People v. Shellstrom

• Decision Date: 21 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. 97831.,97831.
• Citation: 833 N.E.2d 863,216 Ill.2d 45
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Daniel R. SHELLSTROM, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

833 N.E.2d 863

216 Ill.2d 45

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Daniel R. SHELLSTROM, Appellee.

No. 97831.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

July 21, 2005.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Joseph E. Birkett, State's Attorney, Wheaton (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin, Gary K. Chan, Michael M. Glick, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, Lisa Anne Hoffman, Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), for the People.

G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, Paul Alexander Rogers, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for appellee.

Chief Justice McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Daniel Shellstrom, was indicted in the circuit court of Du Page County on eight felony counts stemming from an incident that took place in Naperville on August 15, 1994. The indictment charged defendant with three counts of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(2) (West 1994)), three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(b)(1) (West 1994)), and two counts of residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 1994)). Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State. Under the terms of this agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of home invasion and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and the State nol-prossed the remaining counts. The circuit court sentenced defendant to 13 years' imprisonment for home invasion and 6 years' imprisonment for each of the two aggravated criminal sexual assault counts, with all three sentences to be served consecutively. Defendant moved for a reduction in his sentence, and the circuit court denied the motion. On direct appeal, the appellate court affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence. People v. Shellstrom, 294 Ill.App.3d 1114, 242 Ill.Dec. 579, 721 N.E.2d 858 (1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Four years later, defendant filed, pro se, a document entitled "Motion to Reduce Sentence, Alternatively, Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Order Strict Compliance with Terms of Guilty Plea." The circuit court treated the pleading as a postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2002)) and summarily dismissed it, finding that it was patently without merit. Defendant appealed from the circuit court's summary dismissal of his pleading, and the appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 345 Ill.App.3d 175, 280 Ill.Dec. 456, 802 N.E.2d 381. We affirm the judgment of the appellate court, for different reasons, and we vacate the judgment of the circuit court and remand with instructions.

BACKGROUND

As the basis for his guilty plea, defendant stipulated to the following facts. On the evening of August 15, 1994, defendant was walking in a residential neighborhood in Naperville when he looked in the bedroom window of a home and saw a woman standing naked. Defendant climbed a trellis that led to the second-story bedroom window, cut the screen off the window, removed all of his clothing, and entered the home. Once inside, defendant found himself in the master bedroom. Defendant moved to the next room and crouched beside a bed where a four-year-old girl was sleeping. When the girl's 11-year-old sister entered the room, defendant approached her, pulled her shirt up over her face, laid her on her back, pulled her pants down, and sexually assaulted her. Defendant then led the girl downstairs and again assaulted her. He told the girl to open the front door for him, and, still naked, he left the residence.

During the hearing on defendant's guilty plea, the circuit court admonished defendant that each of the three counts to which he was pleading guilty was a Class X felony which carried a sentence of 6 to 30 years in prison. The court further admonished defendant that his sentences for these three counts would be served consecutively. The court added that defendant's sentences would be followed by a three-year period of mandatory supervised release (MSR). Defendant indicated that he understood these admonishments.

With regard to the two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, the court sentenced defendant to six years' imprisonment on each of these counts. An additional sentence of 13 years' imprisonment was imposed for home invasion, bringing defendant's total sentence to 25 years, plus the three years of MSR. In June 1995 defendant moved for a reduction in his sentence, and the circuit court denied the motion. Defendant's convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. No. 2-95-0794 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

In May 2002 defendant, appearing pro se, filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Reduce Sentence, Alternatively, Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Order Strict Compliance with Terms of Guilty Plea." "Respondents" listed in the pleading were "DONALD N. SNYDER, Director of Illinois Department of Corrections," and the "PRISON REVIEW BOARD."

In the pleading, defendant alleged that (1) the circuit court never informed him of the three-year MSR period and (2) the judgment order made no mention of an MSR term. According to defendant, he only "recently learned from his place of confinement that[,] following his completion of the [j]udicially imposed sentence, he would have to serve a 3-year term of MSR." Defendant argued that the alleged failure to inform him of the MSR term resulted in a violation of his constitutional right to due process. Defendant argued in addition that the MSR term was imposed by the administrators of the prison where he was confined, not by the circuit court, and therefore violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1. In a related argument, defendant contended that the allegedly non-judicially-imposed MSR term was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Defendant also argued that, under the relevant statute (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d) (West 1994)), the MSR term was to run concurrently with the prison sentence, not consecutive to it. As relief, defendant asked that the judgment orders be amended to show that he was not required to serve the MSR term.

The circuit court treated the pleading as a postconviction petition pursuant to the Act, and summarily dismissed it, finding that it was "patently without merit." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2002). Defendant was not present and had no notice and no opportunity to respond to the circuit court's dismissal of his complaint.

Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in treating his pleading as a postconviction petition and summarily dismissing it. Defendant conceded that his pleading, if construed as a motion to reduce sentence, would have been untimely. 188 Ill.2d R. 604(d). However, defendant noted that his pleading was titled, alternatively, as an action under the mandamus statute. Thus, defendant argued, his pleading should have been treated as a motion for mandamus relief. Defendant further asserted that there was no provision in the mandamus statute for summary dismissal. The appellate court agreed with defendant that there was no provision in the mandamus statute authorizing summary dismissal of a mandamus complaint. According to the appellate court, the circuit court should have followed the procedure outlined in the mandamus statute, under which the nonmoving party is required to answer or otherwise plead, and the moving party may then respond. The appellate court held that "[t]he trial court committed reversible error when it failed to follow these statutory provisions and instead summarily dismissed defendant's complaint." 345 Ill.App.3d at 177, 280 Ill.Dec. 456, 802 N.E.2d 381. The appellate court reversed and remanded.

We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill.2d R. 315).

ANALYSIS

Before this court, defendant argues, as he did before the appellate court, that his pleading should have been treated as a mandamus complaint and not as a postconviction petition. Defendant concedes that, where a pro se pleading is unlabeled, a trial court may properly recharacterize it as a postconviction petition. However, defendant emphasizes that his pleading in the case at bar "specifically invoked the mandamus statute and never referred to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act." According to defendant, where a pro se pleading is clearly labeled, it should not be recharacterized as a postconviction petition. To do so, defendant argues, deprives a pro se litigant of his choice of procedural vehicle. Quoting from Justice Scalia's partial concurrence in Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386, 124 S.Ct. 786, 794, 157 L.Ed.2d 778, 789 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Thomas, J.), defendant contends that the recharacterization of a clearly labeled pleading "essentially amounts to a `paternalistic judicial exception to the principle of party self-determination.'" Defendant argues that, in the case at bar, his choice of the procedural vehicle of mandamus should have been respected. We disagree.

Under our precedent, it is well settled that, where a pro se pleading alleges a deprivation of constitutional rights cognizable under the Act, a trial court may treat the pleading as a postconviction petition. People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill.2d 555, 566, 280 Ill.Dec. 311, 802 N.E.2d 236 (2003); People ex rel. Palmer v. Twomey, 53 Ill.2d 479, 484, 292 N.E.2d 379 (1973). Moreover, contrary to defendant's argument, such recharacterization is allowed even where the pro se pleading is clearly labeled. In Palmer we stated:

"It is apparent that the same lack of legal knowledge which causes a prisoner to draft an inadequate post-conviction petition might result in his selecting the wrong method of collaterally attacking his conviction. A salutary result, consistent with the intent of the...