People v. Smith

• Decision Date: 05 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. 116572.,116572.
• Citation: 26 N.E.3d 335
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Mickey D. SMITH, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

26 N.E.3d 335

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant

v.Mickey D. SMITH, Appellee.

No. 116572.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 5, 2015.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and James W. Glasgow, State's Attorney, of Joliet (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Stephen M. Soltanzadeh, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Terry A. Mertel and Nadia L. Chaudhry, of the Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Peter A. Carusona, Deputy Defender, and Mario Kladis, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In People v. White, 2011 IL 109616, 352 Ill.Dec. 159, 953 N.E.2d 398, this court held that when the factual basis for a plea agreement which is accepted by the circuit court establishes that the defendant is subject to a mandatory sentencing enhancement, the court must impose it, even if the plea agreement between the State and the defendant included the condition that the State would not pursue the enhancement. At issue in this appeal is whether our holding in White applies retroactively to convictions which were final at the time White was decided. We conclude that it does not.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The defendant, Mickey D. Smith, was charged in a three-count indictment with the first degree murder of Douglas White. Count I alleged that defendant, without lawful justification and with intent to cause great bodily harm, shot White in the back with a handgun thereby causing his death. See 720 ILCS 5/9–1(a)(1) (West 2010). Count II alleged that defendant shot White with a handgun without justification knowing such act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. See 720 ILCS 5/9–1(a)(2) (West 2010). Count III alleged that defendant was an armed habitual criminal. See 720 ILCS 5/24–1.7 (West 2010). Subsequently, the State filed a “Notice of Intent to Enhance Sentencing Upon Conviction” in which it indicated that it intended to seek a sentencing enhancement of 25 years to natural life imprisonment on the ground that defendant murdered White by discharging a firearm. See 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2010).

¶ 4 As part of a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to first degree murder under count II. In exchange, the State dismissed counts I and III, recommended a sentence of 30 years' imprisonment, and withdrew its notice of intent to seek the firearm sentencing enhancement. The factual basis presented by the State in support of the plea established that defendant, while armed with a handgun, entered a garage where White was found. Once inside the garage, defendant fired a single shot, killing White. During admonitions, the circuit court advised defendant that the State was withdrawing its notice of intent to seek the firearm enhancement and that defendant was therefore eligible for a sentence of 20 to 60 years. The circuit court accepted defendant's guilty plea and imposed a sentence of 30 years' imprisonment. Defendant did not file a direct appeal.

¶ 5 Defendant thereafter filed a pro se postconviction petition in which he alleged that his sentence and guilty plea were void under this court's decision in White, 2011 IL 109616, 352 Ill.Dec. 159, 953 N.E.2d 398, because his sentence did not include the statutory firearm enhancement. The circuit court of Will County summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous or patently without merit. Defendant appealed.

¶ 6 The appellate court reversed and remanded. 2013 IL App (3d) 110738, 373 Ill.Dec. 283, 993 N.E.2d 589. The appellate court concluded that defendant's sentence and plea were void under White because the factual basis for defendant's plea established that a firearm was used in the murder, thereby requiring the imposition of the firearm sentencing enhancement (730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2010)). The appellate court noted that the firearm enhancement statute required a 25–year prison term in addition to the minimum 20–year prison term for murder and, thus, the minimum required sentence for defendant's crime was 45 years' imprisonment. Defendant's 30–year term fell below that statutory minimum and, therefore, according to the appellate court, was unauthorized and void.

