People v. Smith

• Court: California Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Baxter
• Citation: People v. Smith, 124 P.3d 730, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 37 Cal.4th 733 (Cal. 2005)
• Decision Date: 29 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. S123074.,S123074.
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jarmaal Laronde SMITH, Defendant and Appellant.

37 Cal.Rptr.3d 163

37 Cal.4th 733

124 P.3d 730

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jarmaal Laronde SMITH, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S123074.

Supreme Court of California

December 29, 2005.

Gregory Marshall, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Janis Shank McLean, Janet E. Neeley, Stephen G. Herndon and Rachelle A. Newcomb, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

BAXTER, J.

The defendant in this case challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of two counts of attempted murder where he fired a single bullet into a slowly moving vehicle, narrowly missing a mother and her infant son. The evidence showed that the mother, who was known to defendant and was driving, and her baby, who was secured in a car seat directly behind her, were each in defendant's line of fire when he fired a single .38-caliber round at them from behind the car as it pulled away from the curb. The bullet shattered the rear windshield, narrowly missed both the mother and baby, passed through the mother's headrest, and lodged in the driver's side door.

On appeal, defendant contends his conviction of the attempted murder of the baby must be reversed for lack of substantial evidence that he harbored the requisite specific intent to kill the child. We disagree. Under the applicable deferential standard of review, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict finding defendant acted with intent to kill the baby as well as the mother. The fact that only a single bullet was fired into the vehicle does not, as a matter of law, compel a different conclusion. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal shall be affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the afternoon of February 18, 2000, Karen A. drove her boyfriend, Renell T., Sr. (Renell), to a friend's house on Greenholme Lane in Sacramento. She was driving her four-door Chevy Lumina, with Renell seated in the front passenger seat and their three-month-old baby, Renell T., Jr., secured in a rear-facing infant car seat in the backseat directly behind her. She parked alongside the curb on the street in front of the house, and Renell got out of the car. As Karen waited in the car to make sure Renell's friend was home, she saw defendant approaching from behind. Karen recognized defendant as a former friend. She had last spoken to him during a telephone conversation eight to nine months earlier during which he had told her the next time he saw her he would "slap the shit out of [her]."

Defendant walked up to the open front passenger window of Karen's car, looked inside and said, "Don't I know you, bitch?" Overhearing the statement, Renell turned around from the walkway leading to the house and said, "Well, you don't know me." As Renell walked back toward the car, defendant lifted his shirt to display a handgun tucked in his waistband. Renell said, "It is cool," and backed away from defendant. According to Karen, group of men on the street corner began approaching the car, and as Renell was entering the vehicle through the front passenger door, defendant and the other men began hitting him.

As soon as Renell was securely inside the car, Karen started to pull away from the curb. After driving about one car length, she looked in her rearview mirror and saw defendant standing "[s]traight behind" her holding a gun. She heard a single gunshot, and although she did not see defendant pull the trigger, he was the only person she had seen with a gun. The bullet shattered the rear windshield, narrowly missed both Karen and the baby, passed through the driver's headrest, and lodged in the driver's side door. As soon as Karen reached a place of safety, she stopped to check the baby for injuries. He was screaming, his face covered with pieces of broken glass.

Renell's testimony generally corroborated Karen's testimony. He declined to identify defendant as the assailant because he did not want to be a snitch, but identified the assailant's gun as a .38-caliber revolver. After the shooting, a Sacramento County deputy sheriff searched defendant's room at his mother's home and recovered two .38-caliber shell casings.

Defendant testified he was unarmed on the day of the shooting, and that it was Renell who had displayed a gun during the confrontation. He claimed that Karen was his ex-girlfriend and that he had spoken to her over the telephone the day before the shooting. During this conversation, defendant told Karen the next time he saw her he would "slap the shit out of [her]." Karen hung up, and then Renell called back and threatened to "smoke" defendant. Defendant suggested he and Renell meet on Greenholme Lane the next day. When Renell arrived at the agreed location with Karen and the baby, defendant approached the car, saw Karen and the baby inside, and said "What are you doing here, bitch?" Renell got out of the car, and defendant challenged him to a fistfight. Renell responded by pulling a semiautomatic handgun from his waistband. Although Renell did not fire, defendant heard a shot, hit the ground, heard several more shots and heard glass shattering. Defendant saw two .38-caliber casings lying on the ground, picked them up, put them in his pocket and brought them to his mother's house.

Defendant was charged by information with the attempted murder of Karen A. (Pen.Code, §§ 664, 187 — count I),¹ the attempted murder of the baby (§§ 664, 187 — count II), shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246 — count III), child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a) — count IV), and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2) — count V). The jury convicted defendant on all counts, finding, with respect to counts I and II, that he had personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and with respect to counts III, IV and V, that he had personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)).

Defendant was sentenced to state prison for 27 years for the attempted murder of Karen — consisting of the middle term of seven years for the attempted murder and a 20-year firearm-use enhancement — to be served concurrently with an identical 27-year term for the attempted murder of the baby. The court stayed sentencing on the remaining counts pursuant to section 654.

The Court of Appeal rejected defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of the attempted murder of the baby. We granted defendant's petition for review.

DISCUSSION

Defendant does not challenge his conviction of the attempted murder of Karen. A. But he argues his conviction of the attempted murder of the baby must be reversed because, as stated in his opening brief, "only a single attempted murder conviction was possible on the facts here." Specifically, defendant asserts that the fact that he fired only one bullet into the vehicle reflects his intent to kill only one victim — Karen A. He urges that "there was no proof of animus toward the baby," and argues his conviction of the attempted murder of that victim must be reversed for lack of substantial evidence that he harbored specific intent to kill the child.

In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing court's role is a limited one. "`The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]'" (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 864 P.2d 103; see Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.)

"`Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness's credibility for that of the fact finder. [Citations.]' (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314, 270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643.)" (People v. Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1206, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 864 P.2d 103.)

We first consider the mental state required for conviction of attempted murder. "The mental state required for attempted murder has long differed from that required for murder itself. Murder does not require the intent to kill. Implied malice — a conscious disregard for life — suffices. (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 107, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 999 P.2d 666.)" (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 327, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107 (Bland).) In contrast, "[a]ttempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing." (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 402, 74 P.3d 176; see People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 604-605, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994.) Hence, in order for defendant to be convicted of the attempted murder of the baby, the prosecution had to prove he acted with specific intent to kill that victim. (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 331, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107.)

Intent to unlawfully kill and express malice are, in essence, "one and the same." (People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1114, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588.) To be guilty of attempted murder of the baby, defendant had to harbor express malice toward that victim. (People v. Swain, supra, 12...