People v. Smith

• Decision Date: 03 March 1896
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. SMITH.

66 N.W. 382

108 Mich. 527

PEOPLE v. SMITH.

Supreme Court of Michigan

March 3, 1896

Error to circuit court, Wayne county; George S. Hosmer, Judge.

Joseph N. Smith was convicted of a violation of statutory provisions regulating the use of emery wheels. From a judgment on a writ of certiorari from the justice's court of Detroit defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Corliss, Andrus & Leete (Arthur Webster, of counsel), for appellant.

Allan H. Frazer, Pros. Atty., and Ormond F. Hunt, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

HOOKER J.

The defendant was convicted of a violation of the statute requiring emery wheels to be provided with blowers to carry away the dust arising from their operation. Pub. Acts 1893 ^[1] p. 151, and 3 How. Ann. St. � 1690z1. Counsel for the defendant assert that they care to raise but one question viz. the constitutionality of this law. It is not disputed that the state may regulate the use of private property, when the health, morals, or welfare of the public demands it. Such laws have their origin in necessity. Prent. Police Powers, 4-8, 52, 54, 161, 433. Counsel say that this law is invalid because it does not apply to all, not even to all who use emery wheels, because some may use with water and others may not work continuously. Again, it is contended that it is invalid because it prohibits a man from running his own machine continuously without protection. We need not concern ourselves with the last objection, because we have not the case before us, and for the reason that the law may be valid to the extent that others are protected, and invalid in the particular mentioned, if such a construction is unavoidable. For the purposes of this case, it may be said that all persons who are given continuous employment over dry emery wheels are within the provisions of this act. This singles out no class, as it applies to all persons who use emery wheels in that manner. Necessarily, the practical application is limited to those who engage in such business but such is the case with many laws. All criminal laws apply only to those who choose to break them. This law applies to all who choose to use the emery wheel. The legislature has seen fit to permit certain uses of the dry wheel without a blower, while in other cases it is required. This is competent, and is not class legislation, as between operatives. It fixes the limits of use without a blower, and requires it after such limits are passed; but the rules apply to all. The vital question in this case is the right of the state to require the employer to provide, and the employ� to use, appliances intended for the protection of the latter. Laws of this class embrace provisions for the safety and welfare of those whom necessity may compel to submit to existing conditions involving hazards which they would otherwise be unwilling to assume. Among them are provisions for fire escapes, the covering or otherwise rendering machinery safe, the condition of buildings, ventilation, etc. In the main, where the necessity is obvious, they commend themselves to those who have at heart the welfare of their fellows, and should be upheld if they do not contravene private rights. The constitution secures to the citizen the rights of life, liberty, and private property, and, as the only value in the latter consists in its use, it follows that the right to use private property is within the provision. There can, however, be no doubt that the use of private property may be regulated by law. No one would think of questioning the validity of laws regulating the manufacture, use, and sale of dangerous drugs or explosives, or laws designed to insure safety in railway travel. The inspection of boilers, fire escapes upon hotels, means of exits from churches and other buildings which the public are wont to frequent, are familiar instances of the exercise of the police power. These rules are defended upon the ground that they are necessary to the safety of the public; not the entire populace, but such persons as shall lawfully place themselves in a position requiring such protection. Where the law is aimed at acts or conditions which threaten contagion,-as where sewers, disinfection, or quarantine is required,-the necessity of and the power to make such laws are obvious. But at first blush they may not be so apparent where there is no direct danger to others than the party whose business is sought to be regulated, and those with whom he contracts. It is contended in this case that neither the public welfare nor health is involved, inasmuch as the protection sought to be afforded is limited to the individual employ�, who, by his contract of employment, signifies a willingness to use the machine in its dangerous condition, and therefore cannot be heard to complain. It is the law that a manufacturer may provide inferior and even dangerous, machinery, tools, and utensils; and enterprises more or less hazardous are common and lawful. Men may contract to use such machinery, or to perform dangerous service, and have no remedy if injured. But we are not aware that the police power is limited by such contracts. As between the parties themselves, the contract may cut off legal redress for injuries sustained; but we are not satisfied that the authority of the state is limited to the protection of those who do not sustain contract relations with each other. In the absence of a law requiring fire escapes, one who works in a high building and is injured may be held to have assumed the risk incident to his employment, but we know of no rule that precludes the state from making a regulation requiring fire escapes to be placed upon high buildings, though the only object to be facilitate the escape of employ�s who are under contract to work there without such appliances for escape. Fire escapes in hotels, and means of exit in theaters and public halls are required by law for the benefit of patrons, who are there by virtue of contract relations with the proprietor. So long as the rule is general, and the danger to the public-i. e. that portion of the public who are subjected to the danger-is clear, it is a proper subject for legislative intervention. In re Jacobs, 98...