People v. Simpson

• Decision Date: 27 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 86926., No. 85084
• Citation: 792 N.E.2d 265,275 Ill.Dec. 34,204 Ill.2d 536
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Robert SIMPSON, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

792 N.E.2d 265

204 Ill.2d 536

275 Ill.Dec. 34

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Robert SIMPSON, Appellant.

Nos. 85084, 86926.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September 27, 2001.

Stephen E. Eberhardt, Tinley Park, for appellant.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb and James E. Fitzgerald, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People. Justice FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Robert Simpson, appeals the orders of the circuit court of Cook County, dismissing his amended post-conviction petition and his petition for post-judgment relief. Defendant was sentenced to death for his underlying murder conviction; therefore, his appeal lies directly with this court. See 134 Ill.2d R. 651(a). We affirm the circuit court's orders.

BACKGROUND

Defendant's convictions arose from the armed robbery and murder of Barbara Lindich at the Fairway Food store in Glenwood, Illinois. This court has previously set forth the evidence presented at defendant's trial in our opinion on defendant's direct appeal. People v. Simpson, 172 Ill.2d 117, 216 Ill.Dec. 671, 665 N.E.2d 1228 (1996). For this reason, we will discuss only the facts that are necessary to the disposition of the issues raised in this appeal.

On May 22, 1992, at approximately 10 a.m., defendant and Carolyn LaGrone entered the Fairway Food store and robbed it while Lurlarn Young waited in the car. As defendant emptied the cash register, Barbara Lindich, a store customer, walked up behind LaGrone and peered over her shoulder. Defendant turned and shot Lindich, who later died as a result of the gunshot wound. Defendant then checked the safe, left the store with LaGrone and went to the car where Young awaited.

LaGrone was arrested three days later and gave a statement to the police that detailed the offense as well as Young and defendant's involvement. Defendant was thereafter arrested and placed in a lineup. He was identified by eyewitnesses, including employees at the Fairway Food store, as the man they saw rob the store and shoot Lindich.

At trial, three store employees identified defendant as the man who was behind the service desk with the gun. Forensic testing experts stated that the cartridge case recovered from the scene was fired from one of the pistols recovered from defendant's storage locker after defendant was arrested.

During all phases of the pretrial and trial proceedings, defendant represented himself with the aid of a public defender acting as standby counsel. Defendant called several witnesses who were present in the store at the time of the robbery to testify on his behalf. No defense witnesses contradicted the State's witnesses' accounts of what occurred in the store. Defendant also called codefendant Young to testify but she invoked her fifth amendment right and did not testify. At defendant's request, and against the trial court's advice, custodial statements of LaGrone and Young were published to the jury.

At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of armed robbery and first degree murder of Lindich. The jury found defendant eligible for death on the basis of the murder-in-the-course-of-felony aggravating factor (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1992)) and the matter proceeded to the second stage of sentencing. Defendant continued to represent himself during the sentencing phase.

The trial court inquired whether defendant intended to call any witnesses on his behalf in mitigation and defendant responded that he wanted to call Judges James Bailey, Richard Fitzgerald and Lloyd Van Duzen as character witnesses. The trial court instructed defendant's standby counsel to investigate the matter and find out where the judges were currently located and if they could recollect knowing defendant. At the next court date, the trial court provided defendant with three transcripts defendant had previously requested. The trial judge further informed defendant that he had contacted Judges Fitzgerald and Bailey and that neither judge remembered defendant. However, the trial court also informed defendant that both judges would be willing to come to court.

Defendant informed the trial court that since the judges could not remember him, he wanted to go to the law library and prepare certain motions. The trial court admonished defendant that he should be more concerned because the jury had not made a final determination as to defendant's sentence. In response, defendant countered that if the worst-case scenario occurred and he was sentenced to death, that sentence would allow him to "bypass the Illinois Appellate Court" and go "directly to the Illinois Supreme Court." The trial court stated, "[Y]ou have your own strategy and I have told you this before, but I still wouldn't give up on the jury." Defendant acknowledged the statement but again affirmed his decision: "I understand, your Honor, but the law indicates if that does occur, the matter goes directly to the Supreme Court."

