People v. Simpkins

• Decision Date: 01 April 1971
• Docket Number: 42926 and 42927,Nos. 42925,s. 42925
• Citation: 268 N.E.2d 386,48 Ill. 2d 106
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Maurice SIMPKINS et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 386

268 N.E.2d 386

48 Ill.2d 106

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Maurice SIMPKINS et al., Appellants.

Nos. 42925, 42926 and 42927.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 1, 1971.

Marshall Patner and Thomas Meites, Chicago, appointed by the court, for appellants.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Chicago (James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert A. Novelle and George Elsener, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

SCHAEFER, Justice:

Each of the three defendants, Maurice Simpkins, Wendell Ross, and Gerald Patten, was charged with violating section 25--1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 25--1(a)(1)). Each complaint charged that the named defendant 'has, on or about 23 July 69 at 51st St. and Ingleside committed the offense of Mob Action in that he did without authority of law and acting together with (the other two defendants and other named persons) use force in such manner as to disturb the peace by firing a revolver * * *.' After a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, the defendants were found guilty, and each defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for one year. In addition, Simpkins and Patten were each sentenced to two years' probation. The defendants appealed to this court and the appeals were consolidated. Several constitutional issues are raised.

The only witness for the prosecution was Officer Emmett Boyd of the Chicago Police Department, who testified that on the afternoon of July 23, 1969, he received a radio call that shots had been fired at 5100 South Ingleside in Chicago. When he arrived there he heard several shots and saw two groups of teenagers running in opposite directions. The group that he followed ran to an automobile parked in the middle of 51st Street. One of the youths in this group, a juvenile, had a revolver in his hand. The officer approached the automobile and placed the group of seven, which included the three present defendants, under arrest. The revolver contained 'one spent cartridge and two misfires.' Officer Boyd also testified that he saw no shots being fired, that none of the defendants was carrying a gun, and that no one was injured.

At the conclusion of the officer's testimony, the State rested, and the defendants' attorneys moved that the charges be dismissed on the ground that there was no evidence that the defendants 'knew of the weapon.' The trial judge denied the motions.

Each defendant then testified. The substance of their testimony was that the defendants and four others were in a car on their way to a party when a group of about 10 youths, known to the defendants as members of a gang called the 'Disciples', ran up to the car. One of the Disciples said to the defendant Patten: 'I got something for you. I will get you.' The defendants testified further that they drove on for about a block and then the driver, who was not one of the defendants, stopped the car. All seven occupants got out and began walking back toward the Disciples, who were walking toward them. The defendants testified that the reason they got out of the car and walked back to the Disciples was to find out why they had 'confronted' Patten, or, as Patten put it, 'to see what it was they had against me.' The two groups had approached to within two or three feet of one another when some of the Disciples drew guns and fired. The defendants turned and ran back to their car, where they were arrested by Officer Boyd. The defendants admitted that one of the juveniles in their group was found with a gun. Each defendant testified, however, that he did not know the youth was carrying a gun, and that he did not see anyone in their group fire a gun.

On cross-examination, the defendant Ross testified that he had been, but was not at the time of this occurrence, a member of another gang called the 'Rangers.' The defendant Patten testified that he had been, but no longer was, a member of the Rangers, that the Rangers had told the Disciples 'they could do anything they wanted to me because I was not a member any more,' and that the Disciples wanted to 'get' him because of his past membership in the Rangers.

Section 25--1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code under which the defendants were charged is part of what is commonly referred to as the Mob Action Statute. The portion involved in this case provides: '(a) Mob action consists of * * * (1) The use of force or violence disturbing the public peace by 2 or more persons acting together and without authority of law * * *.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 25--1(a)(1).) The defendants assert that 'the evidence shows only that the defendants were attacked while peacefully approaching a group which had expressed animosity to them and while they sought to dissolve the ill-feeling by peaceful, non-violent discussions with those insulting them.' Upon this characterization of the evidence the defendants then mount an attack upon the statute on first amendment grounds, charging that it is vague and overbroad.

We are not persuaded by this argument. The trier of the fact was not required to adopt this pollyannaish view of the defendants' conduct. On the contrary, he could have believed that the evidence showed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants did not stop their car, get out in a body, and advance upon the other group in order to engage in reasoned exposition, but rather to engage in combat with the members of the other group on the public street, thereby disturbing the public peace. He could have concluded that when the defendants marched En masse back down the street until they were separated by only two or three feet from the other group, they were engaged in 'physical aggression reasonably capable of inspiring...