People v. Self

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: ALLOY
• Citation: People v. Self, 291 N.E.2d 282, 8 Ill.App.3d 1003 (Ill. App. 1972)
• Decision Date: 29 December 1972
• Docket Number: No. 72--201,72--201
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gaines SELF, Defendant-Appellee.

Page 282

291 N.E.2d 282

8 Ill.App.3d 1003

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gaines SELF, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 72--201.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Dec. 29, 1972.

L. E. Ellison, State's Atty., Whiteside County, Morrison, for plaintiff-appellant.

Donald Blodgett, Rock Falls, for defendant-appellee.

ALLOY, Presiding Justice.

This is an appeal by the people of the State of Illinois from an order of the circuit court of Whiteside County which granted the pretrial motion of Gaines Self suppressing as evidence, findings or results of a chemical analysis to determine the alcoholic content of defendant's blood. The State had planned to use the results of the chemical analysis as evidence against Gaines Self for the purpose of proving his commission of the crimes of Involuntary Manslaughter, Reckless Homicide, or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

Defendant Gaines Self was involved in an automobile accident which resulted in the death of an individual. After the accident he was brought to the hospital in an ambulance where, according to the stipulation of the parties, a specimen of his blood was removed by a qualified technician under the direction of a licensed physician, in compliance with the regulations of the Department of Public Health of the State of Illinois for withdrawal of blood. It was also stipulated that defendant did not consent to the withdrawal or analysis of blood to determine blood alcohol content and that he was incapable of refusing such action within the meaning of chapter 95 1/2 Ill.Rev.Stat., sec. 11--501(e). The parties also stipulated that the Illinois State Trooper who requested the taking of the blood sample had probable cause to blieve that defendant may have been intoxicated. In absence of statutory provision to the contrary, it is apparent that results of a blood test would have been admissible in evidence notwithstanding defendant's inability to consent to the extraction of the blood. (Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Ed.2d 448; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908.) The issue which is presented on appeal, therefore, is whether the provisions of chapter 95 1/2 Illinois Revised Statutes, sec. 11--501 upon which defendant relies and pursuant to which the circuit court order was entered actually precludes the admissibility of the results of the test.

Subsection (c) of section 11--501 referred to provides that evidence obtained by a blood test is admissible 'upon the trial of any action or proceeding arising out of the acts alleged to have been committed by any person while driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor * * *'. It is further provided that such evidence shall give rise to certain specified presumptions, provided, however, that 'evidence based upon a chemical analysis of blood * * * shall not be admitted unless such substance was procured and such analysis was made With the consent of the person as provided by this Chapter, whose bodily substance was so analyzed.' (emphasis added.) Subsection (c) also provides 'the foregoing provisions of this paragraph (c) shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question whether or not the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.'

Subsection (e) of sec. 11--501 referred to provides for the administration of a blood test to an unconscious person or to a person incapable of refusal and provides that, when such person 'is given a blood test at the request of a law enforcement officer under the provisions of this Chapter, only a physician authorized to practice medicine in all its branches, a registered nurse or other qualified person may withdraw blood, in a manner prescribed by the Department of Public Health for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content therein.'

On the basis of the foregoing provisions referred to, the State argues that the prohibition against the admission of a possible blood test as evidence is meaningless, because, in spite of the statutory language 'as provided by this chapter' (the chapter in which the statutory section is located) nowhere does the statute provide the manner in which consent is to be obtained. The State also contends that even assuming that the consent requirement is not regarded as meaningless, the statute contemplates two classes of persons, (1) those who are capable of consenting, and (2) those who are incapable of consenting; that even if the statute requires the consent of the former, it does not require it of the latter. The State's argument in part is that to require consent from persons who are incapable of rendering it would be a ridiculous requirement. The State further argues that the statute does not cause blood tests to be taken in violation of its provisions to be admissible for all purposes but only for the purpose of establishing the presumption specified in subsection (c). It is contended that even if the results of the test are not admissible to create the presumptions, they nevertheless should be admissible to serve as a basis for expert testimony.

Although some cases and language, including certain portions of the statute itself may lend support to the State's arguments, we do not agree with the...