¶ 7 In so holding, the appellate court rejected the State's argument that White did not apply to defendant's case under the rationale of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), which was adopted by this court in People v. Flowers, 138 Ill.2d 218, 149 Ill.Dec. 304, 561 N.E.2d 674 (1990). Teague provides that, with two exceptions, a new rule of criminal procedure does not apply to cases that are already final at the time the judicial decision establishing the new rule is entered. Defendant's conviction was final at the time White was decided, but the appellate court concluded that White did not establish a new rule of law. The appellate court determined that “White did not break new ground or impose a new obligation,” but merely “relied upon existing precedent, which set out the long-standing rule that courts are not authorized to impose a sentence that does not conform to statutory guidelines, because a sentence not authorized by law is void.” 2013 IL App (3d) 110738, ¶ 12, 373 Ill.Dec. 283, 993 N.E.2d 589. Finding that White did not establish a new rule, the appellate court concluded that it applied to defendant's conviction. The appellate court therefore reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the cause to permit defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial. The State subsequently filed a petition for leave to appeal in this court which we allowed. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013).

¶ 8 ANALYSIS

¶ 9 The Post–Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq. (West 2010)), “provides a method by which persons under criminal sentence in this state can assert that their convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights under the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution or both.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d 1, 9, 332 Ill.Dec. 318, 912 N.E.2d 1204 (2009). Petitions filed under the Act are reviewed in three stages. Id. at 10, 332 Ill.Dec. 318, 912 N.E.2d 1204. At the first stage, the circuit court must independently review the petition to determine whether it is “frivolous or is patently without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122–2.1(a)(2) (West 2010). If the court determines that the petition is either frivolous or patently without merit, the court must dismiss the petition in a written order. 725 ILCS 5/122–2.1(a)(2) (West 2010). We review de novo the circuit court's summary dismissal of a postconviction petition.

People v. Morris, 236 Ill.2d 345, 354, 338 Ill.Dec. 863, 925 N.E.2d 1069 (2010).

¶ 10 Initially, the State contends that White did not establish a constitutional rule of criminal procedure. Therefore, according to the State, defendant's petition does not present a constitutional claim which is cognizable under the Act and the circuit court properly dismissed the petition.

¶ 11 In White, the defendant pleaded guilty to first degree murder and possession of contraband, and was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 28 years for murder and 4 years for possession. White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 4, 352 Ill.Dec. 159, 953 N.E.2d 398. The factual basis for the defendant's plea established that the victim was shot with a handgun. Id. ¶ 6. On direct appeal in this court, the defendant argued that his sentence was void because it did not include a mandatory firearm enhancement (730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a) (West 2004)). The State maintained, however, that the parties' plea agreement had included the condition that the enhancement would not be included. We thus identified the issue presented as follows: “When the factual basis entered for a guilty plea makes it clear that a defendant is subject to a mandatory sentencing enhancement, may the trial court enter judgment imposing a sentence that does not include the enhancement on the basis that the enhancement was excluded by the parties from the plea agreement?” White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 1, 352 Ill.Dec. 159, 953 N.E.2d 398. We answered that question in the negative.

¶ 12 We first noted the circuit court has no authority to impose a sentence that does not conform to statutory guidelines and, thus, exceeds its authority when it orders a lesser or greater sentence. “In such a case, the defendant's sentence is illegal and void.” Id. ¶ 20 (citing People v. Arna, 168 Ill.2d 107, 113, 212 Ill.Dec. 963, 658 N.E.2d 445 (1995) ). We then pointed out that the legislature had imposed a specific requirement upon the circuit court for an enhanced sentence when a firearm was used in the offense at issue. Id. ¶ 21. Because the factual basis accepted by the court established that a firearm had been used, and because defendant's sentence did not include the statutory enhancement, we concluded the sentence was void. Moreover, because the defendant had not been properly admonished as to the proper sentencing range, his plea agreement also had to be set aside. Id.

¶ 13 The State maintained, however, that the general rule prohibiting a sentence outside the statutory sentencing range did not control where the parties agreed not to include the enhancement. We disagreed, finding that “[e]ven when a defendant, prosecutor, and court agree on a sentence, the court cannot give the sentence effect if it is not authorized by law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 23.

¶ 14 The State further contended that because it has the exclusive discretion to decide which criminal charges shall be brought, or whether to prosecute at all, it had the authority to negotiate a sentence that did not include the enhancement. We again disagreed. We did not dispute that the State has the...