People v. Smith

• Decision Date: 12 March 2020
• Docket Number: D075372
• Citation: 260 Cal.Rptr.3d 68,46 Cal. App. 5th 375
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Skyler Damon SMITH, Defendant and Appellant.

46 Cal.App.5th 375

260 Cal.Rptr.3d 68

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Skyler Damon SMITH, Defendant and Appellant.

D075372

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed March 12, 2020

Ava R. Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles Raglan, Scott Taylor, and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION AFTER TRANSFER FROM THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

BENKE, Acting P. J.

In December 2014, police entered a casita belonging to Skyler Damon Smith and saw drugs in plain view.The Riverside County District Attorney filed an information charging Smith with possessing heroin ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count 1), possessing methamphetamine ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 2), possessing methamphetamine while armed with a loaded firearm ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1; count 3), being armed with an assault weapon ( Pen. Code,¹ § 30605, subd. (a); count 4), and being a felon in possession of a firearm ( Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 5; case No. INF1402881, the first case).The trial court subsequently denied Smith’s suppression motion relating to the search of his casita.

In September 2015, Smith was in an accident while riding his motorcycle.A search of the motorcycle revealed drugs.In December 2016(case No. INF1600417, the second case), Smith was charged with possessing methamphetamine ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 1), sale or transport of methamphetamine ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 2), possessing methamphetamine while armed with a loaded firearm ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1; count 3), being a felon in possession of a firearm ( Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 4), and being a felon in possession of ammunition ( Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a); count 5).

The trial court granted the People’s motion to consolidate the cases, and the first amended information included all 10 counts.The People further alleged that Smith suffered two prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).During trial, the court denied a second suppression motion concerning a search of Smith’s motorcycle in the second case.

A jury found Smith guilty of all counts and the court found true the two prison priors.The trial court sentenced Smith to 10 years eight months in prison.Smith appealed, asserting the court erred in denying his suppression motions.Relying on People v. Dueñas(2019)30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 268( Dueñas ), Smith also argued that the trial court could not legally impose a $10,000 restitution fine and a $300 court facilities assessment fee without first determining his ability to pay.

In an opinion issued in May 2019, we affirmed the judgment.Smith petitioned our Supreme Court for review.The Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Ovieda(2019)7 Cal.5th 1034, 250 Cal.Rptr.3d 754, 446 P.3d 262( Ovieda ).

In the meantime, our Legislature enacted Senate BillNo. 136, (Stats. 2019, ch. 590), which amended section 667.5, subdivision (b) to limit one-year prior prison terms to cases where the prior was for "a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code[.]"The amendment became effective on January 1, 2020.( Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c).)

We received and considered supplemental briefing from the parties.Smith argues that the warrantless entry into his casita was objectively unreasonable because an unattended car running in a driveway did not constitute exigent circumstances or suggest a medical emergency, claiming that the officer acted upon an unparticularized suspicion devoid of articulable facts.We agree and conclude that the evidence seized during this warrantless search should have been suppressed because the People did not meet their burden to justify the search under the emergency aid or exigent circumstances exceptions, or the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.Accordingly, we reverse Smith’s convictions on counts 1 through 5, but otherwise affirm the judgment.

Smith also contends that his one-year prior prison term enhancements imposed on two prior convictions pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b) must be stricken in light of Senate BillNo. 136.The Attorney General concedes this issue.We find the Attorney General’s concession appropriate.We vacate our original opinion issued May 31, 2019, and issue this revised opinion addressing Smith’s arguments in section II and newly added section V.

DISCUSSION

I.GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the government from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures of private property.( U.S. Const., 4th amend.;Arizona v. Gant(2009)556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485;People v. Macabeo(2016)1 Cal.5th 1206, 1213, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 384 P.3d 1189.)Warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."( Katz v. United States(1967)389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, fns. omitted.)As relevant here, well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement include exigent circumstances, inventory searches, and plain-view searches.(68 Am.Jur.2d(2010)Searches and Seizures§ 114, p. 237.)

A defendant may move to suppress evidence on the ground that "[t]he search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable."(§ 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).)When a defendant files a motion to suppress, the People have "the burden of proving that the warrantless search or seizure was reasonable"( People v. Williams(1999)20 Cal.4th 119, 130, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 973 P.2d 52 ), and alternatively, " ‘the burden ... to prove that exclusion of the evidence is not necessary because of [the good faith] exception.’ "( People v. Willis(2002)28 Cal.4th 22, 36, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 105, 46 P.3d 898.)The prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence the facts justifying a warrantless search.( People v. Johnson(2006)38 Cal.4th 717, 729, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 887, 133 P.3d 1044.)In reviewing a court’s ruling on a suppression motion, "[w]e defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence.In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment."( People v. Glaser(1995)11 Cal.4th 354, 362, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729.)

II.FIRST CASE: CASITA SEARCH

A.Background Facts²

An officer with the Palm Springs Police Department and his partner were dispatched to a home following a call from a concerned citizen.The citizen reported that an unoccupied running car had been in the driveway of a residence for about 30 minutes.The officer met the citizen by the car and noted that the unoccupied car was running, the windows were up and foggy, the lights were on, and determined that a car rental company owned the vehicle.The officer became concerned that a person inside the home might be in distress or that criminal activity was afoot.The officer testified that his duties include welfare checks and that he had experienced a prior incident with similar circumstances where a person had been suffering from a diabetic coma.The officer heard no noise inside the house.The officer rang the doorbell several times and could hear the doorbell ringing inside the home.The officer or his partner also knocked on the door.The officers waited about 30 to 60 seconds for someone to answer the door, but received no response.The lack of any response concerned the officer.

The officers left the front door and walked the exterior of the residence to determine if an occupant was injured or crime was afoot.About 10 feet away from the front door and under the same roofline the officer found a second door that appeared to be "an interior-type door" which led the officer to believe that the door was "part of and open to the main residence."The officer did not knock on the door, but moved the handle.The officer did not knock because he had no reason to believe doing so would alert anyone inside the residence.The officer did not know the interior layout of the house and did not know that the door led to a casita that lacked access to the front door.

Finding the door unlocked, the officer opened the door and announced "police."As the door opened, the officer saw an individual, who he knew to be a felon and not a resident of this home, lying on the floor looking back at him.This caused the officer to believe that crime was afoot.

After a "factually intense" analysis, the trial court denied the suppression motion.The court found the officer’s testimony to be "very sincere, very honest" regarding the description of the scene and the officer’s concerns.The court found that the officers waited a substantial period of time for a response after they rang the doorbell and knocked.The court concluded that the officer’s failure to knock on the second door before entering was not unreasonable given "this was a one-roof situation.It wasn’t the separate casita, which we see in this community on many occasion[s].This was a contiguous part of the entirety of one structure ...."

During trial, the officer testified that after stepping into the room he saw Smith, another individual who he knew had a felony conviction, drug paraphernalia and what appeared to be methamphetamine in plain view.He later learned that Smith and the other individual were on probation and subject to search conditions.

B.Legal Principles

At " ‘the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home...