People v. Sheldon, Docket No. 172889
| Decision Date | 17 January 1995 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 172889 |
| Citation | 527 N.W.2d 76,208 Mich.App. 331 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Calvin SHELDON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., John L. Livesay, Pros. Atty., and Vaughn K. Stecker, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.
Thomas E. Harmon, Coldwater, for defendant.
Before NEFF, P.J., and SAWYER and JOURDAN, * JJ.
The prosecutor appeals from an order of the circuit court quashing the information and dismissing the charges against defendant without prejudice. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Defendant originally was charged with one count of larceny over $100. M.C.L. § 750.356; M.S.A. § 28.588. Following the preliminary examination, the prosecutor moved that defendant not only be bound over on that count, but also that an additional count of larceny over $100 and a count of attempted larceny over $100 be added. The examining magistrate bound over defendant on two counts of larceny over $100, but declined to add the attempted larceny charge, concluding that the evidence merely showed preparation, not perpetration. Defendant successfully had the two larceny charges dismissed in the circuit court as a result of his motion to quash the information.
This case involves the alleged unauthorized removal of motor vehicles from an impound lot. Removed from the impound lot, which was operated by Banker's Wrecker Service, were a 1954 Cadillac and a 1966 Cadillac. No evidence was presented concerning the ownership of those vehicles other than a statement by defendant to the police that he had purchased the 1966 Cadillac a few days before having removed it from the impound lot. The information states that the victim of the larceny is Banker's Wrecker Service. It is the prosecutor's theory that, because Banker's Wrecker Service had the right of possession of the vehicles as a result of the impoundment, Banker's properly may be deemed the victim of the larceny. The trial court quashed the information after concluding that the wrecker service was not the owner of the vehicles. Additionally, the court held that even if it were to conclude that the wrecker service was the owner of the vehicles, there was insufficient evidence presented at the preliminary examination to establish that the value of the wrecker service's interest was more than $100.
The prosecutor first argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the automobiles did not belong to the wrecker service at the time they were removed from the impound lot. We agree in part. Clearly, there was no evidence presented that the wrecker service did, in fact, own the vehicles and possess lawful title to those vehicles. Thus, the question is whether the wrecker service enjoyed a right of possession sufficient to support a larceny charge at the time the vehicles were removed from the wrecker service's possession. We believe that it did.
Larceny is not limited to taking property away from the person who holds title to that property, but also includes taking property from a person who has rightful possession and control of the property. People v. Pohl, 202 Mich.App. 203, 205, 507 N.W.2d 819 (1993); People v. Hatch, 156 Mich.App. 265, 267, 401 N.W.2d 344 (1986). In fact, this expansive definition of "owner" for purposes of the crime of larceny is recognized in the jury instructions, specifically CJI2d 22.2, which provides as follows:
"Owner" in this case means the actual owner of the property [or any other person whose consent was necessary before the property could be taken].
Furthermore, this position is part of the generally accepted principles of criminal law, as evidenced by the example given in Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, § 32.06[B], p 503, citing 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, p. 231.
Similarly, if D, owner of an automobile, nonconsensually takes "his" vehicle from a mechanic who has a possessory interest in it because the car owner has not paid for repairs on it, D has taken and carried away the personal property "of another."
Professor Dressler's example is not directly on point to this case, inasmuch as the case at bar does not involve a garage keeper's lien on a vehicle brought in for repairs. Rather, it involves the right of the operator of an impound lot to hold a vehicle that has been impounded by the police. Accordingly, we must search the statutes for the legal authority of an impound lot operator to hold a vehicle.
With respect to abandoned vehicles, that authority can be found in M.C.L. § 257.252a(5) and (6); M.S.A. § 9.1952(1)(5) and (6). Under that statute, an owner of an abandoned vehicle may retrieve the vehicle from the impound lot upon the payment of the towing and storage fees. If the owner of the vehicle contests either the lawfulness of the impoundment or the reasonableness of the towing and storage fees, the owner may retrieve the vehicle upon the posting of a bond equal to the amount of the towing and storage fees, with the right to be reimbursed if it is subsequently determined that the vehicle had not been abandoned or that the towing and storage fees are unreasonable. Thus, the operator of the impound lot has the right of possession of the vehicle until such time as the owner pays the towing and storage fees or posts a bond for their payment while the issue is being contested.
In the case at bar, one of the vehicles involved was impounded as an abandoned vehicle. Accordingly, even if defendant is the rightful owner of that vehicle, he did not have the right to remove the vehicle from Banker's Wrecker Service's possession until such time as he paid the impoundment fees or posted a bond. Accordingly, the unauthorized removal of the vehicle from the impound lot could constitute the crime of larceny.
However, with respect to the other vehicle involved, the evidence only establishes that it was impounded for unspecified ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Maritime
...defendant's motion for reconsideration and dismissed the charges.The Court of Appeals reversed, focusing on People v. Sheldon, 208 Mich.App. 331, 333–334, 527 N.W.2d 76 (1995), for the proposition that the “owner” of property included not only the titleholder of that property, but also “any......