People v. Smith
| Decision Date | 18 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | Calendar No. 2.,Docket No. 147187. |
| Citation | 496 Mich. 133,852 N.W.2d 127 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. SMITH. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training and Appeals, and Ana I. Quiroz, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Daniel J. Rust, Redford, for defendant.
The issue to be determined in this case is whether MCL 771.1(2) divests a sentencing judge of jurisdiction if a defendant is not sentenced within one year after the imposition of a delayed sentence. We hold that it does not.
The unambiguous language of the statute provides that the court may delay sentencing “for not more than 1 year to give the defendant an opportunity to prove to the court his or her eligibility for probation or other leniency compatible with the ends of justice and the defendant's rehabilitation....” 1 The one-year limitation designates the maximum amount of time that sentencing may be delayed in order to provide defendant the chance to establish his worthiness of leniency. After one year, sentencing may no longer be delayed for that purpose, and the judge is required to sentence defendant as provided by law.
Court of Appeals caselaw holding that a court may not sentence a defendant if the one-year period of delay is exceeded is overruled. We reverse the trial court's dismissal of the case, reinstate defendant's conviction, and remand to Wayne County Circuit Court for sentencing. Upon remand, the matter is to be assigned to a different judge.
On February 10, 2011, defendant was a passenger in an automobile that was stopped by the police for a traffic violation. As defendant exited the vehicle, officers observed defendant drop a silver automatic handgun into the map pocket of the car door and quickly close the door.2 After establishing that defendant did not possess a permit to carry a concealed weapon, he was arrested and subsequently charged with the crime of carrying a concealed weapon (CCW) in violation of MCL 750.227. Defendant, age 21 at the time, was a college student with no prior criminal history.
The prosecutor permitted defendant to plead guilty to the reduced charge of attempted CCW 3 and recommended a probationary sentence. Defendant tendered his guilty plea on May 12, 2011. At sentencing, defense counsel urged the court to delay sentencing for one year, at which time defendant would be “very close to graduating from college” and the prosecutor's office might change its mind and either dismiss the case entirely or permit defendant to plead guilty to a misdemeanor. The prosecutor objected to a delayed sentence and asked that defendant be sentenced to probation. The trial court expressed concern that defendant would “end up with a felony,” thus limiting his employment opportunities. The court asked the parties to file sentencing memoranda and return to court to discuss whether delayed sentencing would be appropriate. Expressing its unhappiness with the prosecutor's position, the court stated that it would consider “the delayed sentence with one day over a year; then [the court] would have lost jurisdiction.” 4
The parties returned to court on June 17, 2011. Defense counsel requested that sentencing be delayed for one year under MCL 771.1 to give defendant the opportunity to show that he deserved “significant leniency” from the court. The prosecutor continued to object to delayed sentencing, stating that the prosecutor's office did not intend to reduce the criminal charge any further. The trial court stated that it found it “disturb[ing]” that the prosecutor opposed letting defendant's sentence “go a day over 365 days,” which would allow defendant to “end[ ] up with no record” because the court would “lose jurisdiction.” 5 The trial court announced that it would exercise its discretion and delayed the imposition of defendant's sentence for one year. On the record, the trial court scheduled defendant's sentencing for June 15, 2012, which would have occurred within the one-year statutory period. However, consistent with statements the trial judge had made on the record that she desired to “lose” jurisdiction in the case, the order signed that day, as well as the entry in the Register of Actions, reflect that the court scheduled defendant's sentencing for June 18, 2012—precisely one year and one day later.
At sentencing, defense counsel reminded the judge that delayed sentencing was sought so that defendant could prove “he was worthy of a dismissal.” Counsel noted that defendant had complied with all court conditions, paid all fines and costs, and would graduate from college. Abruptly interrupting defense counsel's colloquy, the trial court stated that defendant's sentencing was “past a year,” meaning that the court had “lost jurisdiction.” Over the prosecutor's objection, the trial court not only refused to sentence the defendant, it dismissed the case entirely.
The prosecutor filed a delayed application for leave to appeal with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court had no legal authority to dismiss the case over the prosecution's objections, because MCL 771.1 did not permit dismissal of the case. The Court of Appeals issued an order denying the delayed application for leave to appeal for lack of merit.6 This Court granted leave to appeal.7
The consequences, if any, for a trial court's failure to sentence a defendant within one year pursuant to MCL 771.1 is a question of statutory interpretation that this Court reviews de novo.8
The Court's primary responsibility in statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent. 9 The words of a statute are the most reliable indicator of the Legislature's intent and should be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning and the context within which they are used in the statute.10 Once the Legislature's intent has been discerned, no further judicial construction is required or permitted, as the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed.11
The statutory provision at issue in this case, MCL 771.1(2), is contained in Chapter XI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which concerns probation. The statute provides in relevant part:
(2) In an action in which the court may place the defendant on probation, the court may delay sentencing the defendant for not more than 1 year to give the defendant an opportunity to prove to the court his or her eligibility for probation or other leniency compatible with the ends of justice and the defendant's rehabilitation, such as participation in a drug treatment court.... When sentencing is delayed, the court shall enter an order stating the reason for the delay upon the court's records. The delay in passing sentence does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to sentence the defendant at any time during the period of delay.12
The plain language of the statute permits a trial court to delay sentencing for up to one year for those defendants who are eligible for placement on probation.13 The purpose of delaying a defendant's sentence pursuant to this statutory provision is entirely for the benefit of the convicted defendant—it is to “give the defendant an opportunity to prove to the court” that he is worthy of “probation or other leniency compatible with the ends of justice” and rehabilitation. Read in its entirety, the statute provides a simple and straightforward time limit, indicating the maximum amount of time the court may delay sentencing in order to give the defendant a chance to prove himself.14 The statute also indicates that the imposition of a delayed sentence is not irrevocably binding upon the trial court, in that it does not “deprive the court of jurisdiction to sentence the defendant at any time during the period of delay.” 15
In urging this Court to uphold the actions of the trial court, defendant relies on a series of Court of Appeals cases holding that an unexcused violation of the one-year limit contained in MCL 771.1(2) results in the trial court losing jurisdiction to sentence a defendant.16 However, the action taken by the trial court in this case was not simply limited to abstaining from sentencing defendant Smith. There is simply no basis in our law for the trial court to do as it did in this case. Without citing a scintilla of legal authority, the trial court dismissed the case over the objection of the prosecutor. Aside from flagrantly ignoring contrary Court of Appeals precedent in entirely dismissing the case,17 the trial court usurped the prosecutor's role in violation of the separation of powers principles contained in our constitution.18 It is axiomatic that the power to determine whether to charge a defendant and what charge should be brought is an executive power, which vests exclusively in the prosecutor. 19 The trial court had no legal basis to trump the prosecutor's charging decision, much less dismiss the case after the defendant had pleaded to the charge and had never sought to withdraw his plea.
Furthermore, in so far as the Court of Appeals cases relied upon by defendant have construed MCL 771.1(2) to preclude sentencing when there is a failure to impose a sentence within 365 days of the imposition of a delayed sentence, those cases have incorrectly interpreted the statute. Nothing in the language of the statute requires this, and the Legislature is certainly capable of explicitly divesting a court of jurisdiction had such a remedy been intended.20 Indeed, the only mention of the word “jurisdiction” in the entire statutory provision simply clarifies that a court retains its ability to sentence a defendant at any time during the period of delay. The fact that the Legislature explicitly permits a court to sentence defendant at any time during the period of delay simply does not create...
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