As a last attempt to convince defendant to reconsider his strategy, the trial judge informed defendant that if he were in defendant's position he would vigorously present mitigation evidence to the jury so that it would be inclined not to sentence defendant to death. Defendant asked if he could have some time to contact the judges himself. When court resumed, defendant informed the trial court that after speaking to Judge Bailey, the judge could not recall defendant. The judge again admonished defendant that he should not hinge his strategy on post-trial motions or on an appeal. He also explained to defendant that if one person on the jury panel disagreed with the imposition of death, defendant would not be sentenced to death. Despite the trial court's admonishments, however, defendant decided not to present any mitigation evidence.

At the conclusion of the second stage of the sentencing hearing, the jury found no mitigating factors to preclude imposition of the death penalty. The trial court appointed counsel to represent defendant on his post-trial motion. In preparation for the post-trial hearing, counsel requested defendant's medical file from the Pontiac Correctional Center, which showed that defendant suffered from headaches, dizziness, fainting spells, and bad eyesight and had survived a gunshot wound to the head from a prior incident. At the post-trial hearing, counsel argued that defendant was not competent to represent himself during either the trial or the sentencing phase. The trial court denied the post-trial motion and sentenced defendant to death for the murder and 30 years' imprisonment for the armed robbery.

On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. People v. Simpson, 172 Ill.2d 117, 216 Ill.Dec. 671, 665 N.E.2d 1228 (1996). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Simpson v. Illinois, 519 U.S. 982, 117 S.Ct. 436, 136 L.Ed.2d 334 (1996). Thereafter, defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and a motion to appoint counsel. Counsel filed a motion to produce handwritten statements from the Glenwood police department. The trial court ordered the Glenwood police department to produce the requested documents. After records were produced, counsel filed a motion to compel complete production of the documents and a motion to take depositions. The trial court denied the motions.

Prior to the initial court date on defendant's post-conviction petition, the State filed a motion for clarification of defendant's competence pursuant to People v. Owens, 139 Ill.2d 351, 151 Ill.Dec. 522, 564 N.E.2d 1184 (1990). The State requested that the trial court determine if defendant had raised a bona fide issue as to his competence. The trial court determined that defendant's condition had not deteriorated and that he was coherent and able to understand the proceedings.

Thereafter, the trial court dismissed defendant's post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant then filed a pro se petition for post-judgment relief. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 1998). The trial court dismissed the petition for post-judgment relief and defendant appealed directly to this court. We consolidated both matters for purposes of this appeal. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of defendant's post-conviction petition and the dismissal of defendant's petition for post-judgment relief for the following reasons.

ANALYSIS

In a post-conviction proceeding, the trial court does not redetermine a defendant's innocence or guilt, but instead examines constitutional issues which escaped earlier review. See People v. Evans, 186 Ill.2d 83, 89, 237 Ill.Dec. 118, 708 N.E.2d 1158 (1999). To be entitled to post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 through 122-7 (West 1998)), a defendant must demonstrate a substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights in the proceedings that produced the challenged conviction or sentence. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill.2d 500, 528, 241 Ill.Dec. 552, 719 N.E.2d 681 (1999).

A basic tenet of the Act is that the scope of post-conviction relief is limited by considerations of waiver and res judicata "to constitutional matters which have not been, and could not have been, previously adjudicated." People v. Winsett, 153 Ill.2d 335, 346, 180 Ill.Dec. 109, 606 N.E.2d 1186 (1992). Issues that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, and any issues that were decided by a reviewing court generally will not be considered in a post-conviction proceeding. People v. West, 187 Ill.2d 418, 425, 241 Ill.Dec. 535, 719 N.E.2d 664 (1999).

At the second stage of a post-conviction proceeding, as in the present case, the circuit court appoints counsel to represent an indigent defendant and counsel may file an amended post-conviction petition. See 725...