People v. Smith, Docket No. 89414

• Decision Date: 23 September 1991
• Docket Number: Docket No. 89414
• Citation: 438 Mich. 715,475 N.W.2d 333
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rosie SMITH, Defendant-Appellee. 438 Mich. 715, 475 N.W.2d 333
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 333

475 N.W.2d 333

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rosie SMITH, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 89414

438 Mich. 715, 475 N.W.2d 333

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued April 3, 1991.

Decided Sept. 23, 1991.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, and John P. Puleo and Thomas Chambers, Asst. Pros. Attys., Detroit, for the People.

Marcia J. Covert, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

OPINION

LEVIN, Justice.

Rosie Smith escaped from a Michigan Department of Corrections facility. She was apprehended on a larceny charge, convicted, sentenced, and returned to a Michigan Department of Corrections facility to serve the sentence.

Smith was subsequently arraigned on a charge of prison escape, and pleaded guilty after her motion to quash the charge for violation of the 180-day rule ¹ was denied. Smith was sentenced to serve a term of six months to five years in prison consecutively to the sentence she was serving when she escaped and the sentence for the larceny offense.

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, ² holding that the plea of guilty did not waive application of the 180-day rule because the statute provides that when the rule is violated "no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction" to try the charged offense. ³

The people contend that Smith's unconditional guilty plea waived any claim she might otherwise assert that the 180-day rule barred prosecution on the charge of prison escape.

A predicate of Smith's claim is this Court's per curiam decision in People v. Woodruff, 414 Mich. 130, 323 N.W.2d 923 (1982), that the 180-day rule applies without regard to whether a concurrent or consecutive sentence is or might be imposed. We are now persuaded that Woodruff was incorrectly decided, and that the view expressed in People v. Loney, 12 Mich.App. 288, 292, 162 N.W.2d 832 (1968), ⁴ that the 180-day rule does not apply in such a case is correct: ⁵

"The purpose of the statute is clear. It was intended to give the inmate, who had pending offenses not yet tried, an opportunity to have the sentences run concurrently consistent with the principle of law disfavoring accumulations of sentences. This purpose, however, does not apply in the instance of a new offense committed after imprisonment, nor where the statute, as in the case of an escape or attempted escape, sets up a mandatory consecutive sentence. The legislature was not concerning itself with the need for dispatch in the handling of a charge brought against an inmate for offenses committed while in prison." (Emphasis in original.)

1988 P.A. 400 ⁶ amended the 180-day rule to provide that the rule does not apply to a charge of a criminal offense committed by an inmate while incarcerated in a correctional facility, or committed after the inmate has escaped from a facility and before the inmate has been returned to the custody of the Department of Corrections. ⁷

The Court of Appeals agreed with the prosecutor that Smith's unconditional plea of guilty waived any claim she might otherwise assert that her constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. Although this Court's order granting leave to appeal ⁸ was without limitation, we are now persuaded that this issue should not be further reviewed by this Court.

The Court of Appeals is reversed and the conviction is reinstated.

ROBERT P. GRIFFIN and MALLETT, JJ., concur.

BOYLE, Justice (concurring in the result).

I agree with Justice Brickley's analysis and conclusion that an unconditional guilty plea waives a claim of violation of the federal and Michigan constitutional right to a speedy trial, U.S. Const., Am. VI, Const. 1963, art. 1, Sec. 20.

I also concur in Justice Levin's conclusion that People v. Woodruff, 414 Mich. 130, 323 N.W.2d 923 (1982), was incorrectly decided and that the statutory 180-day rule, M.C.L. Sec. 780.131 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(1) et seq. does not apply to this case. However, I write separately to express my view that, assuming the applicability of the rule, a defendant's unconditional guilty plea will waive any claim of error based on its violation. The 180-day rule requires:

"Whenever the department of corrections receives notice that there is pending in this state any untried warrant, indictment, information, or complaint setting forth against any inmate of a correctional facility of this state a criminal offense for which a prison sentence might be imposed upon conviction, the inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint is pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of the inmate and a request for final disposition of the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint." M.C.L. Sec. 780.131; M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(1).

M.C.L. Sec. 780.133; M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(3) requires dismissal with prejudice where an action is not commenced within the 180-day time limit set forth in the act:

"In the event that, within the time limitation set forth in section 1 of this act, action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice." M.C.L. Sec. 780.133; M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(3).

When the statute is applicable as a threshold matter, an unconditional guilty plea waives the right to assert a violation of the 180-day rule.

It is generally stated that a guilty plea "waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings." People v. Alvin Johnson, 396 Mich. 424, 440, 240 N.W.2d 729 (1976), cert. den. sub. nom. Michigan v. Johnson, 429 U.S. 951, 97 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed.2d 319 (1976). In People v. New, 427 Mich. 482, 398 N.W.2d 358 (1986), we elaborated on the meaning of this statement, drawing from the United States Supreme Court cases of Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973), and Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62, n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241, 242 n. 2, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975). The Court quoted from Menna as follows:

" 'Neither Tollett v Henderson, 411 US 258 (1973), nor our earlier cases on which it relied, e.g., Brady v United States, 397 US 742 [90 S Ct 1463, 25 L Ed 2d 747] (1970), and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, [90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763] (1970), stand for the proposition that counseled guilty pleas inevitably "waive" all antecedent constitutional violations. If they did so hold, the New York Court of Appeals might be correct. However, in Tollett we emphasized that waiver was not the basic ingredient of this line of cases, 411 US [at] 266 . The point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case. In most cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis for the State's imposition of punishment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is validly established.' " New, supra, pp 487-488 .

The Court in New held that a defendant could raise only such rights and defenses as "would preclude the state from obtaining a valid conviction against the defendant." Id. at 491, 398 N.W.2d 358. The New Court reasoned:

"Such rights and defenses 'reach beyond the factual determination of defendant's guilt and implicate the very authority of the state to bring a defendant to trial....' [People v ] White, 411 Mich 398 [308 NW2d 128 (1981) ] (Moody, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In such cases, the state has no legitimate interest in securing a conviction. On the other hand, where the defense or right asserted by defendant relates solely to the capacity of the state to prove defendant's factual guilt, it is subsumed by defendant's guilty plea." Id. at 491 .

Thus, the shorthand question whether violation of the 180-day rule is a "jurisdictional defect" which cannot be waived, may be rephrased as whether the statutory 180-day rule implicates the very authority of the state to bring defendant to trial.

This requires examination of the object of the statute and the harm it is designed to remedy. The title of the act indicates that its purpose is "to dispose of untried warrants, indictments, informations or complaints against inmates of penal institutions of this state." We stated in People v. Hill, 402 Mich. 272, 282, 262 N.W.2d 641 (1978), that "[a] defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial is legislatively observed in ... the 180-day statute, which specifically addressed speedy trial rights of those already incarcerated in state prison...." I find these purposes wholly consistent with one another. The disposition of untried warrants against prisoners, obviously a desirable aim, has the further purpose of protecting the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. Neither of these interests concerns the very authority of the state to prosecute. The speedy trial right primarily seeks to protect the integrity of the factual determination of guilt or innocence, a question definitively settled by a counseled and voluntary plea of guilty. Especially in view of the clear rule that the constitutional speedy trial right is waived by a valid plea of guilty, Tiemens v. United States, 724 F.2d 928 (C.A.11, 1984), cert. den. 469 U.S. 837, 105 S.Ct. 134, 83 L.Ed.2d 74 (1984), it would be anomalous to hold that the statutory right could never be waived. The state's interest in the expeditious disposition of untried warrants against...