People v. Smith

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WIEST
• Citation: People v. Smith, 224 N.W. 402, 246 Mich. 393 (Mich. 1929)
• Decision Date: 29 March 1929
• Docket Number: No. 150.,150.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. SMITH.

246 Mich. 393

224 N.W. 402

PEOPLE

v.SMITH.

No. 150.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 29, 1929.

Error to Recorder's Court of Detroit; W. McKay Skillman, Judge.

Mamie Smith was charged by information with inducing a certain female to become an inmate of house of prostitution, with receiving moneys from the earnings of a prostitute, and deriving support and maintenance therefrom. To review a judgment of the recorder discharging defendant, the People bring error. Reversed, with direction to reinstate the information and proceed to trial.

Argued before the Entire Bench, except POTTER, J. Robert M. Toms, Pros. Atty., of Detroit, for the People.

Chawke & Sloan, of Detroit, for appellee.

WIEST, J.

An information, filed in the recorder's court of the city of Detroit, charged defendant with inducing, persuading, and encouraging Peggy Sullivan to become an inmate of a house of prostitution, with receiving money from the earnings of a prostitute, and deriving support and maintenance therefrom. The recorder held the statute, under which the prosecution was laid, unconstitutional and discharged defendant. The people review by writ of error under Act 159, Public Acts 1917 (1922 Supp. C. L. § 15842(1).

Act No. 37, Public Acts 1927, is an amendment of former acts, denounces specified conduct, and provides a penalty for violations. The act denounces: (1) Procuring a female inmate for a house of prostitution; (2) inducing a female person to become a prostitute; (3) or to become an inmate of a house of prostitution; (4) taking a female person to or receiving or harboring her in a house of prostitution; (5) inducing or procuring a female to come into or leave this state for the purpose of prostitution; (6) taking or detaining a female with intent to compel her, by force, threats, or duress, to marry him or another, or to be defiled; (7) under pretense of marriage taking a female for the purpose of sexual intercourse; (8) receiving or giving money or thing of value for procuring a female to become a prostitute; (9) or to come into or leave this state for the purpose of prostitution; (10) knowingly accepting money from the earnings of a prostitute; (11) one supported by a prostitute from her earnings, or loans by a keeper of a house of prostitution or assignation. The title to the act states the purpose to be legislation relative to pandering, to define and prohibit pandering and provide punishment therefor.

Counsel for defendant point to offenses enumerated in the statute in no wise related to pandering, and therefor not within the purview of the title. The prosecuting attorney, without conceding the point, makes reply that defendant is not charged with any such offense, but with clear acts of pandering, and she may not have the whole act held bad for something therein with which she is not concerned. It must be conceded that the act denounces several offenses having no relation to pandering, according to the commonly accepted meaning thereof.

The term ‘pandering’ is an old one. Shakespeare in Troilus and Cressida has Pandarus say: ‘* * * Since I have taken such pains to bring you together, let all pitiful goers-between be called to the world's end after my name, call them all-Pandars.’ Skeat, in his Etymological Dictionary, states: ‘Pander, Pandar, a pimp, * * * a personal name. * * *’ This comports with the common understanding that a panderer is one who ministers to the evil passions of others; in short, a procurer.

We do not intend to split hairs over the meaning of the term, and would feel bound to accept a legislative definition, if indulged even though at variance with common understanding and all lexicographers; but when the Legislature employs a common term as indicative of the purpose of an enactment, without further definition or designation, we must let the term speak its ordinary sense.

The conduct stated in the act, and numbered above as 6, 7, 10, and 11, are not acts of pandering. No. 6 states a crime against a person, and has been a criminal offense, covered by statute in this state, for over 70 years. See C. L. 1915, §§ 15213, 15214. No. 7 states a common-law crime involving fraud, fornication, or lewdness. Nos. 10 and 11 mention offenses punished for years in this state by statute. See C. L. 1915, § 15496. Of course, the Legislature may re-enact or duplicate statutes, and fit new names to old offenses; but the purpose to do so must appear, not only in the title, but as well in the enactment. The title to the act in question does not indicate the dragnet purpose indulged in the body of the enactment, and we would shear the act to fit the title and save as much of it as possible, were it not for a more serious...