People v. Silagy

Decision Date16 April 1987
Docket NumberNo. 62912,62912
Citation507 N.E.2d 830,116 Ill.2d 357,107 Ill.Dec. 677
Parties, 107 Ill.Dec. 677 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Charles SILAGY, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Roma J. Stewart, Sol. Gen., Mark L. Rotert, Scott Graham, Jack Donatelli, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, for appellee.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, Springfield, Deborah L. Rose, Asst. Defender, for appellant.

Justice WARD delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Charles Silagy, was convicted in the circuit court of Vermilion County of the murder of two women and sentenced to death. This court affirmed on direct appeal (People v. Silagy (1984), 101 Ill.2d 147, 77 Ill.Dec. 792, 461 N.E.2d 415), and the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari (Silagy v. Illinois (1984), 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 227, 83 L.Ed.2d 156). The defendant has now appealed from the circuit court's denial of a petition filed under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 122-1 et seq.). Because of the sentence of death, there is a direct appeal to this court under Supreme Court Rule 651 (103 Ill.2d R. 651). We affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

The circumstances of the crimes involved were discussed at length in the first appeal (Silagy I ), 101 Ill.2d 147, 77 Ill.Dec. 792, 461 N.E.2d 415, and we will discuss the facts relevant to the issues on this review. Silagy was arrested on February 15, 1980, in connection with the murders of two women in Danville. Insanity was the defense at trial. A jury found him guilty of both crimes, and he chose to represent himself at the sentencing hearing. At that hearing, Silagy confessed to the crimes and asked that the death penalty be imposed. The jury did sentence him to death, and Silagy asked that he be executed without delay. The convictions and sentence, however, were challenged on numerous grounds on direct appeal to this court, and as stated, this court affirmed.

Silagy's counsel subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the circuit court of Vermilion County (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 122-1 et seq.). The State moved to dismiss the petition, and after argument, the court dismissed the petition; Silagy's motion for reconsideration was denied. The trial court's order held that the issues raised in the petition were previously ruled upon by this court in Silagy's direct appeal and were res judicata, were waived by his failure to raise them in the prior appeal, or involved simply questions of trial strategy.

The sole issue presented on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing Silagy's post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing on the allegations raised by affidavits that supported the petition. He argues that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to develop the allegations made in the affidavits because they presented questions of substantial constitutional importance.

Silagy raised 12 claims for relief in his petition. He has since abandoned some of the claims and grouped the remaining ones into five categories. First, he says he was denied his right to a trial by an impartial jury because (1) the statutory method of selecting jury arrays (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 78, par. 4) exempts certain occupations from jury service; (2) the chief clerk to the Vermilion County jury commission excludes from jury service all persons who do not return jury questionnaires, who are more than 70 years of age, and those who indicate in the juror questionnaires that they have a medical condition, which the chief clerk considered precluded them from effective jury service. An affidavit of the jury commission's chief clerk, detailing these policies, was attached. The State correctly argues that Silagy waived both claims because he failed to make the allegations at the time of jury selection, during the trial, or in his previous appeal. At a hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the burden is on the defendant to establish a substantial deprivation of rights under the United States Constitution or the Constitution of Illinois (People v. Griffin (1985), 109 Ill.2d 293 303, 93 Ill.Dec. 774, 487 N.E.2d 599; People v. Moore (1975), 60 Ill.2d 379, 384, 327 N.E.2d 324), and determinations by the trial court will not be disturbed unless manifestly erroneous (People v. Griffin (1985), 109 Ill.2d 293, 303, 93 Ill.Dec. 774, 487 N.E.2d 599; People v. Bracey (1972), 51 Ill.2d 514, 283 N.E.2d 685). The purpose of the post-conviction proceeding is to permit inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the original conviction that have not already been adjudicated or could have been. (People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill.2d 79, 87, 85 Ill.Dec. 269, 473 N.E.2d 868; People v. Williams (1970), 47 Ill.2d 1, 3, 264 N.E.2d 697.) A post-conviction petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of right (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 122-6; People v. James (1986), 111 Ill.2d 283, 291, 95 Ill.Dec. 486, 489 N.E.2d 1350), but a hearing should be conducted when the petitioner makes a " ' "substantial showing of a violation of constitutional rights" and to accomplish this the allegations in the petition must be supported by the record in the case or by accompanying affidavits.' " (People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill.2d 79, 91-92, 85 Ill.Dec. 269, 473 N.E.2d 868, quoting People v. Curtis (1971), 48 Ill.2d 25, 27, 268 N.E.2d 29.) The judgment of the reviewing court on a previous appeal is res judicata as to all issues actually decided, and any claim that could have been presented to the reviewing court in the direct appeal is, if not presented, thereafter barred under the doctrine of waiver. (People v. Kubat (1986), 114 Ill.2d 424, 436, 103 Ill.Dec. 90, 501 N.E.2d 111; People v. Jones (1985), 109 Ill.2d 19, 24, 92 Ill.Dec. 552, 485 N.E.2d 363; People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill.2d 79, 87-88, 85 Ill.Dec. 269, 473 N.E.2d 868.) Silagy did not challenge the statutory method of selecting jury arrays or the jury commission's policies on direct appeal, and this failure to raise the claims on direct review waived the issues and precludes their being considered in a post-conviction proceeding.

