People v. Sharpe
| Decision Date | 16 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 333872,No. 332879,332879 |
| Citation | 319 Mich.App. 153,899 N.W.2d 787 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Lovell Charles SHARPE, Defendant–Appellee. People of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Lovell Charles Sharpe, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Jason W. Williams, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Madonna Georges Blanchard, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Jonathan B. D. Simon, Bloomfield Hills, for defendant.
Before: Riordan, P.J., and Meter and Fort Hood, JJ.
In these consolidated appeals, the trial court issued an order1 granting in part and denying in part the prosecution's motion to admit evidence concerning a criminal sexual conduct victim's pregnancy, abortion, and lack of other sexual partners. In its ruling, the court held that references to the complainant's abortion and lack of other sexual partners were inadmissible, but references to the complainant's pregnancy were admissible.
In Docket No. 332879, the prosecution filed an application for leave to appeal, seeking to challenge the trial court's order to the extent that the prosecution's motion was denied. In Docket No. 333872, defendant filed a delayed application for leave to appeal, seeking to challenge the order to the extent that the prosecution's motion was granted. We granted both applications and consolidated the appeals.2 We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
This case arises from several incidents of criminal sexual conduct (CSC) that defendant allegedly committed against the complainant, DM, when she was 13 or 14 years old. Defendant has been charged with first-degree CSC, MCL 750.520b ; third-degree CSC, MCL 750.520d(1)(a) ; and fourth-degree CSC, MCL 750.520e.
At the preliminary examination, the complainant described two incidents of abuse by defendant that allegedly occurred in late 2013 or 2014. Defendant was previously in a relationship with DM's mother, and he fathered two of DM's half-siblings. The first incident occurred when defendant stayed with DM and her siblings while DM's mother was hospitalized. DM alleged that defendant made sexual contact with her, consisting of vaginal penetration as well as other touching. A second incident of abuse allegedly occurred at defendant's home, which again, included vaginal penetration, among other things.
In October 2014, DM went to Henry Ford Hospital after her mother received a letter indicating that DM had an abnormal test result and needed to see the doctor again. At that time, DM underwent a pregnancy test, which came back positive. DM had not been showing any signs of pregnancy, and she and her mother were unaware that she was pregnant before they received the test results. Before she went to the hospital, DM was unaware of how a woman became pregnant, and Henry Ford staff had to explain the process to her.
DM's mother told defendant about the pregnancy, and they agreed that DM needed to get an abortion. Defendant gave DM's mother money to pay for half the cost of the abortion, with no expectation of repayment. DM then underwent an abortion in November 2014.
For several months, DM refused to tell her mother how she became pregnant. In April 2015, after ending her relationship with defendant, DM's mother again asked DM how she had become pregnant. DM then disclosed defendant's alleged sexual abuse.
At the preliminary examination, DM testified that she did not have any boyfriends during the year that she was 14 and that no one else had penetrated her. DM's mother provided similar testimony, stating that she had no reason to believe that DM was sexually active with anyone other than defendant.
After defendant was bound over for trial, the prosecution filed a request to pierce the rape shield at trial. The prosecution first requested that the trial court admit evidence that defendant was the only person with whom DM had sexual contact between the incidents giving rise to defendant's charges and DM's abortion. The prosecution argued that this would corroborate DM's account of the sexual assault and help the jury to decide whether defendant penetrated and impregnated her. The prosecution asserted that the evidence would be admissible under the exceptions in MCL 750.520j and MRE 404(a)(3) as evidence regarding the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease. The defense argued that evidence concerning DM's virginity was inadmissible under People v. Bone , 230 Mich.App. 699, 584 N.W.2d 760 (1998), and that the evidence of her pregnancy and abortion was not relevant. Rather, it contended, the evidence regarding DM's virginity, pregnancy, and abortion was extremely prejudicial. Accordingly, defendant asked the court to preclude any mention of DM's virginity, pregnancy, and abortion at trial.
The court initially ruled:
Later in the hearing, the court provided clarification of its ruling:
Consistent with its ruling on the record, the trial court entered an order granting the prosecution's motion in part by allowing evidence of DM's pregnancy and denying the motion in part by excluding evidence of DM's abortion and lack of other sexual partners.
We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v. Mardlin , 487 Mich. 609, 614, 790 N.W.2d 607 (2010) ; People v. Aldrich , 246 Mich.App. 101, 113, 631 N.W.2d 67 (2001). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision "is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." People v. Orr , 275 Mich.App. 587, 589, 739 N.W.2d 385 (2007). In general, there is no abuse of discretion when the trial court's decision involves a close evidentiary question. People v. Sabin (After Remand) , 463 Mich. 43, 67, 614 N.W.2d 888 (2000). "When the decision involves a preliminary question of law, ... such as whether a rule of evidence precludes admission, we review the question de novo." Mardlin , 487 Mich. at 614, 790 N.W.2d 607.
The rules of statutory construction also apply to the construction of rules promulgated by the Michigan Supreme Court, including the Michigan Rules of Evidence. People v. Duncan , 494 Mich. 713, 723, 835 N.W.2d 399 (2013).
When construing a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. To do so, we begin by examining the language of the statute. If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning and the statute is enforced as written. Stated differently, a court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself. Only where the statutory language is ambiguous may a court properly go beyond the words of the statute to ascertain legislative intent. [ People v. Phillips , 469 Mich. 390, 395, 666 N.W.2d 657 (2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
These consolidated appeals implicate the same statute and rule of evidence. MRE 404 provides:
Similarly, MCL 750.520j, known as the rape-shield statute, states:
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People v. Sharpe
...of the evidence.In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals determined that all the evidence was admissible. People v. Sharpe , 319 Mich. App. 153, 173, 899 N.W.2d 787 (2017). As to the pregnancy and abortion evidence, the Court of Appeals held that MRE 404(a)(3) did not apply because MRE ......