People v. Sherman-Huffman
| Decision Date | 24 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 117468, Calendar No. 4. |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Cross-Appellee, v. Bonnie June SHERMAN-HUFFMAN, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, James J. Gregart, Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith B. Ketchum, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Kalamazoo, MI, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Gail Rodwan), Detroit, MI, for the defendant.
Jeffrey L. Sauter, President, Michael E. Duggan, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training
and Appeals, Detroit, MI, for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and William E. Molner, Assistant Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for the people.
Arthur A. Busch, Prosecuting Attorney, and Donald A. Kuebler, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Flint, MI, for the people.
Defendant was charged with and convicted of third-degree child abuse1 after she spanked the victim, her daughter, twice, and pushed her in the face, causing a nosebleed and bruising on the victim's face and back. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction, holding that third-degree child abuse is a specific intent crime and that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of defendant's specific intent to harm her child. We originally granted leave to consider whether third-degree child abuse is a specific or general intent crime. We conclude, however, that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of third-degree child abuse regardless of whether the statute requires general or specific intent.2 Accordingly, we affirm defendant's conviction.
In determining whether sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction, this Court reviews the evidence in a light favorable to the prosecution. People v. Wolfe, 440 Mich. 508, 515, 489 N.W.2d 748 (1992). This Court must consider "`whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. at 513-514, 489 N.W.2d 748, quoting People v. Hampton, 407 Mich. 354, 366, 285 N.W.2d 284 (1979). See also People v. Nowack, 462 Mich. 392, 399-400, 614 N.W.2d 78 (2000).
Here, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of defendant's guilt at trial. Defendant admitted striking her child. The victim's testimony corroborated defendant's admission. The testimony of school, law enforcement, and medical personnel established that the victim sustained physical injury in the form of extensive bruising to parts of her body and a nosebleed. Further, the injuries to the victim's face were sufficiently painful that the victim asked for an ice pack at school on the following day.
Michigan's third-degree child abuse statute states that a defendant must "knowingly or intentionally" cause physical harm to a child. Regardless of whether the statute requires general or specific intent, the evidence is sufficient to convict defendant of third-degree child abuse because she knew of her daughter's susceptibility to bruising, due to asthma medication taken by the victim, yet still spanked her with enough force to dislodge a blood clot from her daughter's nose and to cause bruises that raised the suspicion of several school, law enforcement, and medical personnel. Thus, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence that defendant had the requisite mens rea to convict her of third-degree child abuse.
Accordingly, we affirm the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to convict defendant of third-degree child abuse.
Defendant also argues that the prosecution failed to prove that her conduct toward the victim was not a reasonable disciplinary measure. She invokes M.C.L. § 750.136b(7)3 to make this argument.
Defendant did not formally invoke the "reasonable discipline" statute at trial, but she did indicate in her trial testimony that the victim (her daughter) was "getting real, real lippy" with her and that she intended to punish the victim by spanking her. The trial court did not expressly refer to the "reasonable discipline" statutory provision in its findings of fact. However, the trial court obviously rejected the...
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