People v. Sequin

• Citation: 609 P.2d 622,199 Colo. 381
• Decision Date: 31 March 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79SA69,79SA69
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Danny SEQUIN, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

Page 622

609 P.2d 622

199 Colo. 381

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Danny SEQUIN, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 79SA69.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

March 31, 1980.

Stuart A. Van Meveren, Dist. Atty., Loren B. Schall, Asst. Dist. Atty., Fort Collins, for plaintiff-appellant.

John P. Frey, Frey & Huisjen, Fort Collins, for defendant-appellee.

LOHR, Justice.

This is an appeal from a trial court order dismissing criminal charges against the defendant on grounds that section 42-5-102(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), is unconstitutional. We reverse.

Defendant was charged with two class 4 felonies under section 42-5-102(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), for knowingly possessing an automobile and automobile parts containing altered identification numbers. ¹ The statute provides:

"Any person who removes, changes, alters, or obliterates the vehicle identification number, manufacturer's number, or engine number of an automobile or automobile part or knowingly possesses an automobile or automobile part containing said removed, changed, altered, or obliterated vehicle identification number, manufacturer's number, or engine number commits a class 4 felony . . . ." (Emphasis added.)

The trial court found the statute to be unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and dismissed the charges.

Familiar principles of constitutional law provide the framework for our review. The statute is presumed to be constitutional. E. g., People v. Edmonds, 195 Colo. 358, 578 P.2d 655 (1978); Howe v. People, 178 Colo. 248, 496 P.2d 1040 (1972). Defendant has the burden of proving the statute to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. E. g., People v. Albo, 195 Colo. 102, 575 P.2d 427 (1978); People v. Gonzales, 188 Colo. 272, 534 P.2d 626 (1975). He has failed to carry that burden.

I.

We first address the question whether the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad.

A statute which proscribes conduct which can be prohibited under the police power of the state is overbroad if it also purports to proscribe conduct which cannot validly be prohibited under that power. People v. Garcia, Colo., 595 P.2d 228 (1979); People v. Holloway, 193 Colo. 450, 568 P.2d 29 (1977). A judicial declaration that a statute is overbroad on its face is an extreme remedy and is to be used sparingly. People v. Weeks, Colo., 591 P.2d 91 (1979); People v. Stage, 195 Colo. 110, 575 P.2d 423 (1978).

It is a fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication that "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court." Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); accord, People v. Stage, supra; People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 544 P.2d 385 (1975). Defendant recognizes that principle and does not attempt to bring himself within any of the limited narrow exceptions to its application. ²

Defendant has standing to challenge the application of section 42-5-102(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), to his business of assembling vehicles from new and used parts ³ to the extent that the statute affects him personally and adversely. See People v. Stage, supra; People v. Blue, supra. That statute was enacted to curb trafficking in stolen automobiles and stolen automobile parts. Cf. People v. Smith, 193 Colo. 357, 566 P.2d 364 (1977). ⁴ Trafficking in stolen property directly affects public safety and welfare and is an appropriate subject for legislation in exercise of the police power of this state. Cf. People v. Czajkowski, 193 Colo. 352, 568 P.2d 23 (1977) (involving an equal protection challenge to section 42-5-104, C.R.S. 1973, which treats theft of automobile parts). Alteration of identification numbers is one means to conceal evidence of theft. Prohibition of possession of automobiles and automobile parts having altered identification numbers is rationally related to the prevention of theft and the apprehension of thieves. There is no constitutional right to possess automobiles or automobile parts having altered identification numbers. Compare People v. Holloway, supra, with Wilson v. Denver, 65 Colo. 484, 178 P. 17 (1918). The state has a legitimate interest in controlling harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. People v. Fitzgerald, 194 Colo. 415, 573 P.2d 100 (1978). Thus, section 42-5-102(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), treats a legitimate subject for legislation under the police power, does not infringe any constitutionally protected aspects of the business of assembling vehicles from new and used parts, and is not overbroad as applied to such business. ⁵

II.

