People v. Seewald
| Decision Date | 25 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | Calendar No. 5.,Docket No. 150146. |
| Citation | 879 N.W.2d 237,499 Mich. 111 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. SEEWALD. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, and Bruce H. Edwards, Assistant Attorney General, for the people.
Fausone Bohn, LLP, Northville (by Keith W. Madden ), for defendant.
Victor A. Fitz, Eric J. Smith, and Joshua Van Laan, for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.
This case requires us to decide what alleged conduct is sufficient to warrant a bindover on the peculiar charge of “conspiring to commit a legal act in an illegal manner,” MCL 750.157a(d). In an anomalous reversal of roles, defendant, Paul Seewald, argues that his aim was illicit through and through. He never agreed to commit any legal act. Rather he conspired to commit an illegal act illegally; and that double illegality should set him free. The prosecution, for its part, argues that while defendant's agreed-to means were surely illegal, his conspiratorial ends were purely legal; and that legality is sufficient to try him as a felon.
The irony is not lost on us. Yet, after examining the conspiracy statute, we hold that the conduct alleged provides probable cause for trial on the charge. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Wayne Circuit Court for reinstatement of the 16th District Court's order to bind defendant over and for further proceedings.
Defendant and alleged coconspirator Don Yowchuang worked in the district office of former Congressman Thaddeus McCotter during McCotter's 2012 reelection campaign.1 Michigan election law required McCotter to submit at least 1,000 valid voter signatures before the Secretary of State could certify his placement on the ballot.2 Defendant and Yowchuang bore some responsibility for collecting those signatures and submitting them to the Secretary of State. The day before the nominating petitions were due, defendant and Yowchuang realized that several of the petitions had not been signed by their circulator, as required by law.3 To solve this problem, they agreed to sign the petitions as circulators, even though they had not circulated the petitions themselves. Defendant and Yowchuang explained that they signed as circulators so McCotter would qualify to appear on the ballot.
The Board of State Canvassers discovered the petitions' irregularities and, pursuant to MCL 168.544c(10)(a), disqualified the voter signatures contained thereon.4 The remaining signatures were too few to secure McCotter's place on the ballot. Shortly after the announcement that his name would not appear on the ballot, McCotter resigned his seat in the House of Representatives.
These events led to a criminal investigation. Defendant was charged with nine counts of falsely signing petitions, a misdemeanor under MCL 168.544c(9), and one count of felony conspiracy to commit a legal act in an illegal manner under MCL 750.157a. The conspiracy count charged defendant with agreeing “together with [Yowchuang] to submit nominating petitions with valid signatures to The Michigan Secretary of State by falsely signing the petitions as the circulator [.]”5
Following a preliminary examination, the 16th District Court bound defendant over to the Wayne Circuit Court as charged; defendant then moved to quash the information on the felony charge. The circuit court granted defendant's motion and dismissed the felony charge against him, concluding that there had been no conspiracy to commit a legal act.6 The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the prosecution could not show an agreement to commit a legal act.7 We granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal.8
In order to bind a defendant over for trial in the circuit court, the district court must find probable cause that the defendant committed a felony.9 This standard requires “evidence of each element of the crime charged or evidence from which the elements may be inferred.”10 Absent an abuse of discretion, a reviewing court should not disturb the district court's bindover decision.11 An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision “falls outside the range of principled outcomes.”12 Determining the scope of a criminal statute is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.13
The “gist” of conspiracy “lies in the illegal agreement”;14 once the agreement is formed, the “crime is complete.”15 Michigan law requires no proof of an overt act taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. And, because the crime is complete upon the conspirators' agreement, the prosecution need not prove that “the purpose contemplated by the unlawful agreement was accomplished.”16
At common law, conspiracy consisted of “an understanding or agreement to accomplish an unlawful end, or a lawful end by unlawful means.”17 Most states have since abandoned this common-law formulation, jettisoning the “lawful end by unlawful means” alternative in favor of a requirement that the object of the conspiracy be itself criminal.18 Michigan's conspiracy statute, by contrast, has retained the common-law form. MCL 750.157a provides:
Any person who conspires together with 1 or more persons to commit an offense prohibited by law, or to commit a legal act in an illegal manner is guilty of the crime of conspiracy ... [.]
As at common law, then, the statutory crime of conspiracy can be established in one of two ways: by proof that two or more persons have agreed to do an act that is in itself unlawful, or by proof that two or more persons have agreed to do a legal act using illegal means.
