People v. Smith

• Citation: 193 Cal.Rptr. 692,34 Cal.3d 251,667 P.2d 149
• Decision Date: 08 August 1983
• Docket Number: Cr. 22273
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 667 P.2d 149 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Kevin Leroy SMITH, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 692

193 Cal.Rptr. 692

34 Cal.3d 251, 667 P.2d 149

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Kevin Leroy SMITH, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 22273

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Aug. 8, 1983.

John M. Bishop, Riverside, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, Alice V. Collins, Harriet Wiss Hirsch and Jean R. Sternberg, Deputy State Public Defenders, as amici curiae on behalf defendant and appellant.

George Deukmejian and John K. Van de Kamp, Attys. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., William D. Stein and Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Attys. Gen., Ronald E. Niver, David D. Salmon and John W. Runde, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

Christopher N. Heard, San Jose, as amicus curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of one count of robbery. He principally contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by article I, section 15, of the California Constitution. As will appear, we conclude that the contention is meritorious and the judgment must therefore be reversed.

In mid-November 1979 Edwin Meares ¹ was 68 years old and lived in a trailer park in San Pablo, Contra Costa County; defendant was a young man of no fixed abode. They first met when defendant was hitchhiking and Meares picked him up twice in one day. On the second occasion defendant said he had been up all night and had no place to take a shower. Meares replied that he lived alone, and offered him the use of his trailer. Defendant accepted and became his houseguest.

For a week or 10 days all went well. Defendant and Meares shared their meals, watched television, and attended a drive-in movie together; they also went shopping together, and Meares bought defendant a pair of shoes. Trouble arose, however, over the use of the Meares car, a late-model Buick Regal. Meares allowed defendant to borrow the car almost every day; he later testified that defendant "seemed to have an inordinant [sic ] love for it." Unfortunately defendant did not always take the car where he said he would or return it when promised, and the discrepancies began to bother Meares.

Matters came to a head on November 20, 1979, when defendant told Meares he was going to a drugstore but went to a park instead. When he brought the car back, an argument ensued and defendant asked, "Would you rather I go?" Meares replied, "Yes, I think it would be better," and defendant left the trailer. He returned early that evening, however, assertedly for some clothes he had left behind. After renewed discussion defendant pointed a knife at Meares and said, "I want your car," demanding that Meares turn over the keys and registration papers for the vehicle. Defendant then bound and gagged Meares with some clothing, and left with his host's wallet, credit card, checkbook, and a few other small items. Meares summoned help from a neighbor, and was freed unharmed.

A few hours later--about 11 p.m.--Police Officer Tucker was on routine patrol in Vallejo, Solano County, when he observed defendant urinating against the side of a building in a supermarket parking lot. The only car in the lot was a Buick Regal backed into a nearby parking space, with a passenger sitting in the front seat. As Officer Tucker stepped out of his squad car defendant walked over to meet him. The officer asked defendant if he had any identification, and defendant replied he did not.

Officer Tucker next patted defendant's clothing for weapons, but found none. He did feel an object in defendant's right rear pants pocket, however, and from its shape he inferred it was a man's wallet. Without further ado Officer Tucker reached into the pocket, took out the wallet, and ordered defendant to open it. When defendant complied, the officer saw a credit card inside that he directed defendant to hand over. The card bore the name of Meares, although earlier in the questioning defendant had given the officer his true name of Kevin Smith. Because of this discrepancy Officer Tucker ran a radio check on the card and learned it was stolen. He placed defendant under arrest for possession of stolen property, then searched the rest of the wallet; finding the Buick's registration, he learned by a second radio check that the car was also stolen.

Officer Tucker transported defendant to the Vallejo police station, intending to interrogate him about the stolen property. When defendant was advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 however, he declined to answer any questions. During the night defendant was moved to the Contra Costa County jail in Martinez. There he was interrogated about the robbery at some time between 9 and 10 o'clock the next morning by Sergeant Hisey of the Contra Costa Sheriff's office. Defendant was again read his Miranda rights, and this time he confessed to the robbery. Sergeant Hisey later testified he had not been told that defendant had previously been given Miranda warnings and had refused to talk to the police.

