People v. Simpson

• Decision Date: 14 June 1882
• Citation: 48 Mich. 474,12 N.W. 662
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. SIMPSON.

12 N.W. 662

48 Mich. 474

PEOPLE v. SIMPSON.

Supreme Court of Michigan

June 14, 1882

In a prosecution for murder the offer of dying declarations should be preceded by evidence that they were actually made in expectation of impending death; and this may be shown by the nature of injury, by what the injured person said or what physicians or attendants said in his hearing, by the evident state of his mind, etc. It is not essential that the injured person should have stated that they were made in that expectation, or that any person should have said in his presence that death must speedily follow.

Dying declarations are admissible even though others may not have thought the person making them would die, and even though death may not have followed for some time.

Where several witnesses testify to the same facts the court cannot single out a particular witness and instruct the jury what conclusion to come to if they do not believe him.

The prosecution in a murder case cannot be confined to proving dying declarations made at one time if there were others made at other times and all were competent; nor can he be confined to proving what was said at one time where the statement was reduced to writing and signed at another.

Two women were walking together and one was fatally shot. In a prosecution for the murder the other testified that immediately after the shot was fired her companion exclaimed "My God, Simpson, you have shot me," and then turned slowly and clasped the next to the top board in the fence close by. Another witness testified that he lived a block distant on the opposite side of the street and was in the house when he heard the shot; that he ran to the place and found a woman leaning against the fence; that he went over as quick as he could and said to her "Who shot you madam?" and that she said it was John Simpson. Held that these declarations of the injured person were admissible.

In the prosecution of a husband for the murder of his wife it was proper to show that for some time previously they had not lived peaceably together and that respondent had threatened to shoot or kill the deceased. But testimony as to alleged relations between the wife and third persons of questionable reputation are inadmissible where there is no pretence that the latter were guilty of the offence and they are not on trial.

Conversations between a policeman and a man arrested for murder are admissible in evidence where it does not appear that any undue influence was resorted to for the purpose of obtaining evidence from the accused, and it is shown that he was warned that his statements would be used against him.

In a prosecution for the murder of a woman by her husband questions to a witness as to how the husband had treated the wife within two years preceding were properly excluded where it appeared that witness had not seen them together in five years.

Evidence that a wife's general disposition was bitter and vindictive is inadmissible in the prosecution of her husband for her murder either generally or for the purpose of affecting her dying declarations against him.

In a prosecution for murder questions as to the clothing worn by the respondent at the coroner's inquest are irrelevant in the absence of the fact that he had not changed his clothing.

Error to the superior court of Detroit.

J.J. Van Riper, for the people.

Chas E. Miller and Geo. H. Prentis, for defendant.

MARSTON, J.

The respondent was convicted of murder in the first degree. The case comes up on exceptions before sentence. The first exceptions discussed by counsel relate to the admissibility of certain dying declarations, and it is claimed that this evidence was not competent because not made under the solemn belief of impending death.

It is incumbent upon the prosecution, before offering what is claimed to have been dying declarations, to show that they were made under a sense of impending death. It is not necessary to show that the injured party so stated at or about the time, or that any person in his or her presence and hearing said that death must speedily ensue.

The fact may be proved, like any other fact in the case and in the light of the existing and surrounding circumstances. The question is from the character and nature of the injury whether slight, severe or necessarily mortal: from what was said, if anything, by the injured person, or by the physicians or attendants in her hearing; what evidently was the state of the injured person's mind at the time the declarations were made. If the injured party had no hopes of recovery, and made the declarations under the impression that death was imminent, they are admissible, even though others may have thought differently and so expressed in her hearing, and even though death may not have ensued for some time thereafter. 1 Greenl.Ev. � 158, and note.

In this case there certainly was evidence from which the court below under the ruling made, must have been satisfied that the deceased was under the impression that death was impending, and the case would require to be a very strong one to justify this court, who did not see the witnesses, in arriving at a different conclusion. In this connection we may also refer to the error assigned upon the refusal of the court to instruct the jury that if they did not believe the testimony of Sarah Wilmot the so-called declarations must be rejected.

Where facts and circumstances are testified to by several witnesses, no one witness can be singled out and the jury instructed what conclusion they must arrive at if they do not believe such witness to have testified truly. The real question is, has a particular fact...