We next consider whether section 42-5-102(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), is unconstitutionally vague. Due process of law requires that a statute not forbid or require "the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); People v. Cardwell, 181 Colo. 421, 510 P.2d 317 (1973).

The trial court determined that section 42-5-102(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), was vague as to whether an actor must have knowledge of the existence of altered identification numbers in order to come within the conduct proscribed. If such knowledge is required, the statute establishes a substantial deterrent to purchase of stolen automobiles and automobile parts, without adversely affecting legitimate purposes. The legislative objective was to curb trafficking in such stolen property; the statute deals with those who seek to aid a thief. Cf. People v. Smith, supra (see note 4, supra ). If knowledge of altered identification numbers is not required as an element of the crime, a purchaser assumes a high risk of committing a serious crime unwittingly whenever he acquires an automobile. We hesitate to ascribe to the legislature an intent to create the dampening effect on legitimate commercial transactions which would result from such a statutory construction. Even more importantly, we will not lightly assume that the legislature intended to subject conduct to serious criminal penalties without requiring a culpable mental state. See People v. Washburn, Colo., 593 P.2d 962 (1979); People v. Johnson, 193 Colo. 199, 564 P.2d 116 (1977). Indeed, a culpable mental state almost certainly is constitutionally mandated if a criminal statute of the nature of section 42-5-102(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), is to comport with due process of law. See People v. Washburn, supra; see also People v. Johnson, supra (Erickson, J., specially concurring).

A statute should be construed in a manner consistent with constitutional requirements if possible. People v. Washburn, supra; People v. Gonzales, supra. Where a statute is susceptible to two different constructions, one constitutional and the other not, it will be presumed that the legislature intended the constitutional construction. People v. Fitzgerald, supra. The policies underlying the statute and the applicable rules of statutory construction provide guidance to resolution of the possible ambiguity in a manner fully consistent with the natural meaning of the language of the statute. We conclude that knowledge of the existence of an altered identification number with respect to an automobile or automobile part is intended to be an essential element of the crime of possession of an automobile or automobile part containing altered identification numbers, pursuant to section 42-5-102(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

A more difficult problem is presented in attempting to reconcile section 42-5-102(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), with section 42-6-117, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). That latter statute provides:

"The department (department of revenue) is authorized to assign a distinguishing number to any motor vehicle whenever there is no identifying number thereon or such number has been destroyed, obliterated, or mutilated. Such distinguishing number shall be affixed to the vehicle in a manner and position to be determined by the department. Such motor vehicle shall be registered and titled under such distinguishing number in lieu of the former number or absence thereof."

Defendant contends that the quoted provisions reflect a legislative determination that possession of a motor vehicle containing a destroyed, obliterated, or mutilated identification number is legitimate; that such possession is the very conduct which section 42-5-102(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), declares to be criminal; and that, in light of such conflict, it is necessary to guess as to the acts which section 42-5-102(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), was intended to proscribe. That is not the case.

A review of the history of the relevant legislation is helpful in harmonizing the statutes. Sections 42-5-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (the Automobile Theft Law), were first enacted in 1919. Colo.Sess.Laws 1919, Extra.Session, ch. 7 at 14. Prohibition of alteration of identification numbers and prohibition of possession of automobiles and automobile parts having altered identification numbers were not included in the Automobile Theft Law until 1976. Colo.Sess.Laws 1976, ch. 169, 42-5-102(2) at 809.

Sections 42-6-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (the Certificate of Title Act), were first enacted in 1949. Colo.Sess.Laws 1949, ch. 114 at 233. As originally enacted, the Certificate of Title Act contemplated the situation in which an identification number legitimately might be "changed or altered" by an owner incident to alteration, replacement, or change of a motor vehicle part. Colo.Sess.Laws 1949, ch. 114, section 6 at 239. ⁶ In 1952, a section was added to the Certificate of Title Act to provide for the situation in which an identification number legitimately might be "destroyed, obliterated, or mutilated". Colo.Sess.Laws 1952, ch. 31,...