People v. Slaughter

• Citation: 27 Cal.4th 1187,47 P.3d 262,120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477
• Decision Date: 30 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. S024116.,S024116.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael Corey SLAUGHTER, Defendant and Appellant.

120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477

27 Cal.4th 1187

47 P.3d 262

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael Corey SLAUGHTER, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S024116.

Supreme Court of California.

May 30, 2002.

Rehearing Denied July 17, 2002.¹

Certiorari Denied January 13, 2003.

John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Supreme Court, San Jose, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Wanda Hill Rouzan and Harry Joseph Colombo, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Certiorari Denied January 13, 2003. See 123 S.Ct. 855.

GEORGE, C.J.

Defendant Michael Corey Slaughter was convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of murder (Pen.Code, § 187, subd. (a)),² one count of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187), and one count of robbery (§ 211). With regard to the murders, the jury found true the special circumstance allegations of multiple murder and murder in the commission of a robbery. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (17).) The jury further found true the allegations that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the charged offenses (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and inflicted great bodily injury on the victim of the attempted murder (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The initial jury was unable to reach a verdict at the penalty phase trial, and a mistrial was declared. A second jury was selected and, following a second penalty phase trial, that jury returned a verdict of death. This appeal from the resulting judgment is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment.

FACTS

On January 24, 1990, Jeff DeRouen, Eddie Keith, and Djamal Littleton drove from Pittsburg, California, to Modesto in Keith's Mustang automobile to purchase two kilos of cocaine from defendant for $30,000. The deal had been arranged by Roland Mourning, a mutual friend of DeRouen's and defendant's, while Mourning was incarcerated in the Stanislaus County Jail. DeRouen, Keith, and Littleton had $45,000 they had obtained from a drug dealer known to them as "Jeest." They carried $30,000 in a small, gray Nike backpack or bag and placed the remaining $15,000 in a plastic bag under the rear seat of the vehicle.

At approximately 6:30 p.m., the three men picked up defendant in Modesto. Defendant was wearing a red ski jacket and black gloves. He got into the backseat with Littleton. At defendant's direction, Keith drove the Mustang onto the freeway and entered the left lane, traveling approximately 60 miles per hour. Littleton was looking out the window when he heard a loud bang and felt his body go numb. He then saw two flashes at the back of DeRouen's head.

Helio Silveira was on the same freeway, driving home from work, when he saw a light flash inside the Mustang and a window burst on the driver's side of the vehicle. The Mustang veered down an embankment, went through a chain link fence, and came to rest on some railroad tracks, with the engine still running. Silveira stopped his vehicle and went to help. As he approached the Mustang, he saw a man wearing a red jacket leave the passenger side of the vehicle and run from the scene. A .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol was lying on the floor near the backseat of the vehicle. Subsequently, it was ascertained that there was a bullet in the chamber and the pistol was cocked and ready to fire. The pistol's magazine, which can hold seven bullets, was empty. There were six empty shell casings in the vehicle. A passerby found a bloody red jacket by the side of the road; defendant's girlfriend identified it as belonging to defendant. Law enforcement officers found in the vicinity a black glove and a red baseball cap that also belonged to defendant. DeRouen had been shot twice in the head and was dead. Keith also was dead, having been shot in the head and shoulder. Littleton had been shot in the side and in the knee, but survived. Subsequent tests revealed that bullets recovered from the bodies of DeRouen and Littleton and from the Mustang had been fired from the .45-caliber semiautomatic handgun found in the vehicle.

Shortly after the shootings, Josh Brown was driving near Modesto Junior College when he saw defendant running from the direction of the freeway. Defendant yelled for Brown to stop and asked for a ride. Brown agreed. Defendant was carrying what appeared to be a backpack and was breathing heavily and perspiring. Defendant placed his backpack on the floor of Brown's vehicle, and "a couple rolls" of money spilled out. When Brown dropped him off, defendant offered Brown "a handful of money" for gas. Brown declined the offer.

About 9:00 that night, defendant went to a Mazda dealership in Modesto. Defendant had been there a few days earlier and told the salesman that he planned to pay cash for an automobile. Defendant testdrove a Mazda MX6 automobile and agreed to purchase it for $20,445. Defendant paid $17,000 in cash and promised to return the next day with the balance.

Defendant was arrested shortly after he returned home with his new automobile. He waived his right to remain silent and initially denied knowing the victims. After later being told that his clothing had been found at the scene of the crime, defendant admitted agreeing to sell cocaine to the victims and riding in the Mustang automobile. Defendant said that when Littleton pointed a gun at him, defendant shot Littleton with a gun that defendant found on the floor of the automobile. Defendant said that after he fired the first shot, the gun "just kept going," causing him accidentally to shoot the other victims.

At trial, defendant testified that while they were driving, Littleton pointed a gun at him and demanded that defendant give him the cocaine. Defendant complied and then picked up a firearm that he found on the floor of the automobile. Littleton and DeRouen struggled with defendant for control of the weapon and, during the struggle, defendant shot Littleton and DeRouen in self-defense and Keith by accident.

At the retrial of the penalty phase—held before a new jury after the first jury failed to agree on penalty—the prosecution introduced much of the same evidence that it had introduced during the guilt phase. Defendant offered the testimony of his high school vice-principal and a school counselor that defendant had been "well behaved" and was a good art student. Defendant's mother, father, brother, and aunt testified that defendant was a friendly and loving child with good manners and was an excellent artist. They stated they loved defendant and asked the jury to show him mercy. A friend from junior high school testified that defendant was friendly and had a good sense of humor.

DISCUSSION

GUILT PHASE ISSUES

A. Voir Dire

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to sequester and question individually the prospective jurors regarding their views on the death penalty, citing Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301, in which this court declared, "pursuant to its supervisory authority over California criminal procedure, that in future capital cases that portion of the voir dire of each prospective juror which deals with issues which involve death-qualifying the jury should be done individually and in sequestration." (Id. at p. 80, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301, fn. and italics omitted; see also People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1135, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 628, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.)

Nearly a decade later, on June 5, 1990, the voters adopted Proposition 115 which, among other things, added section 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure, containing the following provision: "Voir dire of any prospective jurors shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases." We have held that the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 223 abrogated the rule announced in Hovey v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301. (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1180, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46; Covarrubias v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1171, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 91.) Accordingly, the trial court properly did not sequester prospective jurors during voir dire.³

B. Instruction to View Defendant's Extrajudicial Statement With Caution

As noted above, defendant gave two statements to the police shortly after committing the offenses. In his second statement, he admitted shooting the victims but claimed that he shot Littleton after Littleton pointed a gun at him and that the gun "just kept going," causing defendant accidentally to shoot the other two victims. Defendant testified at trial that he shot Littleton and DeRouen in self-defense and shot Keith accidentally.

At the guilt phase and the second penalty phase, the trial court gave the jury an instruction (based upon CALJIC No. 2.71) that stated: "An admission is a statement made by a defendant other than at this trial which does not by itself acknowledge guilt of the crime for which the defendant is on trial, but which tends to prove guilt when considered with the rest of the evidence .... [¶] Evidence of an oral admission of a defendant should be viewed with caution." Although defendant did not object in the trial court to this instruction, the propriety of the instruction nonetheless is reviewable on appeal to the extent it affects his substantial rights. (§ 1259.)

Defendant contends the trial court erred in giving this instruction at the guilt phase and at the second penalty phase trial, because there is a reasonable likelihood that it caused the jury to view with suspicion the exculpatory portions of defendant's statements. Defendant asserts the instruction should not have been given at all, because defendant's statements...