People v. Smeathers
| Decision Date | 14 February 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 73--162,73--162 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Norman SMEATHERS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Ralph Ruebner, State Appellate Defender Agency, Deputy Appellate Defender, Elgin, for defendant-appellant.
Wm. Sisler, State's Atty., Freeport, James W. Jerz, Ill. State's Atty. Association, Elgin, for plaintiff-appellee.
The defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of theft of property worth over $150 and was sentenced to a term of not less than 2 nor more than 6 years in the penitentiary. In this appeal, the defendant contends he was not adequately admonished by the trial court as to the nature of the charge before his plea of guilty was accepted, as required by Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(1), Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110A, § 402(a)(1).
The facts developed by the testimony at the hearing on the guilty plea established that the defendant and several companions were riding around in an old truck owned by the defendant and while doing so they stopped at a farmhouse, for the purpose, so the defendant said, of borrowing some tools to repair his ailing truck. The defendant and his companions had been drinking beer while driving around.
The defendant and his companions knocked at the door of the farmhouse but received no answer. Defendants' companions admitted that they then proceeded to break the door open and to steal several articles of personal property from the house. The defendant never specifically admitted the breaking and entering but the State was prepared to establish by a fingerprint expert that defendant's fingerprints were found on the bedroom dresser upstairs.
While the defendant and his companions were in the house a neighbor noticed the truck and called the owner of the house who was visiting at a neighboring farm, asking her if she had given permission to anyone to come upon the premises. Upon receiving a negative answer the neighbor drove his tractor into the driveway and blocked the defendant's egress. Shortly afterward the police arrived and after the defendant protested his innocence and gave permission for the police to search the truck, the police made a search and found several articles in the truck which the owner identified as being property which belonged to her which had been removed from the house. The defendant contends he did not steal anything from the house but several of his companions say he did. The defendant claims he does not remember stealing anything from the house.
At his arraignment, the defendant, after proper admonishment as to the nature of the charge, pleaded not guitly. Some two months later, after negotiations between his attorney and the Assistant State's Attorney, the defendant offered to plead guilty to the charge of theft only but not to the charge of burglary. At the hearing on the guilty plea the trial court carefully explained to the defendant his right to a trial by jury, his right to remain silent, his right against self-incrimination, the maximum and minimum sentences for theft of property over $150 and also inquired whether any threats or promises had been made to induce the defendant's guilty plea. Before accepting the plea of guilty to the theft charge the judge then asked if the State's Attorney had any evidence against the defendant, whereupon the State's Attorney detailed the evidence indicating both burglary and theft had occurred.
The contention that the trial court did not make sure that the defendant understood the nature of the charge and knowingly pleaded guilty to such charge appears to be based on a part of the colloquy between the court and the defendant, as shown below, which occurred immediately before the State's Attorney described in detail what had occurred at the farmhouse:
'(By the Court) Q. Do you enter this plea of guilty to this charge because you did, in fact, do the things it is alleged that you did in Count II of this indictment?
(Defendant) A. No, your Honor.
(By Mr. Mahoney privately employed Defense Counsel) May I address the Court on that?
(By the Court) You may.
(By Mr. Mahoney) Your Honor, Mr. Smeathers has at this time no recollection of doing the acts of which he is charged in Count II. He has been--after I obtained discovery of the State's Attorney's evidence and have been confronted with the evidence, and I have gone over it with him, and he and I agree that the evidence is, in fact, insurmountable, and based upon our belief that the evidence has no defense to it, we are entering a guilty plea. That's Mr. Smeathers' understanding at this time, I believe.
(By the Court) Q. Is this correct, Mr. Smeathers?
(Defendant) A. Yes.
(By the Court) Q. Is it your understanding that you are aware of the evidence against you in this case, and that you feel that this evidence is insurmountable, and you have no recollection of the incident with which you are charged, is that correct?
(Defendant) A. Yes.
(By Mr. Mahoney) May I correct that slightly. He has some recollections of the incident. He does not remember doing the elements of the crime which is charged in Count II.
(By the Court) Q. Now, when you say you have no recollection, I assume this means you don't have any recollection of your not doing it either, is that correct? In other words, there is a period of time here in which you have no recollection of what you did, is that what you are saying?
(Defendant) A. In a way, I guess.'
Immediately following this colloquy, the State's Attorney outlined the evidence against the defendant in considerable detail, including fingerprint evidence. Then, after asking the defendant if he was satisfied with his attorney and receiving an affirmative answer and again asking the defendant if he still persisted in his plea of guilty, to which the reply was 'Yes', the court accepted defendant's plea.
There is no question, of course, that the salutary provisions of Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(1) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 110A, par. 402(a)(1)) requiring an explanation of the nature of the charge, must be substantially complied with before the court accepts a guilty plea. When, after such explanation, the defendant's reaction casts doubts on his understanding of the nature of the crime he is pleading to, the court should not accept the guilty plea, and if he does so it is grounds for reversal of the conviction. The point is well established by the case of People v. Farnsworth (1973), 10 Ill.App.3d 844, 295 N.E.2d 83, an opinion of this court, which the appellant cites in his brief. There the defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of attempted murder but in the hearing on the guilty plea he persisted in denying the specific intent to commit murder, saying at last that 'I didn't intend to kill anyone, but I did shoot him with intent to commit the robbery.' (10 Ill.App.3d 846, 295 N.E.2d 83.) This court held that even though the shooting occurred during the commission of a felony it did not come under the rules of felony-murder which does not require a specific intent to kill but, since the victim did not die, came under the rule pertaining to attempted murder and since that is a crime requiring a specific intent to kill, the defendant's guilty plea was inconsistent with his rejection of such specific intent, therefore should not have been accepted as a proper guilty plea.
We consider the Farnsworth case an entirely proper decision but it obviously turned on a technicality which is not present in the case before us and the Farnsworth case is of no help to the defendant. It is true that the crime of theft requires a specific intent to deprive the owner permanently of the use and benefit of his property but the defendant in this case did not deny that such was his intent, he merely alleged that he did not remember all that occurred (his counsel stated that he recalled something of the incident but not all of it) and he did not recall either committing the theft or not committing it, either one. He therefore did not deny either the act or the intent but stated that since his fingerprints were found on the dresser from which some of the articles were stolen he could not say he was not involved. This is far different from the Farnsworth case where the defendant stated clearly what the state of his mind was and that it was Not to do the act he was charged with attempting. The clear-cut inconsistency which impaired the guilty plea in the Farnsworth case is therefore lacking in the case before us.
On motion we allow the defendant to cite additional authority and he has cited the recent cases of People v. Billops (1974), 16 Ill.App.3d 892, 307 N.E.2d 206 and People v. Hawkins (1974), 17 Ill.App.3d 863, 309 N.E.2d 60, both dealing with admonishments prior to a guilty plea.
We find Hawkins not to be apposite to the...
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