.2d 330, 331, supra.) Although such questioning may deprive the guilty plea process of some of its efficiency, it has been well said that 'these inquiries nonetheless take far less time and are far less demanding of criminal justice resources than full-scale trials. The benefits derived for defendants and for the system far outweigh the loss in efficiency. First and...