People v. Smith

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.
• Citation: People v. Smith, 2015 IL App (4th) 130453-U, NO. 4-13-0453 (Ill. App. Jul 07, 2015)
• Decision Date: 07 July 2015
• Docket Number: NO. 4-13-0453,4-13-0453
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MATTHEW SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.

2015 IL App (4th) 130453-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MATTHEW SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-13-0453

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

July 7, 2015

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from Circuit Court of Livingston County

No. 12CF15

Honorable Jennifer H. Bauknecht, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Knecht and Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, concluding the trial court (1) substantially complied with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401 (eff. July 1, 1984) in admonishing defendant regarding his waiver of counsel, (2) did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress his confession, and (3) improperly sentenced defendant as a Class X offender.

¶ 2 In January 2012, the State charged defendant, Matthew Smith, with aggravated battery to a corrections officer, a Class 2 felony (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i), (h) (West 2010)). In April 2012, defendant waived his right to counsel after being admonished pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 1984) that he was eligible for mandatory Class X sentencing due to his prior criminal convictions. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2010). The same month, defendant filed a motion to suppress an incriminating statement he made to a corrections officer, which the trial court subsequently denied in August 2012.

¶ 3 Following an April 2013 trial, a jury found defendant guilty and, in May 2013, the trial court sentenced him as a Class X offender to six years in the Department of Corrections (DOC).

¶ 4 Defendant appeals, asserting the trial court erred by (1) improperly admonishing him regarding his waiver of counsel, (2) denying his motion to suppress his confession, and (3) improperly sentencing him as a Class X offender.

¶ 5 We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

¶ 6 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 7 In January 2012, the State charged defendant by indictment with the offense of aggravated battery, a Class 2 felony (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i), (h) (West 2010), alleging, on September 2, 2011, defendant, an inmate at the Pontiac Correctional Center (Pontiac), threw an unknown liquid on corrections officer Jody Davis. That same month, the State filed notice that defendant was eligible for mandatory Class X sentencing pursuant to section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2010)). At the time, defendant was 20 years old, as his date of birth is September 24, 1991.

¶ 8 In April 2012, defendant, still 20 years old, expressed his desire to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. The trial court asked defendant several questions regarding his level of education and experience, and defendant responded he attended school through the ninth grade and could read and write. He had represented himself in criminal proceedings previously, but not during a trial. He further indicated he understood he was charged with aggravated battery of a corrections officer, a Class 2 felony. The court explained defendant was subject to mandatory Class X sentencing if convicted, which meant he faced a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years in DOC, and defendant indicated he understood. The court also noted any sentencedefendant received would run consecutively to his ongoing DOC sentences. Finally, the court admonished defendant as to the benefit of having trained, experienced counsel to represent him, and that the court could not assist him with his defense. Following these admonishments, defendant waived his right to counsel.

¶ 9 On the same date, defendant, pro se, filed a motion to suppress an incriminating statement he made to corrections officer Robert Snyder, as he was not read his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In August 2012, the motion to suppress proceeded to a hearing, at which time the parties offered the following evidence.

¶ 10 Officer Snyder testified he was an investigator for the internal-affairs unit at Pontiac. Officer Snyder explained, in September 2011, he interviewed defendant regarding an allegation that defendant threw an unknown liquid at Officer Davis. Officer Snyder, wearing his corrections uniform, escorted defendant from his cell in segregation to an interview room in the health unit, which consisted of a small room with a single exit, fluorescent lighting, a desk, and two chairs. Defendant remained handcuffed during the interview, though Officer Snyder stated inmates were always handcuffed upon leaving their cells, including while walking to the shower or exercise yard. Officer Snyder indicated he did not read defendant any Miranda warnings before interviewing him. Officer Snyder stated, at the time he interviewed defendant, he was concerned for Officer Davis' health and safety, as the nature of the substance thrown at Officer Davis was unknown. The interview lasted approximately 10 minutes, during which time defendant admitted assaulting Officer Davis after the officer failed to provide defendant with his weekly shower. Officer Snyder testified he interviewed defendant in anticipation of filing a prison disciplinary action against defendant, not to pursue criminal charges. He said he did notpressure defendant to answer in a certain way, nor did he tell defendant he could not leave unless he confessed.

¶ 11 Following the hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress, finding Officer Snyder was conducting an investigation, not an interrogation. The court also pointed out defendant was interviewed in a less restrictive environment than the segregation unit in which he was housed, which demonstrated he was not "in custody" for purposes of Miranda. Additionally, the court found any statements defendant made to Snyder were knowingly and voluntarily made.

¶ 12 In April 2013, defendant's case proceeded to a jury trial. Following the presentation of evidence, including defendant's statement to Officer Snyder, the jury returned a guilty verdict. In May 2013, the trial court sentenced defendant as a Class X offender to six years in DOC.

¶ 13 This appeal followed.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by (1) improperly admonishing him regarding his waiver of counsel, (2) denying his motion to suppress his confession, and (3) improperly sentencing him as a Class X offender. We address these arguments in turn.

¶ 16 A. Waiver of Counsel

¶ 17 Defendant first asserts the trial court's admonishments regarding the waiver of counsel were insufficient under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 1984). Defendant concedes this issue was not raised or preserved at trial, but he seeks plain-error review under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine. Ordinarily, a defendant's failure to preserve an issue before the trial court results in forfeiture. People v. Morgan, 385 Ill. App. 3d 771, 773,896 N.E.2d 417, 419 (2008). However, where the defendant challenges a fundamental right, such as the right to counsel, we may review the court's order for plain error. People v. Vernón, 396 Ill. App. 3d 145, 150, 919 N.E.2d 966, 973 (2009). Under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) a clear or obvious error occurred, and (2) the error is so serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence, that it affects the fairness of the trial and raises questions as to the very integrity of the judicial process. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565, 870 N.E.2d 403, 410-11 (2007). The Illinois Supreme Court has "equated the second prong of plain-error review with structural error," which, when found, requires reversal. People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613, 939 N.E.2d 403, 413 (2010).

¶ 18 Having established the appropriate standard of review, we now turn to the merits of defendant's argument.

¶ 19 When a defendant chooses to exercise his right to waive counsel, the trial court must admonish him pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401 (eff. July 1, 1984). Rule 401 states, in relevant part:

"(a) Waiver of Counsel. Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands the following:

(1) the nature of the charge;

(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when applicable, thepenalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and

(3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel appointed for him by the court." Ill. S. Ct. R. 401 (eff. July 1, 1984).

The purpose of Rule 401 is to ensure that a defendant knowingly and intelligently makes a waiver of counsel. People v. Campbell, 224 Ill. 2d 80, 84, 730, 862 N.E.2d 933, 936 (2006).

¶ 20 At issue here is the trial court's admonishment under subsection (a)(2). Defendant asserts the trial court failed to properly admonish him as to the appropriate minimum and maximum sentences, thus rendering his waiver invalid. We begin by determining whether the court committed a clear or obvious error by admonishing defendant that he was eligible for mandatory Class X sentencing.

¶ 21 1. Whether Defendant Was Eligible for Class X Sentencing

¶ 22 Section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified Code provides:

"When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, after having twice been convicted in any state or federal court of an offense that contains the same elements as an offense now (the date the Class 1 or Class 2 felony was committed) classified in Illinois as a Class 2 or greater Class

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