Silagy also says his right to an impartial jury was violated because (1) during the trial, three jurors discussed certain newspaper articles about the trial and one juror told two other jurors that the defendant was a bad person; (2) the jury's decision to impose the death penalty was based on a misapprehension of the law as the jurors allegedly believed that Silagy would serve only five to seven years if sentenced to life imprisonment; and (3) one juror had slept during portions of the trial. An affidavit of one juror, stating the above, was filed in support of Silagy's petition. The State contends that the first two issues could have been presented in post-trial motions or upon direct appeal and the failure to do so constituted a waiver of the questions. Silagy correctly points out that the waiver rule should be relaxed where fundamental fairness so requires (People v. Cihlar (1986), 111 Ill.2d 212, 218, 95 Ill.Dec. 297, 489 N.E.2d 859; People v. Partin (1977), 69 Ill.2d 80, 83, 12 Ill.Dec. 741, 370 N.E.2d 545, and says that, because of the "high degree of prejudice" involved, waiver should not be applied. Because the actual effect of the complained-of conduct on the minds of the jurors cannot be proved, this court has held that "the standard to be applied is whether the 'conduct involved "such a probability that prejudice will result that it is [to be] deemed inherently lacking in due process." ' " (People v. Holmes (1978), 69 Ill.2d 507, 514, 14 Ill.Dec. 460, 372 N.E.2d 656, quoting Estes v. Texas (1965), 381 U.S. 532, 542-43, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1633, 14 L.Ed.2d 543, 550; People v. Tobe (1971), 49 Ill.2d 538, 544, 276 N.E.2d 294.) We consider that the juror's affidavit concerning jurors' alleged discussion of news reports did not demonstrate that the jury deliberations were so affected as to deprive the defendant of due process. Assertions of exposure to media coverage do not of themselves demonstrate prejudice to a defendant. (People v. Lieberman (1986), 149 Ill.App.3d 1052, 1057, 103 Ill.Dec. 480, 501 N.E.2d 797.) Considering the record before us, we cannot say the judge's denial of an evidentiary hearing on this claim was manifestly erroneous. (People v. Griffin (1985), 109 Ill.2d 293, 303, 93 Ill.Dec. 774, 487 N.E.2d 599; People v. Bracey (1972), 51 Ill.2d 514, 283 N.E.2d 685.) If a juror did comment to other jurors that the defendant was a bad person, it must, however, be presumed, absent a showing to the contrary, that the jury followed the court's instructions in reaching a verdict. Too, the defendant confessed before the jury that he had killed the two women; his mother had testified that she and the defendant's sister had been raped by the defendant. We can be certain that the juror's remark, if made, did not affect the jury's appraisal of the defendant's character. The defendant's second claim under this category was also properly dismissed without an evidentiary hearing, as People v. Holmes (1978), 69 Ill.2d 507, 511, 14 Ill.Dec. 460, 372 N.E.2d 656, made clear that affidavits or testimony to show "the motive, method or process by which the jury reached its verdict" is not admissible. (See also People v. Preston (1979), 76 Ill.2d 274, 288, 29 Ill.Dec. 96, 391 N.E.2d 359.) Silagy's third contention--that one juror slept through a portion of the trial--was addressed and decided in the previous appeal (Silagy I, 101 Ill.2d 147, 170-71, 77 Ill.Dec. 792, 461 N.E.2d 415) and is res judicata.

The defendant also contends that he should be given a new trial because newly discovered evidence shows that he was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the murders and that this evidence was not available at the time of...

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