There can be little doubt that the Legislature intended to proscribe two forms of conspiracy. The plain language of the statute contemplates it,19 and distinct penalty provisions govern the commission of conspiracies to commit legal and illegal acts.20
The statute provides penalties for conspiring to commit an illegal act that roughly track the penalties for the substantive offense. Conspiracies to commit a felony are subject to the same penalties as the corresponding substantive offense.21 Conspiracies to commit a misdemeanor may be punished by no more than one year in prison, a $1,000 fine, or both.22
Conspiracies to commit a legal act in an illegal manner are treated differently. The statute makes such conspiracies categorically subject to penalties of up to five years' imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both, regardless of whether the “illegal manner” would constitute a felony or a misdemeanor if charged as a substantive offense.23 On the facts of the present case, this sentencing scheme elevates conduct that could be charged as a misdemeanor—either as falsely signing petitions or as conspiracy to do the same—to conduct chargeable as a five-year felony. In a different case, the statute might allow a prosecutor to limit punishment, by charging conduct punishable as a felony with a higher maximum penalty as a felony with a five-year maximum. The scheme thus places great discretion in the hands of prosecutors. Absent constitutional infirmity, however,24 we must give effect to the statute the Legislature has crafted.
We now consider whether defendant's agreement with Yowchuang can provide the basis for a bindover on a charge of violating MCL 750.157a(d). The statute specifies three elements: (1) conspiring, (2) to commit a legal act, (3) in an illegal manner. Here, the prosecution charged that defendant conspired “together with [Yowchuang] to submit nominating petitions with valid signatures to The Michigan Secretary of State by falsely signing the petitions as the circulator[.]” The parties agree that falsely signing a nominating petition as a circulator is an illegal act.25 What divides them is whether the agreement to falsely sign as circulators can be charged as an illegal means to commit a legal act.
The prosecution argues that submitting nominating petitions with valid signatures to the Secretary of State is, in the abstract, a legal act. Defendant and Yowchuang agreed to perform this legal act by falsely signing the petitions as circulators. In the prosecution's view, falsely signing is the illegal means by which the conspirators agreed to perform the generally legal act of submitting nominating signatures.
Defendant, by contrast, argues that, on the facts of this case, there never was any agreement to commit a legal act. Although submitting nominating petitions containing valid voter signatures to the Secretary of State is generally legal, once defendant and Yowchuang falsely signed the petitions, the voter signatures contained thereon would become invalid by operation of law, and their submission to the Secretary of State would therefore be illegal. Thus, as defendant characterizes the facts here, the only agreement between defendant and Yowchuang was to do an illegal act through illegal means.
At bottom, then, the dispute revolves around whether to read the conspiracy statute as requiring proof of an agreement to perform an act legal in generic terms, or legal as it would be performed in the particularcircumstances of the case. We conclude that it must be the former.
This Court has never opined on the scope of the “legal act” requirement under MCL 750.157a and so we have no precedent on point.26 Yet, defendant's suggestion that we should train our focus on the specific facts of the case when construing the statute's requirement of an agreed-upon “legal act” points us in the direction of our impossibility jurisprudence. Another way to have presented defendant's argument, after all, would have been to argue that it was impossible, on the facts of the case, to have done the legal act alleged (submitting nominating petitions) because the illegal means alleged (false signing) made the legal act illegal. Defendant has not squarely raised an impossibility defense. Still, our precedent...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Walters v. Snyder (In re Flint Water Cases)
...a rule from a case that did not address the pertinent question is "to build a syllogism upon a conjecture." People v. Seewald , 499 Mich. 111, 879 N.W.2d 237, 242 n.26 (Mich. 2016). See also Wright v. Spaulding , 939 F.3d 695, 702 (6th Cir. 2019) ("[Q]uestions which merely lurk in the recor......
-
People v. Cunningham
... ... conspiracy. And, because the crime is complete upon the ... conspirators' agreement, the prosecution need not prove ... that the purpose contemplated by the unlawful agreement was ... accomplished. [ People v Seewald , 499 Mich. 111, 117; ... 879 N.W.2d 237 (2016) (quotation marks and citations ... omitted).] ... "[D]irect ... proof of agreement is not required, nor is proof of a formal ... agreement necessary. It is sufficient that the circumstances, ... ...
-
People v. Coleman
..."An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes." People v. Seewald , 499 Mich. 111, 116, 879 N.W.2d 237 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of la......
-
Tomra of N. Am., Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury
...semantic meaning that is determined based on facts from the narrow context.").36 Reading Law , p. 167; see also People v. Seewald , 499 Mich. 111, 123, 879 N.W.2d 237 (2016) ("When possible, we strive to avoid constructions that would render any part of the Legislature's work nugatory.").37......