People v. Skinner
Citation | 312 Mich.App. 15,877 N.W.2d 482 |
Decision Date | 20 August 2015 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 317892. |
Parties | PEOPLE v. SKINNER. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan (US) |
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Michael D. Wendling, Prosecuting Attorney, and Hilary B. Georgia, Senior Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
University of Michigan Juvenile Justice Clinic (by Kimberly Thomas and Frank E. Vandervort ) for defendant.
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, and iLinus Banghart–Linn, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General.
Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and SAWYER and BORRELLO, JJ.
BORRELLO
, J.
This case presents a constitutional issue of first impression concerning whether the Sixth Amendment mandates that a jury make findings on the factors set forth in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012)
, as codified in MCL 769.25(6), before sentencing a juvenile homicide offender to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We hold that the Sixth Amendment mandates that juveniles convicted of homicide who face the possibility of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole have a right to have their sentences determined by a jury. In so holding, we expressly reserve the issue of whether this defendant should receive the penalty of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a jury. In this case, defendant requested and was denied her right to have a jury decide any facts mandated by MCL 769.25(6) with respect to her sentence. Accordingly, we vacate her sentence for first-degree murder and remand for resentencing on that offense consistent with this opinion.
Defendant was charged in connection with the attacks and, following a trial, a jury convicted her of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a)
, attempted murder, MCL 750.91, and conspiracy to commit murder, MCL 750.157a. On September 16, 2011, the trial court sentenced defendant to mandatory life without parole for the first-degree-murder conviction and life sentences each for the attempted-murder and conspiracy-to-commit-murder convictions. Defendant appealed her convictions and sentences.
While defendant's appeal was pending, on June 25, 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller, 567 U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2460
, wherein the Court held that mandatory sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders violated the Eighth Amendment. Subsequently, this Court affirmed defendant's convictions and life sentences for attempted murder and conspiracy, but remanded for resentencing on defendant's first-degree-murder conviction to consider the factors set forth in Miller.2
On July 11, 2013, the trial court held a resentencing hearing and again sentenced defendant to life without parole for the first-degree-murder conviction. Defendant again appealed her sentence. On March 4, 2014, while defendant's appeal was pending, MCL 769.25took effect, which had been enacted in response to Miller and established a framework for imposing a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile convicted of, inter alia, first-degree murder. Meanwhile, this Court ordered defendant's appeal held in abeyance pending our Supreme Court's decision in People v. Carp, 496 Mich. 440, 852 N.W.2d 801 (2014)
, which concerned the retroactivity of Miller. Following the decision in Carp, this Court remanded defendant's case to the trial court for a second resentencing—third sentencing—hearing to be conducted in accordance with MCL 769.25 ; this Court retained jurisdiction.3
On second remand, defendant moved to empanel a jury, arguing at the resentencing hearing that a jury should make the factual findings mandated by MCL 769.25(6)
. The trial court denied defendant's motion, and this Court denied defendant's emergency application for leave to appeal that order.4 Thereafter, the trial court held the second resentencing hearing on September 18, 19, and 24, 2014, and, after hearing evidence from both defendant and the prosecution, the court again sentenced defendant to life without parole for the first-degree-murder conviction. Defendant now appeals that sentence as of right, arguing, inter alia, that MCL 769.25 violates her Sixth Amendment right to a jury because it exposes her to a harsher penalty than was otherwise authorized by the jury verdict.
We review constitutional issues de novo. People v. Nutt, 469 Mich. 565, 573, 677 N.W.2d 1 (2004)
. Issues of statutory construction are also reviewed de novo. People v. Williams, 483 Mich. 226, 231, 769 N.W.2d 605 (2009)
.
This case brings us to the intersection of the Sixth and Eighth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Specifically, the issue before us illustrates, following Miller, the interplay between the Eighth Amendment's limitations with respect to sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and a juvenile's right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. We proceed with a review of the seminal case of Miller before discussing Miller 's impact on Michigan's sentencing scheme; we then review relevant United States Supreme Court Sixth Amendment jurisprudence before applying that precedent to Michigan's post-Miller juvenile-sentencing scheme.
Miller is part of a line of growth in the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence relative to juvenile offenders. This precedent can in part be traced back to Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988)
, wherein a plurality of the Court held that the Eighth Amendment categorically barred "the execution of any offender under the age of 16 at the time of the crime." Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), citing Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818–838, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (opinion by Stevens, J.). Subsequently, in Roper, 543 U.S. at 568–579, 125 S.Ct. 1183, the Court expanded on the rationale in the Thompson plurality and held that the Eighth Amendment categorically barred imposition of the death penalty on all juveniles under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed, irrespective of the offense. The Court reasoned that "[c]apital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and whose extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution." Id. at 568, 125 S.Ct. 1183
(quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court reasoned that because of the unique differences between juveniles and adults, "juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders." Id. at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183. In particular, the Court noted, juveniles exhibit " ‘[a] lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility’ " that " ‘often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.’ " Id. (citation omitted) (alteration in original). Additionally, "juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure," and "the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult." Id. at 569–570, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Thus, "neither retribution nor deterrence provides adequate justification for imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders...." Id. at 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183.
Following Roper, under the Eighth Amendment the maximum penalty that could be imposed on a juvenile offender was life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Court further limited that form of punishment in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010)
, and Miller. Specifically, in Graham, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment categorically barred a sentence of life without parole for juvenile "nonhomicide offenders." Graham, 560 U.S. at 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011. The Graham Court reasoned that juveniles "who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment...." Id. at 69, 130 S.Ct. 2011
. The Court explained that, unlike "nonhomicide" offenses, homicide is unique with respect to its "moral depravity" and the injury it inflicts on its victim and the public and concluded: Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court proceeded to establish a bright-line categorical bar on sentences of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. Id. at 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011
. Although a state was not "required to guarantee eventual freedom," juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses were to be afforded "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Id. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011.
Building on Roper and Graham, the Supreme Court held in Miller that, irrespective of the offense, mandatory...
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