At the outset of trial defendant moved to suppress on grounds of illegality (1) the evidence seized in the parking lot by Officer Tucker and (2) the confession obtained at the county jail by Officer Hisey. The court granted the motion in part, ruling that the search of defendant's wallet was unlawful; accordingly, it ordered that the evidence of the stolen credit card, registration certificate, and Buick automobile be suppressed as fruits of the search. The court denied the motion as to the confession, however, and Officer Hisey was allowed to testify to its contents.

I

As a preliminary matter, we take up the question of the law governing this appeal. After we granted a hearing in this case, the voters adopted an initiative measure at the June 1982 Primary Election designated on the ballot as Proposition 8. It took effect on the day after the election, i.e., on June 9, 1982. (Cal. Const., art. XVIII, § 4.) The initiative made a number of changes in the constitutional and statutory law of this state governing criminal prosecutions. In particular, section 3 of the initiative added new section 28 to article I of the Constitution, and subdivision (d) of that section declares in pertinent part that "relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding." ²

Shortly after the election, the Attorney General filed a supplemental brief contending that section 28(d) governs this case and all other criminal appeals pending when it was adopted. Reply briefs were filed by defendant and by the State Public Defender as amicus curiae, contending that not only section 28(d) but Proposition 8 as a whole is inapplicable to pending appeals, and indeed to any case in which the crime occurred before the proposition took effect. The Attorney General filed a detailed responsive brief. The issue was thus joined, and has been orally argued before this court. In Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) supra, 32 Cal.3d 236, 186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274, we exercised our original jurisdiction to review by writ certain challenges to the validity of Proposition 8 because "the issues are of great public importance and should be resolved promptly." (Id. at p. 241, 186 Cal.Rptr 30, 651 P.2d 274.) The issue here raised by the parties--i.e., to which cases does Proposition 8 apply?--is no less important and urgent to the profession and the public at large. In view of all these circumstances, it is appropriate that we address the question in the case at hand. We shall hold that Proposition 8 applies only to prosecutions for crimes committed on or after its effective date.

We reach this conclusion for three reasons. First, the primary stated purpose of Proposition 8 is to deter the commission of crimes. Subdivision (a) of new section 28, article I, of the Constitution, added by section 3 of Proposition 8, is a legislative declaration of intent that evidently speaks for the proposition as a whole. In its first three paragraphs it lists certain rights of personal security that the proposition is designed to protect; in particular, the second paragraph emphasizes "the more basic expectation that persons who commit felonious acts causing injury to innocent victims will be appropriately detained in custody, tried by the courts, and sufficiently punished so that the public safety is protected and encouraged as a goal of highest importance." (Italics added.) And the fourth paragraph recites that "To accomplish these goals, broad reforms in the procedural treatment of accused persons and the disposition and sentencing of convicted persons are necessary and proper as deterrents to criminal behavior and to serious disruption of people's lives." (Italics added.)

It is obvious that no such reform, no matter how effective, can deter criminal behavior or avert disruption of life if that behavior or disruption has already taken place. Not even a unanimous vote of the people could have turned back the clock and prevented crimes that had previously been committed; we cannot ascribe so irrational a hope to the electorate. Accordingly, by declaring the purpose of Proposition 8 to be the deterrence of crime the voters must have intended the measure to apply only to offenses that could be deterred, i.e., that had not already been committed by the time Proposition 8 was adopted. ³

Our second reason for so viewing Proposition 8 flows from the fundamental principle that if reasonably possible the courts must construe a statute to avoid doubts as to its constitutionality. (In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal.3d 930, 942, 83 Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142; accord, People v. Roder (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 505, 189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302; People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 10, 184 Cal.Rptr. 454, 648 P.2d 104; ...